Individual Values In Organizations 1

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Journal of Management 1998, Vol. 24, No. 3, 351-389
Individual Values in Organizations: Concepts, Controversies, and Research
Bruce M. Meglino Elizabeth C. Ravlin
University of South Carolina
The values of managers and employees in organizations are phenomena that have captured the interest of researchers, practitioners, social critics, and the public at large. Despite this attention, there continues to be a conspicuous lack of agreement on what values are and how they influence individuals. In this article we discuss how values have been defined and conceptualized. Focusing on values as desirable modes of behavior, we describe how they affect individuals in organiza­tions and discuss some of the salient controversies that characterize contemporary research on values. Finally, we report on a comprehen­sive review of the most recent literature in this area.
Values occupy a prominent place in the scientific and public discourse at a number of levels. They are "among the very few social psychological concepts that have been successfully employed across all social science disciplines" (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989, p. 775). Values are believed to have a substan­tial influence on the affective and behavioral responses of individuals (Locke, 1976; Rokeach, 1973), and changing values are frequently evoked as explanations for a variety of social ills (Etzioni, 1993), employee problems in the workplace (Nord, Brief, Atieh, & Doherty, 1988), and a purported increase in unethical busi­ness practices (Mitchell & Scott, 1990). At the organizational level, values are viewed as a major component of organizational culture (O 'Reilly & Chatman, 1996; Schein, 1985), and are often described as principles responsible for the successful management of a number of companies (e.g., Mitchell & Oneal, 1994). Values have also been characterized as "the most distinctive property or defining characteristic of a social institution" (Rokeach, 1979, p. 51).
Despite their popularity, there is a lack of consensus on the nature of values themselves. Among other things, values have been considered as needs, personal­ity types, motivations, goals, utilities, attitudes, interests, and nonexistent mental entities. This lack of agreement (see e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach & Ball-
Direct all correspondence to: Bruce M. Meglino, The Darla Moore School of Business, University of South Caro­lina Columbia, South Carolina 29208; e-mail <meglino@darla.badm.sc.edu>.
Copyright © 1998 by JAI Press Inc. 0149-2063
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Rokeach, 1989; Williams, 1979) has created problems in interpreting the results of various studies, and has prompted calls for greater unanimity on how values are conceptualized, defined, and measured in organizational research (Connor & Becker, 1975, 1994).
In this article we will attempt to provide some coherence on the issue of values by (a) describing how theorists have conceptualized values, (b) discuss­ing some of the major controversies that surround values research, and (c) reviewing the recent literature on values in organizations. Because the space allotted to this article is extremely small when weighed against the diversity of the values literature, we were required to make a number of decisions about what to emphasize. In doing so, we focused on (a) the preponderance of theoret­ical views and (b) the utility of concepts for management and organizational behavior. Although we attempted to make these decisions objectively, we should state that we have previously taken positions on a number of controver­sial issues dealt with here (e.g., Meglino, 1996; Ravlin, 1995). Thus, it is likely that our prior work has had some influence on our present treatment of the issues discussed below.
Scope and limitations of this review
As noted later, our primary focus will be on processes related to values as desirable modes of behavior. Not wanting to introduce an "ecological" error (Robinson, 1950), we will not consider studies in which both the inde­pendent and dependent variables are operationalized at an aggregate (e.g., group, organizational) level of analysis. We will also exclude studies of values that underlie a particular orientation or philosophy (e.g., organizational development).
Although we will introduce examples and draw on theoretical work with deeper historical roots, we will concentrate on empirical studies that have been published between 1987 and 1997. While this decision was primarily motivated by space limitations, it may have additional significance. Nord et al. (1988) main­tain that prevailing work conditions influence the values that managers and social scientists choose to emphasize. Thus, because the work environment has substan­tially changed in recent years, examining studies over a longer period of time could provide a misleading view of contemporary research issues. For example, as discussed later in this review, research on the Protestant Work Ethic has sharply declined recently. Because this value emphasizes the importance of hard work at jobs that may be devoid of any intrinsic meaning (see Nord et al., 1988), this change in research emphasis may have been precipitated by a change in the structure of work toward more knowledge-based jobs that emphasize greater worker control (see Howard, 1995).
In the following sections, we will discuss the nature of values, how individ­ual differences in values arise, the stability of values, the effects of values and value similarity, and controversies surrounding values and values research. Lastly, we will review the contemporary values literature, and provide a summa­tion of current knowledge.
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Value Concepts
What are values?
As noted earlier, values have been conceptualized in different ways. At the most basic level, theoreticians (e.g., Fallding, 1965; Rokeach, 1973; Williams, 1968) have focused on two types of values. One type is the value that an individ­ual places on an object or outcome (e.g., the value one places on pay). As with the valence term used in expectancy models of motivation (e.g., Vroom, 1964), these objects or outcomes acquire value through their instrumental relationship with other objects or outcomes which, in turn, are instrumental to still other objects or outcomes. Because valuing an object in this way requires calculations that are beyond an individual 's capabilities, this process is probably more subconscious or automatic than active (see Locke, 1975).
A second type of value is more likely to be used to describe a person as opposed to an object (Feather, 1995). These values have been further subdivided into instrumental and terminal values (Rokeach, 1973). Terminal values are self-sufficient end-states of existence that a person strives to achieve (e.g., a comfort­able life, wisdom). As the name implies, a distinguishing feature of terminal values is that they are pursued for their own sake. Instrumental values are modes of behavior (e.g., honesty, helpfulness) rather than states of existence. Rokeach has proposed a functional relationship between instrumental and terminal values wherein instrumental values describe behaviors that facilitate the attainment of terminal values.
The two types of values described above are often identified using terms such as the value "inherent in an object" and the values "possessed by a person" (see Rokeach, 1973). It is important to recognize, however, that objects or outcomes do not possess innate value apart from the value attached to them by persons. Thus, the locus of both types of values is within the individual.
Because of space limitations, we will focus on values applied to individuals, as opposed to the value placed on objects or outcomes. In this respect, we reflect the views of Rokeach (1973) and Williams (1968), who maintain that this approach is more appropriate for social analysis because it provides information that is more central to the individual. It is also more parsimonious because there are far fewer values that describe individuals than there are objects or outcomes to be valued. Thus, this view facilitates the development of common measuring instruments. Moreover, research indicates a correspondence between these two types of values such that the values held by a person will influence the value he or she places on certain objects or outcomes (Feather, 1995; Prentice, 1987). There­fore, a deeper understanding of the values held by individuals may provide a better understanding of the value placed on objects or outcomes.
Our reading of the current literature in organizational behavior indicates a greater focus on values as modes of behavior (instrumental values) as opposed to end-states of existence (terminal values). We, therefore, concentrate on values that indicate modes of behavior. Also, in contrast to end-states of existence, modes of behavior have more in common with values as they are used by researchers and practitioners to describe an organization 's culture (Schein, 1985).
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We should note that in selecting studies to include in this review it was sometimes difficult to separate values as modes of behavior (e.g., achievement) from values as outcomes (e.g., the feeling of achievement associated with a partic­ular job). In such cases, we relied on the context to make this distinction. That is, we included studies where the context indicated a mode of behavior characteristic of an individual, but excluded them when the value was descriptive of an object (e.g., a job).
Having limited our attention to modes of behavior, we next consider a distinctive characteristic of values, namely "oughtness." This term indicates that values specify an individual 's personal beliefs about how he or she "should" or "ought" to behave. That is, a person 's values do not necessarily reflect how he or she wants or desires to behave, but rather, they describe his or her internalized interpretations about socially desirable ways to fulfill his or her needs (Kluck-hohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Williams, 1968, 1979). This distinction derives from values being partially influenced by culture. That is, values "define the limits of permissible cost of an expressional gratification.. .by evoking the consequences of such action for other parts of the system" (Kluckhohn, p. 394). Hence, an individ­ual 's values may induce him or her to help another person, even when an alterna­tive behavior would provide greater pleasure, because the benefits to the broader society outweigh the inconvenience to the individual (see Simon, 1990 for a discussion of this process as it relates to altruistic forms of behavior). The social aspect of values is evident in that individuals experience guilt when they act inconsistently with social expectations that they endorse (Kluckhohn, 1951). In light of the above, we define a value as "a person 's internalized belief about how he or she should or ought to behave" (Ravlin, 1995). If one is particularly concerned about behavior at work, then we would add the qualifier "at work" to the previous definition (Meglino, 1996). These beliefs are inculcated in cognition as elements of the ideal self-schema (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) as opposed to the actual self.
What is responsible for observed similarities and differences in values?
Numerous possibilities have been offered to explain similarities and differ­ences in the values held by individuals. One suggestion derives from the belief that values are "founded, in part, upon the fundamental biological similarities of all human beings" (Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 418). Support for this proposition was found in a recent study of twins reared apart, which concluded that 40% of the variance in work values could be accounted for by genetic factors (Keller, Bouchard, Arvey, Segal & Dawis, 1992). Another proposition is that individuals, in part, rely on values as a means to justify their behavior (Nord et al., 1988). Thus, some variance in values could be the direct result of differences in individu­als ' behavior.
By far, the most frequently evoked reason for similarities and differences m values is that they are influenced by personal experiences and exposure to more formal socialization forces (Bern, 1970; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Rokeach, 1973). This is not surprising given that most theorists see values as products of a culture or social system. Thus, individuals learn, through both formal and informal
