The End Of The Cold War By Rajesh Rajagopalan
The end of the cold war has given the United States much more advantage in shaping its policy choices because uni-polarity ceased the opportunity of regional players that they enjoyed within the bipolar world System.
Rajesh Rajagopalan explained in his article ‘Extra-regional Powers and the Emerging Security Scenario in South Asia’ that it was the regional powers, India and Pakistan, that achieved their strategic objectives by subverting American and Soviet agenda in this region. T.V. Paul also noted this ‘reverse influence’ of regional powers. According to Rajagopalan, despite their enormous power, both superpowers were forced to follow the lead of their regional allies more often than the other way around. In the bipolar world, at least …show more content…
According to him, India and Pakistan (and Bangladesh) to some extent are fairly capable states in the international system. Though there is significant disparity in power between these states, and the two superpowers, these are not exactly weak states. By most measures of power-size, wealth and military muscle- these are middle powers that need to be treated with respect. Their voice and influence may not carry much beyond their borders and definitely not small states and manipulating them is somewhat more difficult than manipulating some of other much weaker third world post-colonial countries.
The second reason, according to Rajagopalan, for what the superpowers within bi-polarity were not able to manipulate India-Pakistan-Bangladesh was that the interests of external powers in South Asia have been sporadic. There have been periods when external powers intensely involved in the region, but there have also been long periods when they have not shown much interest in the region or had withdrawn from the region. For example, the United States withdrew from active engagement in South Asia for several years in the mid-1960s, the mid-1970s and mid-1990s. This sporadic involvement led to distrust between the regional players and the superpowers, …show more content…
As a result, uni-polarity significantly reduced the maneuvering room of regional powers. For example, after 9/11, Pakistan had no choice but to essentially give in to American demands that Islamabad abandon its Taliban friends and facilitate the US war on Afghanistan. According to Rajagopalan, president Musharraf justified it as a decision in which Pakistan had not much choice. It is clear, if Pakistan had not cooperated with the United States, the latter could have made life very difficult for Pakistan. No other external power or even China would have lifted a finger to help Pakistan. Similarly, due to America’s support behind Pakistan, India compelled to prevent herself taking any direct military action against terror attacks on India by Pakistan-based terror groups.
With the brief discussion above, we can conclude that though subservient in nature, the United States reshuffled its interests in South Asia several times in response to the following incidents: (a) during the Sino-India war in 1962; (b) Indo-Pak war in 1965; (c) Bangladesh liberation war in 1971; (d) India’s nuclear test in 1974; (d) Soviet aggression in Afghanistan in 1979; (e) in the post-cold war period; (f) after 9/11
Rajesh Rajagopalan explained in his article ‘Extra-regional Powers and the Emerging Security Scenario in South Asia’ that it was the regional powers, India and Pakistan, that achieved their strategic objectives by subverting American and Soviet agenda in this region. T.V. Paul also noted this ‘reverse influence’ of regional powers. According to Rajagopalan, despite their enormous power, both superpowers were forced to follow the lead of their regional allies more often than the other way around. In the bipolar world, at least …show more content…
According to him, India and Pakistan (and Bangladesh) to some extent are fairly capable states in the international system. Though there is significant disparity in power between these states, and the two superpowers, these are not exactly weak states. By most measures of power-size, wealth and military muscle- these are middle powers that need to be treated with respect. Their voice and influence may not carry much beyond their borders and definitely not small states and manipulating them is somewhat more difficult than manipulating some of other much weaker third world post-colonial countries.
The second reason, according to Rajagopalan, for what the superpowers within bi-polarity were not able to manipulate India-Pakistan-Bangladesh was that the interests of external powers in South Asia have been sporadic. There have been periods when external powers intensely involved in the region, but there have also been long periods when they have not shown much interest in the region or had withdrawn from the region. For example, the United States withdrew from active engagement in South Asia for several years in the mid-1960s, the mid-1970s and mid-1990s. This sporadic involvement led to distrust between the regional players and the superpowers, …show more content…
As a result, uni-polarity significantly reduced the maneuvering room of regional powers. For example, after 9/11, Pakistan had no choice but to essentially give in to American demands that Islamabad abandon its Taliban friends and facilitate the US war on Afghanistan. According to Rajagopalan, president Musharraf justified it as a decision in which Pakistan had not much choice. It is clear, if Pakistan had not cooperated with the United States, the latter could have made life very difficult for Pakistan. No other external power or even China would have lifted a finger to help Pakistan. Similarly, due to America’s support behind Pakistan, India compelled to prevent herself taking any direct military action against terror attacks on India by Pakistan-based terror groups.
With the brief discussion above, we can conclude that though subservient in nature, the United States reshuffled its interests in South Asia several times in response to the following incidents: (a) during the Sino-India war in 1962; (b) Indo-Pak war in 1965; (c) Bangladesh liberation war in 1971; (d) India’s nuclear test in 1974; (d) Soviet aggression in Afghanistan in 1979; (e) in the post-cold war period; (f) after 9/11