The Problem of the "One and Many"
Introduction In a quest to inquire into being, metaphysics is confronted by one fundamental question that; is reality constituted by one being or are there many beings? This question establishes the central problem of metaphysics that is known as the problem of the ‘one’ and ‘many’. Parmenides who first dealt with the nature of being and considered ‘being as being’ as the source of unification of all reality, held that “ultimately there exists a One Being”. It follows that this being is changeless, indivisible and is the source of sameness insofar as it is one; nothing differs from it. Hence, according to Parmenides, the senses deceive us in reporting reality as many. This doctrine of seeing reality as one is called ‘monism’. On the other hand, empirists also hold a pluralistic view of reality when they reject the notion of being and favour the reality of observable or concrete beings existing positively. Many philosophers endeavor to give a philosophical solution to the aforementioned problem that takes into account both doctrines, monism and pluralism. St. Thomas Aquinas is credited with providing such a solution to the problem of the one and many. It is precisely the objective of this paper to discuss the one and many as a metaphysical problem vis-à-vis the solution proposed by Aquinas. To do this, we shall firstly present the nature of the problem in relation to Parmenides’ earliest view of being. Further we shall expose the standpoint of Plato who earlier made strides in a bid to solve the problem. Lastly, we will discuss the solution suggested by Aquinas.
Exposition of the problem and Parmenides’ view of being Common sense experience affirms that there are distinct beings existing in reality. Regardless of the differences subsisting among concrete beings, they are similar and related by one common denominator that is ‘actual existence’. Thus, beings are identical by the fact that they exist and distinct simply on grounds that each being ‘is’ insofar as
Exposition of the problem and Parmenides’ view of being Common sense experience affirms that there are distinct beings existing in reality. Regardless of the differences subsisting among concrete beings, they are similar and related by one common denominator that is ‘actual existence’. Thus, beings are identical by the fact that they exist and distinct simply on grounds that each being ‘is’ insofar as
Bibliography: CONFORD, F. M., trans. Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides’ Way of Truth and Plato’s Parmenides, Bobbs- Merrill Company Inc. Indianapolis, N. Y. 1957. HART, C ST.THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. A.C. PEGIS, Doubleday and Company. Inc., Garden City, N. Y. 1955. [ 2 ]. F. M. CONFORD, trans. Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides’ Way of Truth and Plato’s Parmenides, Bobbs- Merrill Company Inc., Indianapolis, N. Y. 1957, 29. [ 3 ]. A. C. HART, Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing, Prentice- Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1959, 80. [ 13 ]. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans., A. C. PEGIS, Doubleday and Company. Inc., Garden City, N. Y. 1955, Bk. 1, 1.