Too Little, Too Late: The Vietnam War

‘’Too Little, Too Late’’ – Could the Vietnam War have been won if intervention had started earlier, or firepower been increased?

‘’We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.’’ Were the words of Lyndon B. Johnson in October 1964, [Lyndon B. Johnson Re-election Campaign speech 1964] in reference to the pressure the American government had been facing from questions raised about how far their support in an ‘advisory’ role would extend to, as the Vietnamese civil conflict escalated. The Vietnam ‘War’ had been ongoing internally since the French defeat at Điện Biên Phủ [Vietnam in HD, History Channel]and the Geneva Accords division, and as a result of …show more content…
In 1954, the power vacuum left by the French withdrawal from Vietnam due to the French inability to fight such a large war for their colonial power, resulted in the US-led advisory role of military and political commanders to be sent to South Vietnam in support of the pro-western government there. By 1955, the US-sponsored President Diem of South Vietnam declared the South an independent state. Diem’s strong anti-communist beliefs, his persecution of Buddhists, and almost warmongering nature are the key factors for the eminent escalation, predicted by the US military in the period from 1950-1960. The Eisenhower administration understood that if Diem continued, the overwhelming support for the Vietminh would escalate into a proper conflict. It is said that if Diem had not rigged his own election, 80% of the population would have voted for the nationalistic North Vietnamese. The Vietminh’s desire to hold further …show more content…
Johnson that ‘’we still have a commitment to Vietnamese freedom.’’ And thus the cycle of what-to-do left by JFK was to be repeated when by a full year had passed since Diem’s death and the withdrawal of 1000 military personnel, there was still no clear option of what action to take in the commitment to containment, Vietnamese freedom, and the will of the American people. In late 1964, Johnson was at ends over the necessity of intervention. Though he proclaimed that ‘’We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves,’’ the incident off the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 2 1964. Suddenly, all his senior military advisers and the Pentagon called for escalation, exaggerating the following incident to be an act of war. Evidence would suggest Johnson’s decision was not due to a belief that Vietnam would be easy, but rather it was necessary. Whether or not it was too late at this time is debatable, as the earliest combat reports in 1965 showed several successful operations even with the new use of airlifting, and the success of La Drang is an early example of such. Throughout 1965-1966, further combat bases were being established all across, and it seemed considerable efforts to route the NVA had been achieved, and the US government viewed this as a success in a sense that it would be reasonable to continue on with