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means, to behave in ways that are appropriate in their social environment. In the case of general social values, this process takes place early in life. In the case of values that are relevant to specific social institutions or work organizations, it primarily occurs during the organizational entry and socialization processes. We should note that Locke and Woiceshyn (1995) have expressed a different view. They see "moral values" or "virtues" (what we have identified as "values") as products of an individual 's reason directed toward his or her individual survival as opposed to societal survival.
Although a detailed description of socialization is beyond the scope of this article, two characteristics of this process have important implications for under­standing similarities and differences in values. The first is that values "are initially taught and learned in isolation from other values in an absolute, all-or-none manner" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 6). That is, rather than placing qualifications on value-related behavior (e.g., being honest some of the time), the social environ­ment teaches individuals that they "should" or "ought" to exhibit such behaviors all of the time. In addition, there appear to be differences in individuals ' receptiv­ity to these socialization influences. Such individual differences include self-esteem, cognitive style, and specific attitude structures (see Wanous & Colella, 1989). Recently, Simon (1990; 1993) has proposed a sociobiological model that addresses this issue. His model suggests that the tendency to respond to social influence can have beneficial effects for the individual as well as the society. Therefore, because the tendency to accept social influence can enhance an indi­vidual 's fitness, Simon maintains that it can evolve through the process of natural selection. In sum, value differences can be partially explained by differences in individuals ' susceptibility to socialization and value-change efforts.
Are values stable?
Unlike constructs that are more peripheral to an individual (e.g., attitudes, opinions), values are relatively permanent, although capable of being changed under certain conditions. In this respect, they are not unlike the societies or social systems that support them. If societies were unstable, social order would be impossible; if they were completely stable, evolution would be impossible (Rokeach, 1985). Rokeach and his colleagues have found evidence for the relative stability of values in American society. They have also discovered that values can be changed using interventions that produce self-dissatisfaction (see Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989).
A number of mechanisms have been proposed to explain value stability. Rokeach (1973) maintains that values are stable because, as previously noted, they are learned in isolation from each other in an all-or-nothing manner. It is this "absolute learning of values that more or less guarantees their endurance and stability" (p. 6). Jones and Gerard (1967) explain value stability by noting that people experience some discomfort or deprivation in acquiring values. Thus, values acquire stability because individuals develop attachments to the things they have undergone discomfort to acquire (the effort justification hypothesis). These authors also maintain that stability is further instilled because values are rein­forced on a schedule of partial reinforcement.
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What are the effects of values on perception and behavior?
Once developed, a system of values functions in a number of ways. It affects an individual 's perceptual processes in that external stimuli are perceived in ways that are consistent with the value structure itself (Postman, Bruner & McGinnies, 1948; Williams, 1979). As mentioned earlier, values also serve a legitimizing function in that they can provide reasons to justify an individual 's past behavior (Nord et al., 1988; Williams, 1979). More importantly, values directly affect behavior in that they encourage individuals to act in accordance with their values (see e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Williams, 1979). In this regard, values are one of a number of forces that affect behavior (Rokeach, 1973). Values should, therefore, have their greatest impact in the absence of task and situational variables (e.g.,. incentives, limitations) that affect behavior in other ways. Also, as with other constructs that are central to an individual, values affect general modes of behav­ior across situations and over time (Epstein, 1979).
The psychological mechanisms responsible for the effect of values on behav­ior depend, in part, upon whether the behavior itself is public or private. Because "values specify modes of conduct that are socially desirable, the threat of social sanctions (e.g., shame, punishment) will induce individuals to conform to domi­nant social values in their public actions (Kluckhohn, 1951). This inducement will be present whether or not an individual 's internalized values conform to dominant social values. The mechanism that operates in the case of private behavior is a form of self sanction. An individual 's internalized values (i.e., ideal self) function as personal standards of conduct. Therefore, any actions that are inconsistent with these values will result in feelings of guilt, shame, or self-depreciation (Kluck­hohn, 1951). Thus, individuals exhibit value-related behavior in private in order to avoid negative internal feelings. Because value-inconsistent behavior produces such negative feelings, individuals who fail to act, or are prevented from acting, in accordance with their values should exhibit lower levels of satisfaction.
In assessing the relationship between values and behavior, one must be care­ful to distinguish values that are "espoused" from those that are "in use" (Argyris & Schon, 1978). Because values are socially desirable, there are strong pressures to publicly express and validate values whether or not they are held internally ("in use"). Therefore, when an individual 's values are different from those that are prevalent in his or her social environment (e.g., unit, organization), the values of the social environment may influence what the individual says, but they may not predict how he or she will actually behave.
What are the effects of value similarity?
Because values affect perceptions and behavior, they also have implications for interpersonal interactions. That is, when persons share similar value systems (i.e., interpersonal value congruence), they tend to perceive external stimuli in similar ways. Among other things, this similarity in interpreting and classifying environmental events serves to clarify their interpersonal communications. Indi­viduals with similar value systems also behave in similar ways. This enables them to better predict the behavior of others and, thus, more efficiently coordinate their actions. In effect, value similarity produces a social system or culture that facili-
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tates the interactions necessary for individuals to achieve their common goals (Kluckhohn, 1951). Because predictability in interpersonal interactions reduces role ambiguity and conflict, individuals with similar values should also experi­ence greater satisfaction in their interpersonal relationships (Fisher & Gitelson, 1983; see also Byrne 's 1971 research on the similarity-attraction paradigm).
Can value similarity occur between individuals and organizations?
A number of studies have measured value congruence between individuals and units (e.g., work groups, organizations, etc.). Such studies require that one assess the aggregate values of the unit. This can be done directly or by: (a) using content analysis to extract values from the unit 's publications, (b) measuring the personal values of the unit 's gatekeepers, (c) measuring the personal values of the unit 's special clients, (d) assessing the values of the unit as perceived by the unit 's gatekeepers, and (e) assessing the values of the unit as perceived by the unit 's "targets" or "general clients" (see Rokeach, 1979).
It is important to note that while these and other methods can be used to assess unit-level values, organizations do not really possess values apart from the values of their members. Thus, there must be a reason to believe that unit-level values, however assessed, are shared among the individual members of the unit. Selecting a set of values that are not shared (e.g., by aggregating otherwise diverse sets of values) can lead to erroneous conclusions (James, 1982). Also, as cited above, a key issue for researchers using these methods is to avoid measuring "espoused values" (Argyris & Schon, 1978) that are not really part of the unit 's behavioral repertoire.
As noted earlier, shared values are a major component of an organization 's culture (O 'Reilly & Chatman, 1996). Because of this, their role within an organi­zation or other unit is similar to their function in society at large. Schein (1985) has described these functions as external adaptation and internal integration. In the same way that values specify the behaviors appropriate for satisfying an indi­vidual 's needs, so does an organization 's culture specify the behaviors necessary for the organization to survive in its environment (i.e., external adaptation). Simi­larly, as shared values encourage efficient interactions between individuals, so does an organization 's culture facilitate interactions that occur between employ­ees in the workplace (i.e., internal integration). It is important to recognize, however, that the values responsible for internal integration may be different from those required for external adaptation. Stated another way, it is possible for an organization 's culture to emphasize values that are not appropriate for its survival. In such a case, employees may interact in a highly efficient manner while the organization fails to survive.
This issue can be somewhat more complicated in cases where value congru­ence does not enhance performance at certain tasks. For group tasks requiring decision making, judgment, and creativity, the type of homogeneity created by value similarity among members (e.g., similarity in interpreting and classifying environmental events) may actually inhibit performance (see Goodman, Ravlin & Argote, 1986). Thus, there is no necessary reason that shared values should result in enhanced organizational survival or higher task productivity unless the values
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Value Controversies
Although there is reasonable agreement on the issues discussed above, there is a conspicuous lack of consensus on other issues. We consider some of these issues below.
How are values structured?
Thus far, we have described values as being learned in isolation from each other. However, situations inevitably present themselves where a person 's values come into conflict. For example, someone who has been taught to be honest and to be helpful may be asked to help another by lying. In fact, because values relate to nearly all forms of behavior, one would be hard pressed to think of a situation that did not involve value conflict at some level. Over a lifetime, people naturally resolve such conflicts by engaging in a cognitively-driven process of paired comparisons between their values (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). Thus, many theorists and researchers believe that a person 's values are hierarchically orga­nized according to their relative importance to the individual (Locke, 1991; Ravlin & Meglino, 1989; Rokeach, 1973). "Since a person can only take, in effect, one action at a time, a person who did not have any hierarchy of values would be paralyzed by conflict and would be unable to act at all or to sustain an action once taken" (Locke, 1991, p. 291).
This view, however, is not shared by all theorists. Some acknowledge that an individual 's values may be held independently of each other (e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951). This view allows the possibility that a person 's values may be uniformly high or uniformly low. It also recognizes that values may be equal in their inten­sity. As we will discuss later, one 's view about how values are held can have substantial implications for how he or she chooses to measure values.
What values are important in organizations?
The diversity of instruments used to measure values in organizations indi­cates a lack of consensus on the values researchers feel are important. Further complicating this issue is that these instruments measure values at different levels of specificity. For example, organizational researchers have employed Rokeach 's (1973) measure of general social values as well as Wollack, Goodale, Wijting, and Smith 's (1971) survey of specific work values. This not only raises concerns for comparing the findings of different studies, it also creates problems for our understanding of value-related processes (see Connor & Becker, 1975, 1994). If inappropriate values are measured, the absence of significant findings can be incorrectly attributed to the lack of any real relationships.
