TOPIC 1 Locus Standi
Civil Procedure 2015
Dr. Paul Anthony McDermott
Topic 1: Locus Standi and Jus Tertii
A) General principles.
1) In Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v Coogan [1989] IR 734 Finlay CJ referred to a litigant who is “an officious or meddlesome intervenient”. Walsh J. stated in “every member of the public has an interest in seeing that the fundamental law of the State is not defeated. The Constitution commits to the judicial organ of government the ultimate guardianship of the Constitution itself and of the vindication of the rights which are either guaranteed by it or conferred by it. But the courts cannot move until their powers are invoked.” (at 743).
2) The basic test of locus standi was laid down in Cahill v Sutton [1980] I.R. 269 where, in the context of a constitutional challenge to legislation, Henchy J stated at p. 280:
“…The primary rule as to standing in constitutional matters is that the person challenging the constitutionality of the statute, or some other person for whom he is deemed by the court to be entitled to speak, must be able to assert that because of the alleged unconstitutionality, his or that other person’s interests have been adversely affected, or stand in real or imminent danger of being adversely by the operation of the statute.”
The principles in Cahill in respect of the requirements as to interest and apprehended injury have been generally given a generous interpretation by the courts.1
3) Essentially, standing requirements act as a filter and the rationale for this filtering function is essentially twofold.
4) First, it operates to prevent the wasting of court time by (in the words of Finlay CJ in SPUC v Coogan) “an officious or meddlesome intervenient” or the “…litigious person, the crank, the obstructionist, the meddlesome, the perverse [and] the officious man of straw” (Henchy J. in Cahill v. Sutton).
5) The second rationale for the locus standi rules is encapsulated by the jus tertii rule. This rule is
Dr. Paul Anthony McDermott
Topic 1: Locus Standi and Jus Tertii
A) General principles.
1) In Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v Coogan [1989] IR 734 Finlay CJ referred to a litigant who is “an officious or meddlesome intervenient”. Walsh J. stated in “every member of the public has an interest in seeing that the fundamental law of the State is not defeated. The Constitution commits to the judicial organ of government the ultimate guardianship of the Constitution itself and of the vindication of the rights which are either guaranteed by it or conferred by it. But the courts cannot move until their powers are invoked.” (at 743).
2) The basic test of locus standi was laid down in Cahill v Sutton [1980] I.R. 269 where, in the context of a constitutional challenge to legislation, Henchy J stated at p. 280:
“…The primary rule as to standing in constitutional matters is that the person challenging the constitutionality of the statute, or some other person for whom he is deemed by the court to be entitled to speak, must be able to assert that because of the alleged unconstitutionality, his or that other person’s interests have been adversely affected, or stand in real or imminent danger of being adversely by the operation of the statute.”
The principles in Cahill in respect of the requirements as to interest and apprehended injury have been generally given a generous interpretation by the courts.1
3) Essentially, standing requirements act as a filter and the rationale for this filtering function is essentially twofold.
4) First, it operates to prevent the wasting of court time by (in the words of Finlay CJ in SPUC v Coogan) “an officious or meddlesome intervenient” or the “…litigious person, the crank, the obstructionist, the meddlesome, the perverse [and] the officious man of straw” (Henchy J. in Cahill v. Sutton).
5) The second rationale for the locus standi rules is encapsulated by the jus tertii rule. This rule is