The Centralia Disaster
The Government’s Role in the Centralia Disaster Jason Smith Strayer University PAD500 Modern Public Administration 2012
The Government’s Role in the Centralia Disaster This paper will explore logistical alternatives to those chosen by Mine Inspector Driscoll O. Scanlan as described in “The Blast in Centralia No.5: A Mine Disaster No one Stopped” by John Bartlow Martin (Denhardt, R. B., & Denhardt, J. V. 2010 p31-44). We will seek to understand some of the possible motives stemming from Scanlan’s beliefs concerning the Constitution, bureaucracy, and his obligation to his work. Finally we will suggest alternate decisions which may have lead to better outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to present alternative choices that might have been made by Scanlan, on behalf of the Department of Mineral and Mines, to prevent the mine disaster of 1947.
Logistical Alternatives
According to John Bartlow Martin (1948), Speaking broadly, the job of a state inspector is to police the mine operators--to see that they comply with the state mining law, including its numerous safety provisions. But an inspector’s job is a political patronage job. Coal has always been deeply enmeshed in Illinois politics. (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2010, p.32)
Inherent conflicts between business and government are described openly in this job description. Did this conflict foster the conditions that led to the mine disaster? Could the government have avoided this conflict? The following section will explore some of the possible alternative decisions that might have lead to better outcomes.
Alternative 1: Define Boundaries of Professional Relationships Foster a more professional relationship between government and business. It was too common an occurrence that inspectors and supervisors would be on terms too friendly to be called professional. The government must always avoid the appearance of doing favors for businessmen
The Government’s Role in the Centralia Disaster This paper will explore logistical alternatives to those chosen by Mine Inspector Driscoll O. Scanlan as described in “The Blast in Centralia No.5: A Mine Disaster No one Stopped” by John Bartlow Martin (Denhardt, R. B., & Denhardt, J. V. 2010 p31-44). We will seek to understand some of the possible motives stemming from Scanlan’s beliefs concerning the Constitution, bureaucracy, and his obligation to his work. Finally we will suggest alternate decisions which may have lead to better outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to present alternative choices that might have been made by Scanlan, on behalf of the Department of Mineral and Mines, to prevent the mine disaster of 1947.
Logistical Alternatives
According to John Bartlow Martin (1948), Speaking broadly, the job of a state inspector is to police the mine operators--to see that they comply with the state mining law, including its numerous safety provisions. But an inspector’s job is a political patronage job. Coal has always been deeply enmeshed in Illinois politics. (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2010, p.32)
Inherent conflicts between business and government are described openly in this job description. Did this conflict foster the conditions that led to the mine disaster? Could the government have avoided this conflict? The following section will explore some of the possible alternative decisions that might have lead to better outcomes.
Alternative 1: Define Boundaries of Professional Relationships Foster a more professional relationship between government and business. It was too common an occurrence that inspectors and supervisors would be on terms too friendly to be called professional. The government must always avoid the appearance of doing favors for businessmen
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