Theorists and researchers maintain that organizations transmit a relatively narrow set of values (Schein, 1985; Kluckhohn, 1951) or a subset of general values (Rokeach, 1979). This suggests that very specific values are most relevant in organizations. However, individuals ' behavior in organizations is influenced by social as well as organizational forces. This would argue that broader social
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values are also relevant. Furthermore, measuring values that are specific to a particular organization constrains values research to studies in single organiza­tions that are of limited generalizability. It also complicates the study of values by virtually eliminating the use of common instruments.
This controversy does not have a clear resolution. However, it does seem obvious that there should be a reasonable amount of correspondence between the values that are measured and the phenomena being investigated. Thus, to the extent that one is examining processes that have their origins in a particular orga­nization (e.g., the socialization of new employees) or behaviors that have specific meanings within an organization (e.g., service to the customer), it is important to document the relevance of the values included in the study. As noted earlier, using nonrelevant values to measure organizational processes (e.g., measuring interper­sonal congruence using values that are not relevant to interpersonal interactions) may lead to erroneous conclusions about the process. One should also recognize that more inclusive general instruments tend to predict general modes of behavior and may include some values that are less relevant to behavior in a particular organization. When such instruments are used, one might expect smaller, albeit theoretically important, effect sizes for value-related phenomena.
How should values be measured?
Value researchers are divided on the appropriate way to measure values. Some (e.g., England, 1975; Wollack et al., 1971) have used methods that measure values independently of each other. Others (e.g., Allport, Vernon & Lindzey, 1970; Cable & Judge, 1996, 1997; Chatman, 1991; Meglino, Ravlin & Adkins, 1989) have employed methods that assess preferences between different values. Cattell (1944) used the terms normative to describe the former method and ipsa­tive to describe the latter. The normative technique typically requires respondents to rate the extent they endorse a set of items or statements describing a value or set of values (e.g., "A person should strive to be successful at his or her job."). The ipsative technique typically asks respondents to either rank order a set of values (e.g., achievement, helpfulness, etc.), or to choose one value or value state­ment at the expense of another in & forced choice format.
Researchers who employ normative methods claim a number of advantages. Because normative techniques yield value scores that are independent of each other, they permit a respondent 's value profile to be high or low on any or all values (what Cronbach & Gleser, 1953, have called "elevation"). This is impossi­ble using ipsative procedures because each value must be assigned a different rank. Also, when values are rated independently, it is possible to capture absolute differences between values. This information is unavailable when values are ranked (Osgood & Suci, 1952). Similarly, normative procedures also allow for values to be rated as equal in strength, which is not possible with ipsative measures.
Rating values independently also permits the use of more sophisticated statistical analyses (Hicks, 1970). Because ipsative methodologies yield value scores that are necessarily correlated with each other, they typically limit the statistical techniques one is able to employ. Also, because normative scores are
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B.M. MEGLINO AND E.C. RAVLIN independent, they more readily permit researchers to compare the strength of vari­ous values across individuals (Ng, 1982). Furthermore, some researchers maintain that normative scores can be transformed into a rank ordering. Thus, these indi­viduals note that one can extract a rank ordering from normative ratings for the purposes of analysis and for comparing ratings with rankings. Normative propo­nents also note that ratings are less cumbersome than rankings, making a norma­tive format more convenient to administer (Munson & Mclntyre, 1979).
Researchers who utilize ipsative methods also point to advantages of their procedures. Probably the most important of these derives from how these researchers conceptualize the nature of values themselves. Values are believed to be less than totally conscious, somewhat below an individual 's level of complete awareness (see e.g., Locke, 1976; Rokeach, 1985). As a result, accurate value measurement is thought to require assessments made in choice situations (Falld-ing, 1965; Kluckhohn, 1951; Locke, 1991; Williams, 1968; 1979). Ipsative measuring techniques (i.e., rank order, forced choice) require respondents to make such choices. Therefore, ipsative scores are believed to more closely represent an individual 's true values, rather than his or her public endorsements of socially desirable statements. Furthermore, as previously noted, some researchers main­tain that values are hierarchically structured based on their relative importance to an individual. Because ipsative methodologies ultimately yield a rank ordering of values based on importance, they are believed to duplicate the way values are cognitively held by individuals. Also, some researchers have suggested that ipsa­tive scores can, in fact, be transformed into normalized scores by assigning each rank an equal area under the normal curve (e.g., Chapman, Blackburn, Austin & Hutcheson, 1983; Feather, 1975). This transformation, however, does not recover normative information such as elevation.
As noted earlier, values are socially desirable phenomena. Ipsative scores are less prone to social desirability bias because values are assessed in comparison to each other. Thus, ipsatively rated value scores are likely to remain relatively stable despite changes in the desire for social approval. Normatively rated value scores tend to increase as the desire for social approval increases (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987a). As a result, normally occurring differences in the desire for social approval within a subject population can produce artifactually inflated rela­tionships between normatively measured values and other self-reported constructs that are also socially desirable (e.g., job satisfaction, self-reported performance). Furthermore, since the desire for social approval can also motivate self-presenta­tional behaviors (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), it can produce artifactually inflated relationships between normatively measured values and criterion behaviors that are rated by others. Similar problems can occur when respondents are treated in ways that produce differences in compliance or the desire for social approval. Finally, the tendency to endorse socially desirable constructs can inflate the reli­abilities of normatively measured value scales (Judge & Bretz, 1992; Ravlin & Meglino, 1987a).
Some of the problems inherent in normative and ipsative scales can be corrected or otherwise adjusted. This is true for the previously noted tendency for normative value scores to produce artifactually inflated relationships. Typically,
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such inflation can be estimated and corrected using a separate measure of the desire for social approval. Also, the problem of making value comparisons across individuals using ipsative scales can be avoided if one is interested in assessing the strength of a single value. If the set of measured values is reasonably compre­hensive of the values that are operative in a particular domain or culture (see e.g., Ravlin & Meglino, 1987b; Rokeach, 1973), then an ipsative value score indicates the same value strength for all individuals (see Ng, 1982). In such cases, an ipsa­tive instrument essentially becomes a normative instrument with the potential advantage of not requiring control for social desirability response bias (see Hicks, 1970). Across-person comparisons may also be possible using the normative transformation noted earlier (Chapman et al., 1983; Feather, 1975).
There have been numerous studies comparing various characteristics of ipsa­tive and normative measurement techniques. Generally speaking, the conclusions of this research have been equivocal in that some studies have found little or no difference between the two techniques (e.g., Rankin & Grube, 1980), some have found ipsative techniques to be superior (e.g., Miethe, 1985) and others have found normative techniques to be superior (e.g., Hicks, 1970). In addition to direct comparisons, one can assess a measure 's susceptibility to methodological artifacts by examining its role as a moderator. We were unable to locate any comparative studies that specifically examined the effects of different value scales in moder­ated relationships. However, a study by Zuckerman, Bernieri, Koestner, and Rosenthal (1989) used moderated relationships to compare rankings and ratings of desirable trait dimensions. These authors found substantially greater moderated effects using rank order measures.
Despite decades of research on values, and numerous studies comparing normative and ipsative measurement techniques, there appears to be no clear reso­lution to the value measurement controversy. We believe that this conflict, and perhaps its resolution, is linked to differences in the way individuals process information under various circumstances. Specifically, there appear to be times when an individual 's cognitive processes are naturally focused on creating a rank ordering. This seems to occur when an individual ponders mutually exclusive alternative courses of action. In such situations (e.g., deciding what to do on Saturday night or what television program to watch), people naturally focus on comparing the alternatives to each other, thus constructing a hierarchy of alterna­tive activities (see Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). Furthermore, particularly when the choice is a very difficult one (e.g., an ethical decision), this process seems to require substantial contemplation or soul-searching in order for an indi­vidual to uncover his or her true value preferences.
Just as the process of resolving difficult choices can prompt an individual to reflect on his or her true underlying values, so ipsative methodologies, which require respondents to make such choices, may allow investigators to arrive at a more accurate assessment of a respondent 's value priorities in choice situations. The work of Tetlock may be particularly relevant to this issue. In a number of studies involving value conflict, Tetlock and his associates have found that persons will engage in integratively complex thinking in situations where conflicting values are activated (e.g., Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Armor & Peterson,
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1994). Thus, ipsative scales may capture information about a respondent 's values in choice situations that is impossible to assess using normative procedures. Moreover, when one is concerned with determining value priorities and subse­quent behavior in choice situations, the unique information provided by normative techniques (e.g., elevation, absolute differences in values, whether values have equal strength) may be of little relevance.
On the other hand, there appear to be occasions when an individual 's cogni­tive processes are primarily focused on making absolute discriminations on inde­pendent dimensions. This tends to occur when an individual is concerned with, among other things, classifying various entities, determining the extent such enti­ties are similar, or assessing whether an entity meets a particular standard. For example, people naturally use terms indicating absolute intensity, degree, extent, etc. in describing entities such as organizations (e.g., "very" socially responsible, "extremely" profitable) or people (e.g., "highly" ambitious, "not very" honest). In such cases, the unique information provided by normative scales is very meaning­ful. Here it is important to know whether an entity is high or low on any or all dimensions, the extent of absolute differences between dimensions, and whether two or more dimensions are equal in strength.
