Democratic Deficit in the Eu
Does the EU suffer from a democratic deficit? If so, can it be solved by conferring greater powers on the European parliament?
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The ‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit formulated by Weiler, consisting of the increased role of the executive Commission in matters of legislation, the weakness of the European Parliament (hereafter the EP), the lack of ‘European’ elections, EU distance to public scrutiny and voters, and finally ‘policy drifting’ by the executive non-compliant to voter interests, has and continues to be a major target of criticism within the field of European Union (the EU) law. The matter is of utmost importance in light of the implications of such in the EU legislative process involving the EP and its perceived lack of substantive necessity despite reforms seeking to remedy such.
Since the establishment of supremacy in EU law by the European Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos and Costa, it is primarily the law-making process of the EU itself that drives the debate on the perceived lack of democracy. Central to all of this is the complexity of the process that casts doubt upon its democratic legitimacy. Despite the Treaty of Lisbon (Lisbon) remedying much of the loathsome deficit, effort is still required as overwhelming flaws in the democratic legitimacy of the EU persist to which no single remedy is available. The most significant feature of the complexity of EU law-making throughout its various stages concerns the intra-EU balance of powers which furthers the debate on the democratic deficit. As such, focus must be placed upon the structure and function of the primary EU institutions which are undoubtedly interlinked to the claims of a democratic gap in the law-making process. Factors of representation, electoral politics and public scrutiny are also matters of importance and potentially propose a contrary account to the
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The ‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit formulated by Weiler, consisting of the increased role of the executive Commission in matters of legislation, the weakness of the European Parliament (hereafter the EP), the lack of ‘European’ elections, EU distance to public scrutiny and voters, and finally ‘policy drifting’ by the executive non-compliant to voter interests, has and continues to be a major target of criticism within the field of European Union (the EU) law. The matter is of utmost importance in light of the implications of such in the EU legislative process involving the EP and its perceived lack of substantive necessity despite reforms seeking to remedy such.
Since the establishment of supremacy in EU law by the European Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos and Costa, it is primarily the law-making process of the EU itself that drives the debate on the perceived lack of democracy. Central to all of this is the complexity of the process that casts doubt upon its democratic legitimacy. Despite the Treaty of Lisbon (Lisbon) remedying much of the loathsome deficit, effort is still required as overwhelming flaws in the democratic legitimacy of the EU persist to which no single remedy is available. The most significant feature of the complexity of EU law-making throughout its various stages concerns the intra-EU balance of powers which furthers the debate on the democratic deficit. As such, focus must be placed upon the structure and function of the primary EU institutions which are undoubtedly interlinked to the claims of a democratic gap in the law-making process. Factors of representation, electoral politics and public scrutiny are also matters of importance and potentially propose a contrary account to the
Bibliography: Articles P Dann, ‘European Parliament and Executive Federalism: Approaching a Parliament in a Semi-Parliamentary Democracy’ (2003) G Majone, ‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’ (2000). Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 G Majone, ‘Transaction-cost efficiency and the democratic deficit’, (2010) Journal of European Public Policy, Vol A Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing the Legitimacy of the European Union’ (2002). Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 JHH Weiler, et Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the [Ordinary Legislative] Procedure (2007) OJ C145/2Texts UK Political Info, ‘European Parliament election turnout 1979 – 2009’, D Chalmers, et. Al.,‘European Union Law’ (2010). Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. A Follesdal, ‘Democracy and the European Union: Challenges’ in A Follesdal, P Koslwoski, Democracy and the European Union, (Berlin/Heidelberg Springer-Verl : 1998) -------------------------------------------- [ 1 ]. JHH Weiler, et. al., ‘European Democracy and its Critique’, (1995), West European Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 4–39. [ 7 ]. A Follesdal, S Hix, ‘Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (2006) Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No.3, p.554. [ 8 ]. A Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit” : Reassessing the Legitimacy of the European Union’ (2002) Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, p. 612. [ 9 ]. A Follesdal, ‘Democracy and the European Union: Challenges’ in A Follesdal, P Koslwoski, Democracy and the European Union, (Berlin/Heidelberg Springer-Verl : 1998), p.2. [ 10 ]. D Chalmers, et. Al.,‘European Union Law’, 2nd ed., (Cambridge University Press : 2010), p. 135. [ 14 ]. P Dann, ‘European Parliament and Executive Federalism: Approaching a Parliament in a Semi-Parliamentary Democracy’ (2003) European Law Journal, Vol.9, No.5, p.569. [ 17 ]. G Majone, ‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’, (2000) Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 273–302. [ 19 ]. G Majone, ‘Transaction-cost efficiency and the democratic deficit’, (2010) Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2, p. 159. [ 20 ]. Trilogues are set out in the Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the [Ordinary Legislative] Procedure (2007) OJ C145/2.