The New Cold War Jiergensmeyer Summary
Mark Juergensmeyer's “The New Cold War”:
Smith mentioned Juergensmeyer, who in “The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State” (Juergensmeyer 1993) attempted to deal with the question of religious nationalism and the expected conflict between it and the secular society. While Juergensmeyer does deal with a nationalism that is religious, his definition seems to be influenced by secularization theory, presenting religion opposed to the secular society with no chance for the two to coexist. He explains that his approach in his book is to attempt to see the contrasting roles of religion and secular society through the eyes of “religious activists”:
“From their perspectives it is secular nationalism, and not religion, that …show more content…
It is true that there are anti-modern or anti-secular elements within the religious-Zionist movement, and that these elements live up to Juergensmeyer's perception of religious nationalism, but the movement as a whole does not conform to that perception. Rather, I would argue that Juergensmeyer's idea of national religion should be seen as 'fundamentalism'. He does acknowledge that it would be easy to characterize it as such, but rejects this on three …show more content…
By calling someone a fundamentalist, one would suggest that that person only is motivated by religious beliefs rather than the society and the world in general. This seems like an odd statement, considering that he just two paragraphs later quote Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as stating that there is no clear distinction between religion and politics, the distinction being a Western way of thinking (ibid, locations 138-139). When he recognizes that that is the case, why does he insist that calling a person fundamentalist is denying his ability to think both religiously and politically? A non-Western fundamentalist would necessarily insist on religion and politics being the same or so closely connected that there are no crucial distinction. That is at least the case for both traditional Judaism and
Smith mentioned Juergensmeyer, who in “The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State” (Juergensmeyer 1993) attempted to deal with the question of religious nationalism and the expected conflict between it and the secular society. While Juergensmeyer does deal with a nationalism that is religious, his definition seems to be influenced by secularization theory, presenting religion opposed to the secular society with no chance for the two to coexist. He explains that his approach in his book is to attempt to see the contrasting roles of religion and secular society through the eyes of “religious activists”:
“From their perspectives it is secular nationalism, and not religion, that …show more content…
It is true that there are anti-modern or anti-secular elements within the religious-Zionist movement, and that these elements live up to Juergensmeyer's perception of religious nationalism, but the movement as a whole does not conform to that perception. Rather, I would argue that Juergensmeyer's idea of national religion should be seen as 'fundamentalism'. He does acknowledge that it would be easy to characterize it as such, but rejects this on three …show more content…
By calling someone a fundamentalist, one would suggest that that person only is motivated by religious beliefs rather than the society and the world in general. This seems like an odd statement, considering that he just two paragraphs later quote Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as stating that there is no clear distinction between religion and politics, the distinction being a Western way of thinking (ibid, locations 138-139). When he recognizes that that is the case, why does he insist that calling a person fundamentalist is denying his ability to think both religiously and politically? A non-Western fundamentalist would necessarily insist on religion and politics being the same or so closely connected that there are no crucial distinction. That is at least the case for both traditional Judaism and