In light of the above, we would propose a contingency approach to values measurement that considers the phenomenon one is trying to understand. If one is attempting to comprehend a respondent 's choices from among alternative courses of action, then ipsative measurement would appear to be more appropriate. This assumes that the values being measured are reasonably representative of the alter­native behavioral choices faced by the respondent. On the other hand, if one wishes to understand a respondent 's assessment, classification, or comparison with regard to one or a number of entities (organizations, jobs, persons, etc.), then normative measurement would seem to be more appropriate. Of course, this assumes that the values being measured represent the dimensions upon which individuals actually base their assessment. In each of these cases, we believe that the particular methodology is more phenomenologically correct in that it closely mirrors the actual cognitive process engaged in by individuals.
The previous discussion emphasizes that ipsative and normative scales each contain unique information that is appropriate to different phenomena. That is, ipsative scales contain information related to values in choice situations that is not captured by normative scales. Normative scales, on the other hand, contain infor­mation about the similarities and absolute differences of values in comparative situations that is not contained in ipsative scales. Therefore, each measurement methodology captures relevant information that is unavailable using the other. This underscores the difficulty of conducting comparative research on the relative effectiveness of ipsative versus normative measurement. Such research typically involves one of two methodologies, (a) a transformational methodology that compares a single set of scale responses both before and after they have been mathematically transformed into a second format (e.g., normative value responses that have been transformed into a rank ordering; e.g., Beutell & Brenner, 1986, or rank orderings that have been transformed into normative responses; e.g., Chap­man et al., 1983), and (b) a parallel methodology that asks respondents to
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complete the same scale twice, each in a different format (e.g., Rankin & Grube, 1980). In light of the above discussion, the transformational methodology would seem to be problematic because a mathematical transformation is not capable of capturing information that was not contained in the responses before they were transformed. Thus, a simple transformation must necessarily bias the resulting format by excluding certain information. A different type of bias can occur when researchers employ a parallel methodology. Because each scale tends to model a different type of cognitive phenomenon, one of the two formats will require respondents to employ cognitive processes that are less meaningful, or even inap­propriate, within the context of the study. That is, because individuals do not normally rank order values that describe various entities, nor do they rate values that relate to alternative behaviors, asking study participants to respond in these ways will bias one of the scales. Therefore, comparing ipsative and normative responses to the same scale items may produce a flawed comparison because one of the response formats will require cognitive processing that is less appropriate within the domain of the study.
How should value congruence be measured?
Value congruence between individuals or between individuals and a collec­tive (e.g., group, organization) is a complex issue that has been addressed in a number of ways. Unfortunately, all such methods have at least some problematic elements. One of the least complicated methods is to simply ask respondents themselves to estimate the extent their values are similar to those of the other (e.g., Posner, Kouzes & Schmidt, 1985). In addition to its simplicity, this method allows the researcher to assess value congruence at a perceptual level, if that is the desired construct. On the other hand, this method makes a number of implicit assumptions that may not be justified. Specifically, it presumes that the respon­dent (a) knows what values are, (b) knows what the relevant values are, (c) knows his or her own values, (d) knows the values of the other, and (e) is able to compare these sets of values to produce an overall assessment of their similarity. Variants of this technique (e.g., priming subjects on the meaning of values and/or the value dimensions upon which to judge differences; Enz, 1988) may avoid some prob­lematic assumptions, but these methods still assume that values can be accurately measured without the aid of a values instrument, and that respondents can accu­rately assess the extent their values are similar to those of the other.
These concerns are not an issue in two additional methodologies: (a) having respondents complete two identical values instruments, one on themselves and the second "according to the values of the other" (e.g., Feather, 1979), and (b) having respondents complete a values instrument on themselves and using independent assessments to determine the values of the other on the same dimensions (e.g., Chatman, 1991). Although the former technique raises questions of whether a person can accurately estimate the values of the other, both techniques provide greater control in that they restrict respondents to a particular set of values and impose a common measurement methodology on all respondents. These tech­niques also transfer the responsibility for determining value congruence to the
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B.M. MEGLINO AND E.C. RAVLIN researcher. That is, the researcher must employ some method of assessing the similarity between the two value profiles.
How one should assess value profile similarity is another area of disagree­ment among researchers. A variety of techniques have been used which include variants of difference scores and correlations between different value rank order-ings (see Edwards, 1993; 1994). Recently, Edwards (1993; 1994) has criticized these techniques for a number of reasons, including their inability to assess value similarity on each dimension independently. He has recommended polynomial regression as an alternative that avoids this shortcoming. However, because poly­nomial regression requires the type of interval level data obtained from normative scales, it cannot be used with ipsative measurement methodologies. This is unfor­tunate because, as noted above, some researchers maintain that ipsative methodol­ogies are the most appropriate way to measure certain types of values. These researchers prefer to use corrected correlations between different sets of value rankings as an index of value similarity (e.g., Cable & Judge, 1997; Rokeach, 1973). This approach allows the use of a larger number of value dimensions with­out the requirement of extremely large data sets, as does polynomial regression.
We see this issue as related to the previous discussion of values measure­ment. That is, we believe that the appropriate measure of value congruence depends on how values are measured, which ultimately depends on the phenome­non one is investigating. Specifically, if one is interested in assessing similarity in behavioral choices, then a respondent 's rank ordering would seem to be the appropriate measure of values, and the similarity of rank orderings would, there­fore, be an appropriate measure of value congruence. Here, one is primarily inter­ested in the shape of the relevant profiles, rather than the distance between the profiles. Since the correlation of one profile with another, generally called Q (Cronbach & Gleser, 1953), represents the similarity of profile shape (Edwards, 1994), Q would appear to be one relevant measure of congruence on values that represent alternative courses of action. For example, if persons A and B share the same preference ordering among values that are associated with alternative behaviors in a particular domain, we would expect them to make similar behav­ioral choices. Both persons should, therefore, be extremely comfortable accepting the choices made by the other even though person A finds his or her choices substantially more pleasurable than person B finds his or her choices. In such cases, differences in elevation, absolute differences between alternative choices, and even ties would be expected to contribute very little to the assessment of value congruence.
On the other hand, if one were trying to determine whether persons A and B concur in their assessment of a particular entity (e.g., their job), then value ratings would appear to be the appropriate measure of values, and the distance between their respective value profiles would, thus, be an appropriate measure of value congruence. Here, it is important to know how much each person agrees with the absolute assessment of the other on all dimensions. Therefore, differences in elevation, absolute differences between each evaluation on all value dimensions, and ties have substantial consequences for the amount of agreement between A and B. Thus, even when A and B have value profiles with the same shape, a
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substantial difference in the elevations of the two profiles would make each person extremely uncomfortable accepting the assessment of the other. In such cases, profile similarity measures that respect the distance between profiles, or polynomial regression, which avoids the problems of combining different value dimensions into a single index, would be more appropriate measures of value congruence.
Although questions of how to assess values and their similarity will no doubt be debated for some time to come, we believe that the primary concern in any current and future methodology should be to adequately reflect the phenomenon under investigation. As noted by Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989), some researchers have attempted to employ normative measurement techniques simply because these techniques are more convenient from a statistical point of view. Clearly, we believe that theoretical relevance should take precedence over statisti­cal convenience in such studies. In this respect, we agree with researchers who maintain that allowing statistical issues to dictate methods of value measurement amounts to "putting the methodological 'cart ' before the theoretical 'horse '" (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989, p. 775).
A Framework for Values Effects
In Figure 1 we provide a framework for identifying the types of values-related effects that theorists and empirical researchers have investigated. This is intended as a basis for organizing the values literature rather than a comprehen­sive model of values processes. As this framework indicates, values are thought to arise from socialization processes and genetics. Values then have two main conduits by which they affect outcomes. As noted earlier, values can have a direct effect on an individual 's outcomes or they may affect outcomes to the extent that they are similar or congruent with the values of an "other." These "other" values can be those of a specific person or the aggregate values of a group or organiza­tional unit. As previously described, value congruence can affect outcomes by clarifying communications, removing ambiguity and conflict, and otherwise enhancing interactions.
Some of these influences are likely to be moderated by task and situational variables. For example, values will have little impact on behavior if situational variables restrict the behavior from taking place. Likewise, as noted earlier, the effect of value congruence on performance is likely to be different depending on the task. Values and value congruence are also likely to influence the effect of task and situational variables on outcomes. Thus, situational interventions, such as those designed to increase performance, are likely to have different effects on persons with different value structures (e.g., those with high versus low achieve­ment) and on units with different levels of value congruence. Finally, we might speculate that outcomes and behavior should be expected to reinforce an individ­ual 's value structure. Should this reinforcement uniformly fail to occur, we would expect an individual 's values to change (Jones & Gerard, 1967). This process is illustrated by the feedback loop from outcomes to values.
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o c X z > r
O -n
> z > o CM CO z < o r z o 'Socialization
Process •Genetics
~
Values of Others

