French Foreign Policy
France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and
Issues in U.S.-French Relations
Paul Belkin
Analyst in European Affairs
May 20, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700 www.crs.gov
RL32464
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations
Summary
The factors that shape French foreign policy have changed since the end of the Cold War. The perspectives of France and the United States have diverged in some cases. More core interests remain similar. Both countries’ governments have embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe through an expanded European Union and NATO. Each has recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the most important threats to their security today.
Several factors shape French foreign policy. France has a self-identity that calls for efforts to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human rights. France prefers to engage international issues in a multilateral framework, above all through the European Union. European efforts to form an EU security policy potentially independent of NATO emerged in this context. However, more recently, policymakers in France, Europe and the United States have come to view a stronger European defense arm as a complement to rather than a substitute for NATO.
From the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States through the Iraq war of 2003 until today, France has pressed the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework. France normally wishes to “legitimize” actions ranging from economic sanctions to military action in the United Nations.
The election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French presidency in
Issues in U.S.-French Relations
Paul Belkin
Analyst in European Affairs
May 20, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700 www.crs.gov
RL32464
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations
Summary
The factors that shape French foreign policy have changed since the end of the Cold War. The perspectives of France and the United States have diverged in some cases. More core interests remain similar. Both countries’ governments have embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe through an expanded European Union and NATO. Each has recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the most important threats to their security today.
Several factors shape French foreign policy. France has a self-identity that calls for efforts to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human rights. France prefers to engage international issues in a multilateral framework, above all through the European Union. European efforts to form an EU security policy potentially independent of NATO emerged in this context. However, more recently, policymakers in France, Europe and the United States have come to view a stronger European defense arm as a complement to rather than a substitute for NATO.
From the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States through the Iraq war of 2003 until today, France has pressed the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework. France normally wishes to “legitimize” actions ranging from economic sanctions to military action in the United Nations.
The election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French presidency in
Cited: in “French Premier Urges Approval of Scarf Ban,” International Herald Tribune, February 4, 2004, p. 3. 18 Jean Baubérot, “Laïcité, le grand écart,” (editorial), Le Monde, January 4-5, 2004, p. 1. 19 CRS Report RL33166, Muslims in Europe: Integration in Selected Countries, coordinated by Paul Gallis; see also Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France (Washington, DC, 2006). 21 “Qui sont les juifs de France?”, Le Figaro, November 18, 2002. 22 “Les Juifs et les Arabes en France,” Le Nouvel Observateur, January 24-30, 2002, p. 5; “Wave of Anti-Semitism Called Threat to France,” International Herald Tribune, October 20, 2004, p. 3. 27 Interviews, November 2003-December 2005; Statement of (then) NATO Secretary General Robertson, cited in Atlantic News, December 17, 2003. 28 Interviews, December 2003-December 2005; “Battle Group Plan Advances,” International Herald Tribune, April 6, 2004, p. 3. 29 Interviews, 2003-2005. 32 “L’effort de défense devrait se maintenir ‘autour de 2%’ du PIB,” Le Monde, March 22, 2008, p. 9.