The Effects of Disarmament on “Former” Nuclear and Small Power Relations
The Effects of Disarmament on “Former” Nuclear and Small Power Relations
Neil Kelty
August 12, 2010
POLS-Y 375
The invention and widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons has forever altered the international landscape and world leaders’ approach to conflict. Today, prominent political leaders attempt to create an ideal environment that allows the diverse international community to co-exist in one system without the constant threat of major conflict. However, while some leaders attempt disarmament, they may not comprehend the consequences of either disarmament or further proliferation. This leads to the question of: What effect would the elimination of nuclear weapons from the international system have on the probability of war between a smaller powers and a former nuclear powers? With China becoming a rising power in the world today and the European Union struggling to find a clear direction, the question of nuclear proliferation becomes even more of a world priority. The arguments on both sides have significant merit, but the nuclear question burns brightly with the fast-changing international power landscape. Scholars such as Sagan, Mearsheimer, and Waltz largely deal with relationships between large states. The discussion focuses on relationships like that of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, but there is another facet of this conversation. The potential for deterioration of peaceful relations between small powers and former nuclear powers, assuming absence of nuclear weapons, provides a powerful opportunity to explore the importance of nuclear peace. This paper begins by reviewing the three relevant theories in the nuclear argument from non-proliferation to selective proliferation to laissez-faire proliferation. A critique and summary with considerable scrutiny of the evidence will determine the validity against the historical record. Second, will be a discussion of the theory on small state and former nuclear power
Neil Kelty
August 12, 2010
POLS-Y 375
The invention and widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons has forever altered the international landscape and world leaders’ approach to conflict. Today, prominent political leaders attempt to create an ideal environment that allows the diverse international community to co-exist in one system without the constant threat of major conflict. However, while some leaders attempt disarmament, they may not comprehend the consequences of either disarmament or further proliferation. This leads to the question of: What effect would the elimination of nuclear weapons from the international system have on the probability of war between a smaller powers and a former nuclear powers? With China becoming a rising power in the world today and the European Union struggling to find a clear direction, the question of nuclear proliferation becomes even more of a world priority. The arguments on both sides have significant merit, but the nuclear question burns brightly with the fast-changing international power landscape. Scholars such as Sagan, Mearsheimer, and Waltz largely deal with relationships between large states. The discussion focuses on relationships like that of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, but there is another facet of this conversation. The potential for deterioration of peaceful relations between small powers and former nuclear powers, assuming absence of nuclear weapons, provides a powerful opportunity to explore the importance of nuclear peace. This paper begins by reviewing the three relevant theories in the nuclear argument from non-proliferation to selective proliferation to laissez-faire proliferation. A critique and summary with considerable scrutiny of the evidence will determine the validity against the historical record. Second, will be a discussion of the theory on small state and former nuclear power
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