Individual 1 Values 1
1
Value Congruence
Task and
Situationa
Variables

Figure 1. A Framework for Values Effects
INDIVIDUAL VALUES IN ORGANIZATIONS
367
Prior Research on Values
To provide a context for a more comprehensive review of values research beginning in 1987, we wish to make a few observations about the general tenor of the earlier literature. These observations are based on studies located through a search of the psychological abstracts from 1974 through 1986, and a subsequent screening of these studies according to our definition of values and the previously described limitations of this review. This search yielded a total of 69 studies. Consistent with our earlier comments, the majority of these studies (n = 36) dealt with the Protestant Ethic or the work ethic. The studies were evenly divided in their focus on values as an independent variable (n = 28) versus values as a depen­dent variable (n = 28). Four studies examined value change over time and nine examined values in moderated relationships.
Although there was substantial heterogeneity in the relationships examined, there were some cases in which different studies focused on the same relationship. For example, when values were employed as an independent variable, multiple studies found significant relationships between values and job satisfaction (e.g., Ronen, 1978), ethical decision making (e, g., Hegarty & Sims, 1978), and career success (e.g., Watson & Williams, 1977). There was, however, a conspicuous lack of studies focusing on actual or simulated work behavior. The sole exception was a study by Merrens and Garrett (1975), which found that the Protestant Ethic was significantly related to output and the amount of time spent on a repetitive labora­tory task.
When values were studied as dependent variables, studies typically included multiple independent variables. These were almost exclusively demographic. Thus, a substantial number of studies examined value differences as a function of occupation or organization level, sex, age, race or nationality, and education (see e.g., Buchholz, 1978; Cherrington, Condie & England, 1979). Although there is no shortage of significant findings in these studies, drawing firm conclusions about specific relationships is difficult. As previously noted, differences in values and measures make it difficult to detect consistent relationships across studies. This was particularly true of studies in this category. Furthermore, significant effects observed in one study were often not replicated in subsequent studies that controlled for different variables. For example, Cherrington et al. (1979) discov­ered that females were less likely to strive for advancement than males, while Powell, Posner and Schmidt (1984) found that females were more career versus family oriented than males, and Buchholz (1978) detected no significant differ­ences between males and females on the work ethic and their devotion to their work group or their organization.
Of the four studies that examined value change over time, three consisted of shorter-duration, longitudinal investigations (8 weeks - 1 year) of socialization in specific occupations or work roles (e.g., Hazer & Alvares, 1981). The remaining study was a cross-sectional design that examined broader societal value changes over a six year period (Lusk & Oliver, 1974). Although there were significant value changes in three of the four studies, we could not draw any clear common conclusions from this research.
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B.M. MEGL1NO AND E.C. RAVLIN
All of the studies involving values as a moderator employed versions of the Protestant Ethic or work ethic. The most frequently studied relationship was that between job scope and job satisfaction. These studies were primarily concerned with testing the hypothesis, suggested by Hulin and Blood (1968), that this rela­tionship should be positive for workers who have internalized the Protestant Ethic, and negative for workers who are alienated from this value. In general, these studies failed to support the suggested relationship (see Stone, 1975,1976).
Values Research 1987-1997
We next turn our attention to the current literature on values. In the context of the above discussion, and in accord with Figure 1, these studies are examined in the following categories: values as dependent variables (including a study of value change), values as independent variables, values as moderators, and value congruence as dependent and independent variables. No studies were located that dealt with value congruence as a moderator. Where studies fit more than one clas­sification, they are reported in each appropriate section.
A total of 30 studies fit within the limitations laid out for this review. Of these, four dealt with values as dependent variables, one examined value change, seven characterized values as independent variables, and seven investigated values as moderators. In contrast to the prior literature, a large number of studies dealt with value congruence. Five examined congruence as a dependent construct, and 13 examined value congruence in the independent variable role. These cate­gorizations add up to more than 30 because of the multiple classification of some studies. We also examined the studies by their primary measurement method used in assessing values. Although studies often utilized more than one procedure, in general, ipsative and normative measures were used with very similar frequency.
Values as dependent variables
Two of the studies examining values as dependent variables investigated the influence of national culture, while two looked at the effects of race. This body of literature represents a shift in two respects. First, the amount of research being done examining the effects of various demographic variables on values has dimin­ished remarkably, and second, in the work that is ongoing, the focus is clearly on cultural values. Two studies examined value differences between executives or managers from North America, the People 's Republic of China (PRC), and Hong Kong (Ralston, Gustafson, Elsass, Cheung & Terpstra, 1992; Vertinsky, Tse, Wehrung & Lee, 1990). Differences were observed between respondents of these three nationalities, in that managers from the PRC tended to emphasize innovation and traditional Chinese management values more than the other two groups. North American respondents placed more value on task orientation and integra­tion, and the Hong Kong sample, while less task oriented than the North Ameri­cans, was more task oriented than the PRC sample. Aside from comparable findings regarding traditional Chinese values, it is somewhat difficult to compare the results of these basically very similar studies because they utilized different values measures and control variables.
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Table 1. Values as Dependent Variables o c w z > r o •n
S > z
> o m 2 tn Z H
<
o r to Z

