Does Bicameralism Matter?
Does Bicameralism Matter?
Michael Cutrone Dept. of Politics Princeton University Nolan McCarty Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University
1. Introduction Perhaps the most conspicuous variation in modern legislatures concerns the practice of granting legislative authority to two separate chambers with distinct memberships. While the majority of national governments empower but a single chamber, at least a third of national legislatures practice some form of bicameralism as do 49 of the 50 American state governments.1 Scholars have made a number of arguments to explain the emergence of bicameral legislatures. One of the most common arguments for the emergence of bicameralism in Britain and its American colonies is that it helped to preserve “mixed governments,” to ensure that upper class elements of society were protected (Wood 1969, Tsebelis and Money 1997). In such settings, bicameralism allowed the upper chamber, dominated by aristocrats, to have a veto on policy. More generally, an explicit role of some bicameral systems has been the protection of some minority who is overrepresented in the upper chamber. A second rationale for bicameralism is the preservation of federalism. The United States, Germany, and other federal systems use a bicameral system in order to ensure the representation of the interests of individual states and provinces, as well as the population
Tsebelis and Money (1997, 15) define bicameral legislatures as “those whose deliberations involve two distinct assemblies.” This definition, however, masks considerable variation in the roles of each chamber in policymaking. Many “upper” chambers have legislative prerogatives that are limited in important ways; for instance, the British House of Lords is unable to originate monetary legislation and, at best, can delay bills for a year rather than permanently veto those they disagree with. For our purposes, we wish to define bicameralism more narrowly. We define bicameralism as the requirement
Michael Cutrone Dept. of Politics Princeton University Nolan McCarty Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University
1. Introduction Perhaps the most conspicuous variation in modern legislatures concerns the practice of granting legislative authority to two separate chambers with distinct memberships. While the majority of national governments empower but a single chamber, at least a third of national legislatures practice some form of bicameralism as do 49 of the 50 American state governments.1 Scholars have made a number of arguments to explain the emergence of bicameral legislatures. One of the most common arguments for the emergence of bicameralism in Britain and its American colonies is that it helped to preserve “mixed governments,” to ensure that upper class elements of society were protected (Wood 1969, Tsebelis and Money 1997). In such settings, bicameralism allowed the upper chamber, dominated by aristocrats, to have a veto on policy. More generally, an explicit role of some bicameral systems has been the protection of some minority who is overrepresented in the upper chamber. A second rationale for bicameralism is the preservation of federalism. The United States, Germany, and other federal systems use a bicameral system in order to ensure the representation of the interests of individual states and provinces, as well as the population
Tsebelis and Money (1997, 15) define bicameral legislatures as “those whose deliberations involve two distinct assemblies.” This definition, however, masks considerable variation in the roles of each chamber in policymaking. Many “upper” chambers have legislative prerogatives that are limited in important ways; for instance, the British House of Lords is unable to originate monetary legislation and, at best, can delay bills for a year rather than permanently veto those they disagree with. For our purposes, we wish to define bicameralism more narrowly. We define bicameralism as the requirement
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