Supply Chain Coordination
SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION UNDER SALES EFFORT FREE RIDING
By DAHAI XING Bachelor of Science in Electronics Engineering Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Beijing, China 2004
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of Oklahoma State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY July, 2012
COPYRIGHT c By DAHAI XING July, 2012
SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION UNDER SALES EFFORT FREE RIDING
Dissertation Approved:
Dr. Tieming Liu Dissertation Advisor Dr. Kevin Currier
Dr. Ricki Ingalls
Dr. Manjunath Kamath
Dr. Sheryl A. Tucker Dean of the Graduate College
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Overview of the Supply Chain Contracts under Deterministic Demand 1.3 Overview of the Supply Chain Contracts under Stochastic Demand . 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Sales Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Free Riding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Supply Chain Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Supply Chain Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 Wholesale price contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Channel rebate contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revenue sharing contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 1 4 5 6 6 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 17
2.5 Price Match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 4 THE SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS UNDER DETERMINISTIC DEMAND 4.1 Model with Online Channel Owned by the Manufacturer . . . . . . . 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 Assumptions and notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The baseline case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The centralized supply chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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By DAHAI XING Bachelor of Science in Electronics Engineering Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Beijing, China 2004
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of Oklahoma State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY July, 2012
COPYRIGHT c By DAHAI XING July, 2012
SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION UNDER SALES EFFORT FREE RIDING
Dissertation Approved:
Dr. Tieming Liu Dissertation Advisor Dr. Kevin Currier
Dr. Ricki Ingalls
Dr. Manjunath Kamath
Dr. Sheryl A. Tucker Dean of the Graduate College
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Overview of the Supply Chain Contracts under Deterministic Demand 1.3 Overview of the Supply Chain Contracts under Stochastic Demand . 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Sales Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Free Riding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Supply Chain Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Supply Chain Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 Wholesale price contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Channel rebate contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revenue sharing contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 1 4 5 6 6 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 17
2.5 Price Match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 4 THE SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS UNDER DETERMINISTIC DEMAND 4.1 Model with Online Channel Owned by the Manufacturer . . . . . . . 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 Assumptions and notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The baseline case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The centralized supply chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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References: D. Xing and T. Liu. Sales effort free riding and coordination with price match and channel rebate. European Journal of Operational Research, 219(2):264–271, 2012. A. Zimmerman. Showdown over ’showrooming’. The Wall Street Journal, 2012.