Measure
Likert items adapted from prior research, number of cooperative or competitive choices made as individuals, reasons given for choices
Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values
Ralston et al., 1992 Cultural values Chinese Value Survey Country of origin Gende
Vertinsky et al„ 1990 Ideals of management Likert items developed Country of origin and organization for study
Whitney & Schmidt, Cultural values Intercultural Values Race
1997 Inventory

370
B.M. MEGLINO AND E.C. RAVLIN
Of the two studies examining race or ethnicity as a determining factor in value differences, one investigation found that of 15 cultural value dimensions measured, race explained additional variance in 6 dimensions, when age, sex, parental education, childhood income, and socio-economic status were controlled (Whitney & Schmitt, 1997). Some of these effects were consistent with a priori theorizing, others were not. One concern cited in the study was that blacks appar­ently tended to engage in more socially desirable responding than whites, thus making interpretation of values differences somewhat unclear. The second study of ethnic differences in values (Cox, Lobel & McLeod, 1991) noted that ethnic minorities (Asians, Hispanics, and Black Americans) were more cooperative in orientation than Anglos, as is consistent with common understandings of differ­ences in collectivism/individualism in the cultures of these ethnic groups.
In addition to the studies described above, one study in the review set exam­ined value change. Lubinski, Schmidt, and Benbow (1996) observed that in a sample of gifted adolescents, values were remarkably stable over a 20 year time frame. Dominant value orientation either remained unchanged, or moved to an adjacent value. This finding reaffirms the conceptualization of values as very stable elements tending to form early in life. While acknowledging that major longitudinal studies of values have in general showed their remarkable stability, in a well-known longitudinal study (published outside of the review set), Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989) designed an intervention to determine whether values could, in fact, be changed in adults over a significant time frame. Utilizing a broadcast television program, an effort was made to change the rankings of the equality, freedom, and aesthetics values. Rankings of the targeted values changed for those who watched, thus suggesting that adult socialization, such as that which occurs through the media, or through organizational processes, can in fact change values in a meaningful way.
Values as independent variables
Table 2 presents studies examining values as independent variables. Three studies examined multiple values and their impact on perceptions and decisions. Four studies examined the role of a single value in predicting decisions and behavior. Judge and Bretz (1992) and Ravlin and Meglino (1987a) both used a policy capturing approach to determine the effects of values on decisions. Judge and Bretz concluded that 3 of the 4 values measured by the Comparative Empha­sis Scale (CES) interacted with a job 's value orientation to predict the likelihood of accepting a job offer, and that the fit between an individual 's dominant value and the value orientation of a job was more influential than pay and promotional opportunities. Ravlin and Meglino observed that respondents utilized their value profile, as measured by multiple rank-type procedures, in making evaluation deci­sions regarding fictitious employees. In addition, a simple ranking procedure also predicted individuals ' interpretation of ambiguous stimuli in this study, thus providing support for the idea that values influence how individuals perceive their environment.
Whitney and Schmidt (1997) also examined the effects of multiple values, in this case on responses to extant biodata items. Results indicated that 16% of the
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 24, NO. 3, 1998
Table 2. Values as Independent Variables
Study
Type of values
Measure
Dependent variables
Mod

Brockner et al., 1988 Work ethic
Judge & Bretz, 1992 Work values
Work value concern for others (CFO), empathy
Ravlin & Meglino, 1987a
Samuelson, 1993
Wagner, 1995
Cultural values (individualism/ collectivism)
Cultural values
§ Whitney & Schmitt, L, 1997
$
Work Ethic Scale
Comparative Emphasis Scale (CES)
CES CFO subscale, Empathic Concern subscale
Ranking, point assignment, CES, Likert-type scale of CES items
Ring Measure of Social Values, choice game
Likert items adapted from prior research, factor analysis resulted in 5 dimensions
Intercultural Values Inventory

Job involvement
Rated probability of accepting a job offer
Individual prosocial behavior
Perception of ambiguous stimuli, simulated evaluation of employees
Importance of attributes Past e and choice of resource the all allocation system, (mani harvest behavior
Peer-rated cooperation Demo schoo averag
Socio gende educa living bioda

372
B.M. MEGLINO AND E.C. RAVLIN items were related to the respondent 's cultural values, with dimensions tapping basic human nature and time orientation being the most influential. It is somewhat unclear as to what extent the validity generalization of the population of biodata instruments may be affected by cultural values, given that the specific items were selected based on the a priori belief that they related to values. It is also worth noting that only 7.5 % of the biodata items were found to be related to both culture and race, and that these were mixed as to whether they followed theory regarding racial differences.
Studies examining the relationship between one value and a variety of outcomes have found a number of diverse effects. Concern for others and empa­thy were found to relate positively to secretaries ' prosocial behavior directed at individuals (McNeely & Meglino, 1994). Classification as a cooperator (as opposed to a competitor or individualist) related positively to assigning more importance to fairness, and voting to install a leader-based system for allocation of resources under conditions of severe over-use in a harvest decision experiment (Samuelson, 1993). Non-cooperators in this study emphasized self interest, and did not vote for a leader-based system under any condition. Relatedly, Wagner 's (1995) experimental study found that the cultural value of collectivism was related to cooperation as well. Lastly, the work ethic was found to relate posi­tively to job involvement under conditions of mild layoff, although not under more severe conditions (Brockner, Grover & Blonder, 1988).
These diverse studies strongly support effects of values on decisions, includ­ing evaluation and voting types of situations, and suggest effects for affect and for perception in ambiguous environments. However, with some exceptions, they do not provide a great deal of insight into the relationship between values and actual behavior. A lack of emphasis on research directly measuring behavior, particu­larly in field environments, is a continued shortcoming in the examination of the effects of values on outcomes.
Values as moderator variables
As research into the intercultural implications of organizational behavior increases, values are often suggested to play a moderating role in how organiza­tions should be managed and structured (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). This theme was largely absent from earlier research. Five studies in the review set addressed this issue directly (Earley, 1989, 1993, 1994; Erez & Earley, 1987; Wagner, 1995), and two additional studies looked at other types of moderating effects of values. Erez and Earley varied procedures by which goals were set such that they were assigned, set by a representative of the group, or set by the group. For those subjects low in power distance, group and representative goal setting had stronger effects on performance, and this same pattern was exhibited by goal acceptance at a marginal level. Earley 's subsequent work found moderating effects for collec­tivism: collectivists performed best in in-group contexts, as opposed to out-group or individual contexts, and also did not loaf in group settings low in accountability as individualists did. Collectivists also responded more positively to group-focused training, whereas individualists were more effective under individual-focused training conditions. A more recent study of collectivism (Wagner, 1995)
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Table 3. Values as Moderators
Study
Type of values
Measure
Independent variables Dependent

O c
Z > r O •n
2 > z > a en 2 m z
<
o r z o
Earley, 1989
Earley, 1993
Earley, 1994
Erez & Earley, 1987
Cultural values (individualism/ collectivism)
Cultural values (individualism/ collectivism)
Cultural values (individualism/ collectivism)
Cultural values
Likert collectivism scale
Likert collectivism scale
Study 1: Likert collectivism scale: aggregated at country level (US, PRC, Hong Kong); deviation from country mean for each individual
Study 2: Scale as described above (US, PRC subjects)
Likert collectivism and power distance (PD) scales
US vs People 's Task performa
Republic of China (PRC), (degree of soci group vs individual, loafing) accountability Alone, in-group, out-group context, anticipated rewards and group/individual efficacy
Study 1: Individual- or group-focused training, no training
Study 2: Individual- or group-focused training
Assigned, representative, or group goal

o c
Z > r o •n s >
2 > O ffl g H
<
O r z o
Study
Korsgaard et al., 1996
Korsgaard et al., 1997
Wagner, 1995
Table 3. (Continued)
Independent variables Depende
Comparative Emphasis Payoff, risk, positive
Scale (CES) CFO arousal subscale Work value CFO CES CFO subscale
Likert items adapted from prior research, factor analysis resulted in 5 dimensions

