Sociologists

Max Weber
First published Fri Aug 24, 2007; substantive revision Tue Jul 31, 2012
Arguably the foremost social theorist of the twentieth century, Max Weber is known as a principal architect of modern social science along with Karl Marx and Emil Durkheim. Weber 's wide-ranging contributions gave critical impetus to the birth of new academic disciplines such as sociology and public administration as well as to the significant reorientation in law, economics, political science, and religious studies. His methodological writings were instrumental in establishing the self-identity of modern social science as a distinct field of inquiry; he is still claimed as the source of inspiration by empirical positivists and their hermeneutic detractors alike. More substantively, Weber 's two most celebrated contributions were the “rationalization thesis,” a grand meta-historical analysis of the dominance of the west in modern times, and the “Protestant Ethic thesis,” a non-Marxist genealogy of modern capitalism. Together, these two theses helped launch his reputation as one of the founding theorists of modernity. In addition, his avid interest and participation in politics led to a unique strand of political realism comparable to that of Machiavelli and Hobbes. As such, Max Weber 's influence was far-reaching across the vast array of disciplinary, methodological, ideological and philosophical reflections that are still our own and increasingly more so.
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1. Life and Career

Karl Emil Maximilian Weber (1864–1920) was born in the Prussian city of Erfurt to a family of notable heritage. His father, Max Sr., came from a Westphalian family of merchants and industrialists in the textile business and went on to become a National Liberal parliamentarian of some note in Wilhelmine politics. His mother, Helene, came from the Fallenstein and Souchay families, both of the long illustrious Huguenot line, which had for generations produced public servants and academicians. His younger brother, Alfred, was an influential political economist and sociologist, too. Evidently, Max Weber was brought up in a prosperous, cosmopolitan, and highly cultivated family milieu that was well-plugged into the political, social, and cultural establishment of the German Bürgertum [Roth 2000]. Also, his parents represented two, often conflicting, poles of identity between which their eldest son would struggle throughout his life — worldly statesmanship and ascetic scholarship.
Educated mainly at the universities of Heidelberg and Berlin, Weber was trained in law, eventually writing his Habilitationsschrift on Roman law and agrarian history under August Meitzen, a prominent political economist of the time. After some flirtation with legal practice and public service, he received an important research commission from the Verein für Sozialpolitik (the leading social science association under Gustav Schmoller 's leadership) and produced the so-called East Elbian Report on the displacement of the German agrarian workers in East Prussia by Polish migrant labourers. Greeted upon publication with high acclaim and political controversy, this early success led to his first university appointment at Freiburg in 1894 to be followed by a prestigious professorship in political economy at Heidelberg two years later. Weber and his wife Marianne, an intellectual in her own right and early women 's rights activist, soon found themselves at the center of the vibrant intellectual and cultural life of Heidelberg; the so-called “Weber Circle” attracted such intellectual luminaries as Georg Jellinek, Ernst Troeltsch, and Werner Sombart and later a number of younger scholars including Marc Bloch, Robert Michels, and György Lukács. Weber was also active in public life as he continued to play an important role as a Young Turk in the Verein and maintain a close association with the liberal Evangelische-soziale Kongress (especially with the leader of its younger generation, Friedrich Naumann). It was during this time that he first established a solid reputation as a brilliant political economist and outspoken public intellectual.
All these fruitful years came to an abrupt halt in 1897 when Weber collapsed with a nervous-breakdown shortly after his father 's sudden death (precipitated by a heated confrontation with Weber) [Radkau 2011, 53–69]. His routine as a teacher and scholar was interrupted so badly that he eventually withdrew from regular teaching duties in 1903, to which he would not return until 1919. Although severely compromised and unable to write as prolifically as before, he still managed to immerse himself in the study of various philosophical and religious topics, which resulted in a new direction in his scholarship as the publication of miscellaneous methodological essays, and especially that of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–1905), testifies. Also noteworthy during this period is his extensive visit to America in 1904, which left an indelible trace in his understanding of modernity in general [Scaff 2011].
After this stint essentially as a private scholar, he slowly resumed his participation in various academic and public activities. With Edgar Jaffé and Sombart, he took over editorial control of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, turning it into the leading social science journal of the day as well as his new institutional platform. In 1909, he co-founded the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, in part as a result of his growing unease with the Verein 's conservative politics and lack of methodological discipline, becoming its first treasurer (he would resign from it in 1912, though). This period of his life, until interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, brought the pinnacles of his achievements as he worked intensely in two areas: the comparative sociology of world religions and his contribution to the Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, in particular the sections on economic and legal sociology, which would be put together and published posthumously as Economy and Society. Along with the major methodological essays that he drafted during this time, these works would become mainly responsible for Weber 's enduring reputation as one of the founding fathers of modern social science.
With the onset of the War, Weber 's involvement in public life took an unexpected turn. At first a fervent nationalist supporter of the War, as virtually all German intellectuals of the time were, he grew disillusioned with the German war policies, eventually refashioning himself as one of the most vocal critics of the Kaiser government in a time of war. As a public intellectual, he issued private reports to government leaders and wrote journalistic pieces to warn against the Belgian annexation policy and the unlimited submarine warfare, which, as the War deepened, evolved into a call for overall democratization of the authoritarian state that was Wilhelmine Germany. By 1917, Weber was campaigning vigorously for a wholesale constitutional reform for post-war Germany, including the introduction of universal suffrage and the empowerment of parliament.
When defeat came in 1918, Germany found in Weber a public intellectual leader, even possibly a future statesman, with relatively solid liberal democratic credentials who was well-positioned to influence the course of post-war reconstruction. He was invited to join the draft board of the Weimar Constitution as well as the German delegation to Versaille; albeit in vain, he even ran for a parliamentary seat on the liberal Democratic Party ticket. In those capacities, however, he opposed the German Revolution (all too sensibly) and the Versaille Treaty (all too quixotically) alike, putting himself in an honorable yet unsustainable position that defied the partisan alignments of the day. By all accounts, his political activities bore little fruit, except his advocacy for a robust plebiscitary presidency in the Weimar Constitution.
Frustrated with day-to-day politics, he turned to his scholarly pursuits with renewed vigour. In 1919, he briefly taught in turn at the universities of Vienna (General Economic History was an outcome of this experience) and of Munich (where he gave the much-lauded lectures, Science as a Vocation and Politics as a Vocation), while compiling his scattered writings on religion in the form of massive three-volume Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie [GARS hereafter]. All these reinvigorated scholarly activities ended abruptly in 1920, however, when he suddenly died of pneumonia in Munich. Max Weber was fifty six years old.

