Case Study Abercrombie And Fitch
Case Analysis: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch
CASE SUMMARY
Samantha Elauf is a practicing Muslim who wears a headscarf in accordance with her understanding of the requirements of her religion. She applied for a position at an Abercrombie & Fitch store, which imposes a “look policy” that employees must abide by in regards to their dress while working at the store. Despite being given a rating that would qualify her to be hired, the district manager made the decision to not hire her on the basis that her headscarf would violate the “look policy” at the store. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Abercrombie & Fitch on behalf of Elauf claiming that they were in violation of Title VII of the Civil …show more content…
This broad definition allows the Supreme Court to treat this case as disparate-treatment, because religious practices is included in that definition. It is also important to note that under Title VII, if an employer accommodating a religious practice does cause undue hardship then he or she is not in violation (Civil Rights Act of 1964). In this case, Abercrombie’s “look policy” did not create an example of undue hardship. For an employer to demonstrate undue hardship, he or she would have to show that an accommodation would severely disrupt or negatively impact the company (“Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace”). This accommodation was shown to be a motivating factor in why she was not hired. As stated by Justice Scalia in the majority opinion, “An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions” (EEOC 5). This employer made it a factor and was thus in violation of Title VII. This also means that a company does not violate Title VII if they choose to not hire someone as long as race, color, religion, sex, and national origin are not the grounds for their …show more content…
The employer’s desire to not grant this supports the Supreme Court holding that in a disparate-treatment claim the applicant must only show that his or her need for an accommodation for religious practices was a motivating factor in the decision not to hire. Congress included religious practices in its definition of religion for Title VII purposes which makes this claim fall under disparate-treatment because Elauf was not hired because of the employer’s choice to avoid providing her an accommodation.
From my perspective, this issue also reaches back to the Free Exercise clause found in the First Amendment, stating that Congress shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion. In this case, Elauf was denied the right to freely exercise her religious practices when she was not hired because of her understanding of how to practice her
CASE SUMMARY
Samantha Elauf is a practicing Muslim who wears a headscarf in accordance with her understanding of the requirements of her religion. She applied for a position at an Abercrombie & Fitch store, which imposes a “look policy” that employees must abide by in regards to their dress while working at the store. Despite being given a rating that would qualify her to be hired, the district manager made the decision to not hire her on the basis that her headscarf would violate the “look policy” at the store. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Abercrombie & Fitch on behalf of Elauf claiming that they were in violation of Title VII of the Civil …show more content…
This broad definition allows the Supreme Court to treat this case as disparate-treatment, because religious practices is included in that definition. It is also important to note that under Title VII, if an employer accommodating a religious practice does cause undue hardship then he or she is not in violation (Civil Rights Act of 1964). In this case, Abercrombie’s “look policy” did not create an example of undue hardship. For an employer to demonstrate undue hardship, he or she would have to show that an accommodation would severely disrupt or negatively impact the company (“Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace”). This accommodation was shown to be a motivating factor in why she was not hired. As stated by Justice Scalia in the majority opinion, “An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions” (EEOC 5). This employer made it a factor and was thus in violation of Title VII. This also means that a company does not violate Title VII if they choose to not hire someone as long as race, color, religion, sex, and national origin are not the grounds for their …show more content…
The employer’s desire to not grant this supports the Supreme Court holding that in a disparate-treatment claim the applicant must only show that his or her need for an accommodation for religious practices was a motivating factor in the decision not to hire. Congress included religious practices in its definition of religion for Title VII purposes which makes this claim fall under disparate-treatment because Elauf was not hired because of the employer’s choice to avoid providing her an accommodation.
From my perspective, this issue also reaches back to the Free Exercise clause found in the First Amendment, stating that Congress shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion. In this case, Elauf was denied the right to freely exercise her religious practices when she was not hired because of her understanding of how to practice her