Corporate Governance
Chief Executive Officer
REMUNERATION AND RETENTION RATE
IN
COMPANIES WITH FAMILY-CONTROLLED BOARDS IN HONG KONG
ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether the remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer position in Hong Kong public firms is affected by board composition, given the influence of family control on the boards of many Hong Kong companies. It is hypothesized that I) in family-controlled boards, Chief Executive Officers receiver higher compensation and II) Chief Executive Officers in family-controlled boards serve as Chief Executive Officer positions longer. In family-controlled boards, corporate governance is of very high importance as the independent non-executive directors can exert less influence over the board, compared to non-family-controlled boards (“dispersed boards”).
Keywords: Board composition, Remuneration, Corporate Governance.
1. INTRODUCTION
The economic turmoil in Asia in 1997 has led to a wider recognition of the importance of corporate governance. In line with global trends towards higher standards of corporate governance, the duties and liabilities of the directors of the listed companies have therefore become more stringent.
It follows that many corporate governance mechanisms designed to monitor board members may be less effective for family-owned and family-controlled firms. However, to attract outside investors, family-owned and family-controlled firms tend to encourage greater independence and monitoring from the board.
For the purposes of the study, family-owned and family-controlled are used interchangeably. The reason is that actual family ownership is difficult to ascertain due to various shareholdings and special purpose vehicles that are used, and cannot be deduced from annual reports.
Thus, in this study we classify family-control and family-ownership when the board is made of a majority of related family members as a “family-controlled board”. When it
REMUNERATION AND RETENTION RATE
IN
COMPANIES WITH FAMILY-CONTROLLED BOARDS IN HONG KONG
ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether the remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer position in Hong Kong public firms is affected by board composition, given the influence of family control on the boards of many Hong Kong companies. It is hypothesized that I) in family-controlled boards, Chief Executive Officers receiver higher compensation and II) Chief Executive Officers in family-controlled boards serve as Chief Executive Officer positions longer. In family-controlled boards, corporate governance is of very high importance as the independent non-executive directors can exert less influence over the board, compared to non-family-controlled boards (“dispersed boards”).
Keywords: Board composition, Remuneration, Corporate Governance.
1. INTRODUCTION
The economic turmoil in Asia in 1997 has led to a wider recognition of the importance of corporate governance. In line with global trends towards higher standards of corporate governance, the duties and liabilities of the directors of the listed companies have therefore become more stringent.
It follows that many corporate governance mechanisms designed to monitor board members may be less effective for family-owned and family-controlled firms. However, to attract outside investors, family-owned and family-controlled firms tend to encourage greater independence and monitoring from the board.
For the purposes of the study, family-owned and family-controlled are used interchangeably. The reason is that actual family ownership is difficult to ascertain due to various shareholdings and special purpose vehicles that are used, and cannot be deduced from annual reports.
Thus, in this study we classify family-control and family-ownership when the board is made of a majority of related family members as a “family-controlled board”. When it
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