Gender
Gender
From “Critical Terms for Art History”
The essential feature of gender in representation is not so much "difference," as we are often told, but "agreement." To focus on agreement, as I will do here, enables us to deal not only with the genders depicted in a representation (for example, images of women) and with their relations of difference (for example, depicted distinctions between men and women). It also enables us to deal with the gender of representation - what has come to be called its "gendered" aspect (whether or not it depicts a gender or gender relations) in both its substantive and its intersubjective dimensions. In a representation gendered "male," for example, any depictions of women and of things or environments are bound and governed by the gender with which they must all contextually agree, namely, the male inflection spread through the enunciation. As we will see, usually it is too simple to say that whereas the objects depicted in a painting might be "female," the painting itself, as a painting, is "male." But it is crucial to recognize that the gender(s) in representation cannot be understood without reference to the gender(s) of representation and vice versa. We could consider this matter historiographically. For example, what has sometimes been identified as a first generation of feminist art historians concerned with gender dealt largely with the gender in representation, that is, "difference," while a second generation tackled the gender of representation, that is, "agreement." Available reviews along these lines, however, need not be repeated here (see Tickner 1988; Gouma-Peterson and Mathews 1987).
The two perspectives, in fact, should be treated synthetically. We can start analytically either with the visual marking of gender "difference" or with its gender "agreement." Either way, eventually we must come to terms with the fact that a system of differences is organized in classes of agreements. In so-called queer formations
From “Critical Terms for Art History”
The essential feature of gender in representation is not so much "difference," as we are often told, but "agreement." To focus on agreement, as I will do here, enables us to deal not only with the genders depicted in a representation (for example, images of women) and with their relations of difference (for example, depicted distinctions between men and women). It also enables us to deal with the gender of representation - what has come to be called its "gendered" aspect (whether or not it depicts a gender or gender relations) in both its substantive and its intersubjective dimensions. In a representation gendered "male," for example, any depictions of women and of things or environments are bound and governed by the gender with which they must all contextually agree, namely, the male inflection spread through the enunciation. As we will see, usually it is too simple to say that whereas the objects depicted in a painting might be "female," the painting itself, as a painting, is "male." But it is crucial to recognize that the gender(s) in representation cannot be understood without reference to the gender(s) of representation and vice versa. We could consider this matter historiographically. For example, what has sometimes been identified as a first generation of feminist art historians concerned with gender dealt largely with the gender in representation, that is, "difference," while a second generation tackled the gender of representation, that is, "agreement." Available reviews along these lines, however, need not be repeated here (see Tickner 1988; Gouma-Peterson and Mathews 1987).
The two perspectives, in fact, should be treated synthetically. We can start analytically either with the visual marking of gender "difference" or with its gender "agreement." Either way, eventually we must come to terms with the fact that a system of differences is organized in classes of agreements. In so-called queer formations