Bonjour's Foundationalism
In his article "Foundationalism and the External World," Laurence BonJour explains that there are two elements in a situation of basic belief. First, there is a basic belief whose content pertains to some aspect of the experience. Second, there is second independent mental act that must supply the person's reason for thinking that the belief is true. "If second metal act is construed as cognitive and conceptual, then it is hard to see why it does not itself require justification of reason for thinking that the proposition is true" (BonJour 231). On the other hand, "if the mental act of immediate apprehension is construed as non-cognitive and non-conceptual in character, then it becomes difficult to see how such an act can provide reason for
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By proposing the justification of a meta-belief about an occurrent first order belief as well as beliefs about sensory experience, BonJour argues that the constitutive awareness satisfies the requirement for foundationalism and how its justification works in order to avoid foundationalist dilemma. He extends the idea of this justification to connect the foundation to a physical world. BonJour argues that an occurrent belief is a conscious state on its own and it is an intrinsic and constitutive awareness. For an ultimate source of justification, he argues that an apperceptive meta-belief about an occurrent belief has epistemic status required by foundationalism: it can be justified because it is an internally accessible reason for thinking that it is true without that reason depending on any other beliefs. In parallel to the first point, he also argues that a constitutive awareness of sensory content can justify foundational beliefs. BonJour draws an objection to what was presented by philosopher Davidson who proposed the idea that the distinctive content of a sensory experience is non-propositional and non-conceptual in character. According to Davidson, "there is no intelligible relation of justification …show more content…
He argues that these features of experiences justify an inference to the external physical world. Based on these features of experiences, BonJour concludes that these experiences need to be explained by the three-dimensional physical world, and calls this explanation as the quasi-commonsensical hypothesis. In order to provide the best explanation of the details of our sensory experience, he proceeds to support the quasi-commonsensical hypothesis. He divides the explanations into two categories: analog and digital. Analogue explanation explains the features of experience by appealing directly to the basic features of the objects in the hypothesized world. Digital explanation explains the features of experience by appealing to the combination of the representation of a world and some agent that produces experience in
By proposing the justification of a meta-belief about an occurrent first order belief as well as beliefs about sensory experience, BonJour argues that the constitutive awareness satisfies the requirement for foundationalism and how its justification works in order to avoid foundationalist dilemma. He extends the idea of this justification to connect the foundation to a physical world. BonJour argues that an occurrent belief is a conscious state on its own and it is an intrinsic and constitutive awareness. For an ultimate source of justification, he argues that an apperceptive meta-belief about an occurrent belief has epistemic status required by foundationalism: it can be justified because it is an internally accessible reason for thinking that it is true without that reason depending on any other beliefs. In parallel to the first point, he also argues that a constitutive awareness of sensory content can justify foundational beliefs. BonJour draws an objection to what was presented by philosopher Davidson who proposed the idea that the distinctive content of a sensory experience is non-propositional and non-conceptual in character. According to Davidson, "there is no intelligible relation of justification …show more content…
He argues that these features of experiences justify an inference to the external physical world. Based on these features of experiences, BonJour concludes that these experiences need to be explained by the three-dimensional physical world, and calls this explanation as the quasi-commonsensical hypothesis. In order to provide the best explanation of the details of our sensory experience, he proceeds to support the quasi-commonsensical hypothesis. He divides the explanations into two categories: analog and digital. Analogue explanation explains the features of experience by appealing directly to the basic features of the objects in the hypothesized world. Digital explanation explains the features of experience by appealing to the combination of the representation of a world and some agent that produces experience in