Why Did Britain and France Accept to the Munich Agreement?
Why did Britain and France accept to the Munich Agreement?
On 29 September 1938, the four leaders of Germany, Italy, Britain and France signed an agreement on the fate of the Sudeten territory in Czechoslovakia, without the Czechoslovak authorities present, which, it would seem at the time, was a guarantee of peace. Such was the premise of the event, but in reality it represented the abandonment of Czechoslovakia (Weinberg, 1988: 165), by France in particular, and the naïve nature of the foreign policy of both Britain and France. It was a failure in upholding basic civil rights, and a manifest of weakness of the two countries to stand against the bully, Hitler. There are a few reasons for this: the inexperience in facing a new enemy, dictatorship, the times were bad for a war, (not many years had passed since the last Great War and the economies still felt the effects of the Great Depression,) the public opinion was against another war; the failure of the League of Nations, and the Locarno Treaty, in making countries work together, instead of following their own, selfish, ambitions, and, most important of all, the policy of appeasement, due to Neville Chamberlain.
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement rested on the theory that the objectives of Hitler were essentially “limited in scope... to reversing the wrongs which... had been done to Germany in 1919” (Thomson, 1990: 737). This fatal assumption that the fascist movement had limited objectives and the removal of nationalist grievances would satisfy it, was followed by years of false talks and sense of achieving peace, when the truth was quite the opposite. Furthermore, Chamberlain was inexperienced in foreign affairs, and he had a desire to reach Anglo-German alliance to follow up with what his father, Joe Chamberlain, had started (Adamthwaite, 1977: 62). By ensuing such an alliance, he would, at least on paper, bring peace, something that would be a major achievement for the Tories in the looming General
On 29 September 1938, the four leaders of Germany, Italy, Britain and France signed an agreement on the fate of the Sudeten territory in Czechoslovakia, without the Czechoslovak authorities present, which, it would seem at the time, was a guarantee of peace. Such was the premise of the event, but in reality it represented the abandonment of Czechoslovakia (Weinberg, 1988: 165), by France in particular, and the naïve nature of the foreign policy of both Britain and France. It was a failure in upholding basic civil rights, and a manifest of weakness of the two countries to stand against the bully, Hitler. There are a few reasons for this: the inexperience in facing a new enemy, dictatorship, the times were bad for a war, (not many years had passed since the last Great War and the economies still felt the effects of the Great Depression,) the public opinion was against another war; the failure of the League of Nations, and the Locarno Treaty, in making countries work together, instead of following their own, selfish, ambitions, and, most important of all, the policy of appeasement, due to Neville Chamberlain.
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement rested on the theory that the objectives of Hitler were essentially “limited in scope... to reversing the wrongs which... had been done to Germany in 1919” (Thomson, 1990: 737). This fatal assumption that the fascist movement had limited objectives and the removal of nationalist grievances would satisfy it, was followed by years of false talks and sense of achieving peace, when the truth was quite the opposite. Furthermore, Chamberlain was inexperienced in foreign affairs, and he had a desire to reach Anglo-German alliance to follow up with what his father, Joe Chamberlain, had started (Adamthwaite, 1977: 62). By ensuing such an alliance, he would, at least on paper, bring peace, something that would be a major achievement for the Tories in the looming General
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