INDIVIDUAL VALUES IN ORGANIZATIONS
375
found that this value interacted with both group size and identifiability in predict­ing cooperation, but not with shared responsibility. Taken together, these findings provide initial support for the widespread contention that cultural values in general, and collectivism/individualism in particular, play an important moderat­ing role in the effect of organizational systems and structures.
A second thrust of research on the moderating role of values deals with the value of concern for others, and its moderating influence in decisional and behav­ioral processes. Korsgaard, Meglino and Lester (1996, 1997) observed several important effects over the course of multiple experiments. In particular, concern for others moderated the relationships between situational or task variables (i.e., the favorableness and specificity of feedback, and decision risk and payoff) and satisfaction with and acceptance of feedback, behavior in response to feedback, and attraction to potential gambles. Overall, persons high in concern for others tended to exhibit less self-interested behavior, and increased willingness to respond to social cues. A central point in this line of research is that the value of concern for others has been demonstrated to influence affect, decisions, and behavior that reach far beyond a simple relationship to helping behaviors.
Value congruence as a dependent variable
As Schneider 's (1987) Attraction-Selection-Attrition framework would suggest, value congruence among people in an aggregate should be of interest to organizational scholars. Until recently, relatively little attention was paid to value congruence within aggregates as a dependent variable. However, based on Schneider 's theory, we would anticipate that both selection effects and socializa­tion effects would be important in determining its extent. Five studies from the review period addressed these issues. Chatman (1991) directly examined the contributions of selection and socialization to value congruence in her study utilizing the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP). In this study, the OCP was used to compare employee values to those of the organization, as based on responses of senior employees. Events from the selection process, such as time spent with firm members and ratings of similarity to successful organizational members prior to hire, predicted value congruence at organizational entry. One year later, value congruence was predicted by attendance at social events and time spent with a mentor over the first year of employment. Findings suggested a more prominent role for organizational experiences than for initial selection in deter­mining employee fit as tenure increased.
A second study in this set considered perceptions of congruence between employees and their organization on goals and values of the organization as one of six dimensions of socialization (Chao, O 'Leary-Kelly, Wolf, Klein & Gardner, 1994). Their findings suggested that such judgments of fit were driven by the organizational context in which individuals functioned. Contrary to the other socialization dimensions studied, individuals who subsequently changed jobs and/ or organizations rated their perceptions of congruence with the initial organization lower than did those who remained in their jobs in the same organization. After the change, changers actually were higher on this dimension than non-changers, thus indicating that they had made an adaptive choice. Relatedly, Lee and
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 24, NO. 3, 1998 o c

Table 4. Value
Congruence as a Depend ent Vari

z

Mo

\LOFI>
Study
Type of congruence Measure
Independent variables

Cable & Judge,
With organization
Perceived congruence
OCP value congruence,
Contro

>
1996

as measured by the
Likert measure value position z
>

Organizational Culture congruence, demogr

o

Profile (OCP); demographic similarily percept CO
2

perceived Likert-type between job seekers opportu §

measure and recruiters,

h

emphasis placed on

< o congruence in job

r

choice

Cable & Judge,
With organization
Interviewer perception
OCP actual value
Control

z p
1997

of OCP of applicant and congruence, OCP physica U>

organization and Likert- perceived congruence attractiv S

type measure of

applica

SO
OO

person-organization fit; OCP similarity of applicant-reported values and interviewer perception of

tal, dem

organization (actual

congruence)

Chao et al., 1994
With organization
Perceived Likert-type measure
Whether respondent changed job, organization, or both

Chatman, 1991 With organization OCP (actual congruence) O c ? Lee & Mowday, With organization Perceived Likert-type
<~ 1987 measure
O
TJ
2 > z > o m S tn Z H
<
O r Time 1 value congruence: time spent with members before hire, perceptions of similarity with successful members, acceptance ratio, having more offers.
Time 2 value congruence: social interaction and with mentor during first year, perceptions that socialization emphasizes career path, clear values, etc., openness to socialization
Information available about job, individual characteristics (e.g., age), alternative job opportunities
Control grade po average knowled and abil

z o
> r
O 11
2 > z > o
M
2 en z
H
<
O
r z o
Study
Becker et al., 1996
Cable & Judge, 1996
Cable & Judge, 1997
Chao et al., 1994
Table 5. Value Congruence as an Independent Variable (Perce
Type of congruence Measure
With supervisor Likert-type scale and organization
With organization Likert-type scale (applicants)
With organization
Interviewer hiring recommendations, organizational hiring decisions
With organization Likert-type scale

Harris &
With organization
Profile match based on
Job attitudes, turnover

Mossholder,

competing values intent 1996

model

James et al.,
With supervisor,
Likert-type scale
Blood pressure, health
Controll
1994 non-minority peers

self-reports weight, organiza
Lee & Mowday,
With organization
Likert-type scale
Satisfaction,

1987

commitment, involvement, turnover intent, job search, performance

Miceli & Near,
With top
Likert-type scale
Results of whistle-

1994 management blowing

380
B.M. MEGLINO AND E.C. RAVL1N
Mowday (1987) examined the impact of the information that was available about the job prior to entry, alternative job prospects of applicants, and individual char­acteristics (e.g., age). Only alternative job prospects did not have an influence on individuals ' ratings of their agreement with organizational values and judgments. Lastly, in two recent studies, Cable and Judge (1996, 1997) found a number of linkages between different types of value congruence. The match between applicant perceptions of the organization 's values and their own, as measured by the OCP, predicted global ratings of value congruence. In addition, the match between recruiters ' perceptions of organization values and applicant self-reported values predicted the match between recruiters ' perceptions of applicant and hiring organization values. This second match predicted recruiters ' more general ratings of values-based fit. Taken together, these five studies indicate that selection, socialization, and the organizational context are clearly important in determining the match between an individual 's values and those of the employing organiza­tion, and that within-person profile matches predict more general perceptions of value congruence.
Value congruence as an independent variable
By far, the most research has been done in the area of understanding the effects of value congruence. This literature has taken many forms, but can be divided into two central types: those studies dealing with the global and unspeci­fied perception of value congruence between the respondent and some other entity (see Table 5), and studies in which specific values are identified for the respon­dent and matched directly to another response by an individual or aggregate (Table 6). As noted earlier, there are several different iterations of these tech­niques; here, we organize the research from the review period into these two basic categories.
Results from the 8 studies utilizing general perceptions of value congruence with the organization clearly indicate that perceived congruence relates positively to affective outcomes, including satisfaction, commitment, and involvement (Cable & Judge, 1996; Chao et al., 1994; Harris & Mossholder, 1996; Lee & Mowday, 1987). In addition, findings also indicate positive relationships with interviewer hiring recommendations and organizational hiring decisions (Cable & Judge, 1997), job choice intentions (Cable & Judge, 1996), met expectations (Lee & Mowday, 1987), self-reported health (James, Lovato & Khoo, 1994), optimism about the organization 's future (Harris & Mossholder, 1996), and adaptability (Chao et al., 1994). Negative relationships were noted with performance (Becker, Billings, Eveleth & Gilbert, 1996; Lee & Mowday, 1987), blood pressure (reverse of prediction; James et al., 1994), retaliation for whistle-blowing (Miceli & Near, 1994), job search behavior, and intent to leave the organization (Cable & Judge, 1996; Lee & Mowday, 1987). With the exception of the above noted relationships with performance and blood pressure, and other minor exceptions (see Harris & Mossholder, 1996), these findings tend to be very consistent with theory that proposes that operating in an environment consistent with one 's values is a more positive experience on many levels.
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Table 6. Value Congruence as an Independent Variable (Cross-
O
c
50 Z > r o
-n
S
> z > o en 2 W z
<
O r Type of congruence
With recruiter and organization
Chatman, 1991 With organization
Measure
Comparative Emphasis Scale (CES) with recruiter, organization profile based on recruiter judgments
Organizational Culture Profile (OCP)
Dependent variables
Employabihty, person-organization (P-O) fit, second interview invitation
Job satisfaction, intent to leave, commitment, turnover
Moder con
Controls: g point avera (GPA), prio employmen campus act gender, min status, indu Moderator: communica skills
Controlled GPA, tenur knowledge and abilitie

z o o c jo z > r o •n
2
> z > o tn
S en z <
O
r z o
S
Study
Meglino et al., 1989
Meglino et al., 1992
O 'Reilly et al., 1991
Type of congruence
With supervisor, top management
With supervisor
With organization
Table 6. (Continued)
Dependent variables
CES profile with management values perceptions, with supervisory values, with supervisors ' perceptions of management values, management values, managers ' perceptions of management values
Pride in Work, CES achievement subscale difference scores separately, summed, and profiles based on CES; square of all measures
OCP
Job satisfaction, commitment, intent to leave, actual turnover
Moder con
Controlled tenure, age gender

