The Inevitability of Allied Victory in Europe During World War Two
To consider the inevitability of allied victory in Europe during World War Two requires a more in depth analysis of Germany’s position rather than just looking at the pure ability for the allies to produce war materials and incalculable streams of soldiers. Ultimately ‘quantity of men and arms tells us little about quality’. Obviously Allied victory was final and decisive but this essay will argue that even though this war was won on economic power it did not mean that victory for the nations that were to be industrial superpowers was inevitable. However Allied victory eventually did become inevitable after certain turning points in the war, this essay will demonstrate how the two most important turning points, the Battle for Stalingrad and the entry of the USA into the war changed a possible German victory into an inevitable Allied victory. In essence this essay will show that the idea of total war and industrial gigantism do not guarantee victory in conflict. One must also ask themselves why Germany would have such a drive for war if Allied victory was conceived to be inevitable. After all what soldier would fight the unwinnable battle?
Richard Overy states in Why the Allies Won that ‘no rational man in early 1942 would have guessed at the eventual outcome of the war’ . To appreciate the credibility of this statement and the probability of German victory, the early years of the war must be looked at retrospectively, and Germany’s position tactically, economically and socially must be analysed. Even though Germany was out-matched in production and numbers there is no reason to believe that the early years of the war pointed to inevitable Allied victory.
WW2 in Europe was precipitated by many contributing factors. Widely accepted though is the idea that most Germans were resentful of the humiliating defeat in WW1 which in following, Germany was forced to sign the treaty of Versailles. Economic disaster ensued due to the large reparations the victors demanded.
Richard Overy states in Why the Allies Won that ‘no rational man in early 1942 would have guessed at the eventual outcome of the war’ . To appreciate the credibility of this statement and the probability of German victory, the early years of the war must be looked at retrospectively, and Germany’s position tactically, economically and socially must be analysed. Even though Germany was out-matched in production and numbers there is no reason to believe that the early years of the war pointed to inevitable Allied victory.
WW2 in Europe was precipitated by many contributing factors. Widely accepted though is the idea that most Germans were resentful of the humiliating defeat in WW1 which in following, Germany was forced to sign the treaty of Versailles. Economic disaster ensued due to the large reparations the victors demanded.
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