Relations between Allied Forces and the Soviet Union were weakening by the end of the war but the Allies needed to protect the promises made by Russia. (Ward). The firebombing was designated to show the Russian Forces what the Allies are capable of and to act as a warning to them to stay within the agreements they had made at the war conferences such as the one at Yalta (Zuljan). A January 1945 RAF internal memo states that as the war was coming to an end, there was still a chance for a new war to begin, the Allies needed to show the Russians what Bomber Command is capable of doing and the bombing would further cripple Germany from advancing (Simkin). The Allies were trying to look for ways to give themselves a higher power over their communist ally Russia and the firebombing would weaken the chances for Germany to use Dresden as a way of advancing. Any reforming of Nazi forces in the east could have been dangerous towards the advancing Russian Army, extended out all over Germany as it tried to quickly advance on Berlin. A Russian force less than 70 miles east of Dresden was very vulnerable to German counterattack (USAF) and the Allied bombing made sure that no German communication or support was possible through Dresden and do not cause a threat for the Russians who were coming into Germany. The bombing of Dresden was the only best way in wiping out the German force and warn the
Relations between Allied Forces and the Soviet Union were weakening by the end of the war but the Allies needed to protect the promises made by Russia. (Ward). The firebombing was designated to show the Russian Forces what the Allies are capable of and to act as a warning to them to stay within the agreements they had made at the war conferences such as the one at Yalta (Zuljan). A January 1945 RAF internal memo states that as the war was coming to an end, there was still a chance for a new war to begin, the Allies needed to show the Russians what Bomber Command is capable of doing and the bombing would further cripple Germany from advancing (Simkin). The Allies were trying to look for ways to give themselves a higher power over their communist ally Russia and the firebombing would weaken the chances for Germany to use Dresden as a way of advancing. Any reforming of Nazi forces in the east could have been dangerous towards the advancing Russian Army, extended out all over Germany as it tried to quickly advance on Berlin. A Russian force less than 70 miles east of Dresden was very vulnerable to German counterattack (USAF) and the Allied bombing made sure that no German communication or support was possible through Dresden and do not cause a threat for the Russians who were coming into Germany. The bombing of Dresden was the only best way in wiping out the German force and warn the