INDIVIDUAL VALUES IN ORGANIZATIONS
383
With regard to matching of value profiles of respondents to the profiles of other individuals or aggregates, five articles looked at affective and behavioral outcomes. Research based on the OCP found strong evidence for relationships over time between value congruence with the employing organization and job satisfaction and commitment (positive), intentions to leave, and turnover (nega­tive; Chatman, 1991; O 'Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991). Research performed using the CES also provided support for positive affect as a correlate of value congruence with one 's supervisor (Meglino, Ravlin & Adkins, 1989, 1992). Adkins, Russell and Werbel (1994) noted that congruence between applicants and recruiters was related to positive perceptions of applicants (employabihty and person-organization fit), although not to the likelihood of receiving an invitation for a second interview. In these studies based on the CES, value congruence with an immediate and specific other, supervisors or recruiters, provided more consis­tent findings than value congruence with either aggregates or profiles derived from perceptions not obtained directly from the target (e.g., supervisors ' percep­tions of management values).
Interestingly, in this stream of research, there was once again some evidence of a negative relationship between value congruence and performance (Meglino et al., 1989). This is consistent with several findings cited above for perceived value congruence. This issue is discussed further below.
Conclusions
Our review of the values literature suggests a number of conclusions, despite a wide diversity of results. We would argue that a basic reason why more progress in understanding value processes in the workplace has not been made is that a reasonably large proportion of the research reported here was not performed with the specific intent of understanding value processes, but with the idea that values or value congruence would explain another phenomenon of interest (for example, see Lee and Mowday 's 1987 study of turnover). These studies provide some valu­able insights, but tend not to address the function of values per se. This state of the literature is also part of the reason why there continues to be a plethora of defini­tions, measurement instruments, and specific values used. While in some ways, such diversity is gratifying as values research strives to find a dominant paradigm, it creates some difficulties from the standpoint of making generalizations about the current findings. Below, we provide some key conclusions that can be drawn from this literature.
1. The extent to which an individual values a mode of behavior appears to be related to his or her evaluation of decisions, and behavior regarding relevant situ­ations. While the widely diverse literature is consistent on this point, a trend that continues from earlier research is that organizational behavior beyond decision making has not received much attention. Furthermore, only two studies examin­ing values as independent variables were done in organizations, as compared to all of the studies examining value congruence. The next logical steps would seem to be attempts to incorporate more behavioral outcomes, and the use of more organi­zational field samples.
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B.M. MEGLINO AND E.C. RAVLIN
2. A second finding that is replicated across studies and measurement meth­ ods is that value congruence is positively related to affective outcomes and evalu­ ations. Both perceived and actual value congruence exhibited this relationship.
For actual organizational value congruence, a negative link to turnover, an outcome often associated with job satisfaction and organizational commitment, has been established. Relationships with other types of behavior, especially performance, remain unclear.
In this regard, Argyris and Schon 's (1978) distinction between espoused values and values in-use may be a key to understanding the empirical results obtained to date regarding performance. Enz (1988) has suggested that congru­ence with espoused values, as opposed to in-use values, is likely to have a nega­tive relationship with performance. This is thought to be caused by substandard performers feeling more pressure to conform publicly to the expressed values of the organization. This conceptualization would explain the negative correlations noted above between perceived value congruence and performance, which may be more easily influenced by social desirability concerns. The causal relationship between espoused values and performance may also be post hoc in nature, i.e., the result of behavior, rather than the cause. However, continual espousing of a set of values might also eventually influence actual value beliefs, thus providing a feed­back loop in the values process.
The espoused versus in-use distinction is less easy to utilize as an explana­tion for negative relationships between actual value congruence and performance, as the partially unconscious nature of values, and the measurement procedure itself, make actual match measures difficult to fake. As previously discussed, actual value congruence may hinder performance on non-routine tasks that benefit from constructive conflict in ideas and approaches (e.g., Amason, 19%). Some authors might even go so far as to suggest that in today 's competitive environ­ment, no task environment should be considered strictly routine, and therefore, value congruence may not facilitate performance in any case. This view seems somewhat extreme, but without empirical research into the specific processes whereby different types of congruence affect performance on different types of tasks, all conceptualizations of the relationship remain speculative.
3. Relatedly, although a significant number of studies has addressed both perceptions of and actual value congruence, only initial attempts have begun to logically distinguish between these two different constructs in the literature (see
Cable & Judge, 1996, 1997). In addition to reflecting actual value congruence, perceptions of value congruence may in part reflect efforts to appear more consis­ tent with the values of the organization or of significant others, but may also be driven by inaccurate ideas regarding what values are, what values are important, or the actual extent of congruence that exists. This suggests that we need a clearer theoretical understanding of the causes of perceived value congruence, given that these determinants go beyond the amount of actual value congruence that exists.
We should logically anticipate some differences in the effects of these types of congruence because it is quite likely that they represent different, albeit related, constructs. Although similarities exist in the results reported here, these studies largely ignore these potentially different processes. Another potentially interest-
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ing issue is whether perceived congruence with an organization is in some cases driven by local organizational conditions. If so, we might anticipate that outcomes would revolve around local conditions as well, such as satisfaction with cowork­ers and working conditions, and agreement with and behavior toward the accom­plishment of subgoals. Of course, these ideas remain highly speculative, and are not represented in the empirical literature reviewed above.
4. One issue remaining to be resolved in value congruence research relates to the appropriate method of measuring this construct. As discussed above, research­ers differ on whether normative or ipsative instruments are theoretically and statistically appropriate. Ultimately, the choice of measurement approach should depend on the theoretical nature of the- decision process being investigated. One might argue that, as with most research areas, multiple approaches are in fact a strength of good research, and that investigations of both normative effects of similarity and profile similarity should continue.
5. A central trend for the future should be the examination of national culture and the moderating influences of cultural values. After assuming a connection for many years, studies are now being done that show relationships between an indi­vidual 's country culture and his or her values. In addition, moderating effects of cultural values have also been observed. Given the extent this idea has been cited in everything from our theories to our management texts (e.g., George & Jones, 1996), relatively little in the way of empirical results has appeared in the field 's major journals until very recently. In prior research, our understanding of this issue was hampered by research that used country of origin as a surrogate for values, and ignored the fact that these dimensions vary not only by culture, but by individual as well. As well designed research has begun to appear that incorpo­rates a theory of values as well as their measurement, we should expect to experi­ence greater progress in this area.
6. As some effects of values and value congruence have now been estab­lished in the literature, it seems appropriate to focus more attention on testing elements of process approaches to values, instead of focusing solely on what outcomes are affected. In this respect, it may be useful to utilize a two-pronged approach. One approach would be to investigate a general theory of values, i.e., processes whereby all values should function. A second approach would be to examine individual values for value-specific processes. Either of these approaches requires clear ideas of what values are, which values are important, and what measurement instruments are most appropriate. However researchers proceed, such choices should be made explicitly and as they relate to theory, rather than by happenstance. In addition, research and theory that addresses the intra-individual aspects of values-based decision making, including cognition regarding the self, and emotional responses to such decisions, is clearly called for at this point.
Progress has clearly been made in values research over the last ten years, but perhaps it has not been as great as it should be. Values are commonly cited as influencing everything from selection (Cappelli, 1995) and control processes (Barker, 1993), to organizational ethics (Keeney, 1994) and leadership (Selznick, 1957). For a construct of this apparent importance, more resources should be turned toward a fuller comprehension of its relevant processes and functions.
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Acknowledgment: The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. We also thank Arzu Ilsev for her help with the review portion of this article.
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