2. Philosophical Influences

Putting Weber in the context of philosophical tradition proper is not an easy task. For all the astonishing variety of identities that can be ascribed to him as a scholar, he was certainly no philosopher at least in the narrow sense of the term. His reputation as a Solonic legislator of modern social science also tends to cloud our appreciation of the extent to which his ideas were embedded in the intellectual tradition of the time. Broadly speaking, Weber 's philosophical worldview, if not coherent philosophy, was informed by the deep crisis of the Enlightenment project in fin-de-siècle Europe, which was characterized by the intellectual revolt against positivist reason, a celebration of subjective will and intuition, and a neo-Romantic longing for spiritual wholesomeness [Hughes 1977]. In other words, Weber belonged to a generation of self-claimed epigones who had to struggle with the legacies of Darwin, Marx, and Nietzsche. As such, the philosophical backdrop to his thoughts will be outlined here along two axes: epistemology and ethics.

2.1 Epistemology: Neo-Kantianism

Weber encountered the pan-European cultural crisis of his time mainly as filtered through the jargon of German Historicism [Beiser 2011]. His early training in law had exposed him to the sharp divide between the reigning Labandian legal positivism and the historical jurisprudence championed by Otto von Gierke (one of his teachers at Berlin); in his later incarnation as a political economist, he was keenly interested in the heated “strife over methods” (Methodenstreit) between the positivist economic methodology of Carl Menger and the historical economics of Schmoller (his mentor during the early days). Arguably, however, it was not until Weber grew acquainted with the Baden or Southwestern School of Neo-Kantians, especially through Wilhelm Windelband, Emil Lask, and Heinrich Rickert (his one-time colleague at Freiburg), that he found a rich conceptual template suitable for the clearer elaboration of his own epistemological position.
In opposition to a Hegelian emanationist epistemology, briefly, Neo-Kantians shared the Kantian dichotomy between reality and concept. Not an emanent derivative of concepts as Hegel posited, reality is irrational and incomprehensible, and the concept, only an abstract construction of our mind. Nor is the concept a matter of will, intuition, and subjective consciousness as Wilhelm Dilthey posited. According to Hermann Cohen, one of the early Neo-Kantians, concept formation is fundamentally a cognitive process, which cannot but be rational as Kant held. If our cognition is logical and all reality exists within cognition, then only a reality that we can comprehend in the form of knowledge is rational — metaphysics is thereby reduced to epistemology, and Being to logic. As such, the process of concept formation both in the natural (Natur-) and the cultural-historical sciences (Geisteswissenshaften) has to be universal as well as abstract, not different in kind but in their subject matters. The latter is only different in dealing with the question of values in addition to logical relationships.
For Windelband, however, the difference between the two kinds of knowledge has to do with its aim and method as well. Cultural-historical knowledge is not concerned with a phenomenon because of what it shares with other phenomena, but rather because of its own definitive qualities. For values, which form its proper subject, are radically subjective, concrete and individualistic. Unlike the “nomothetic” knowledge that natural science seeks, what matters in historical science is not a universal law-like causality, but an understanding of the particular way in which an individual ascribes values to certain events and institutions or takes a position towards the general cultural values of his/her time under a unique, never-to-be-repeated constellation of historical circumstances. Therefore, cultural-historical science seeks “ideographic” knowledge; it aims to understand the particular, concrete and irrational “historical individual” with inescapably universal, abstract, and rational concepts. Turning irrational reality into rational concept, it does not simply paint (abbilden) a picture of reality but transforms (umbilden) it. Occupying the gray area between irrational reality and rational concept, then, its question became twofold for the Neo-Kantians. One is in what way we can understand the irreducibly subjective values held by the historical actors in an objective fashion, and the other, by what criteria we can select a certain historical phenomenon as opposed to another as historically significant subject matter worthy of our attention. In short, the issue was not only the values to be comprehended by the seeker of historical knowledge, but also his/her own values, which are no less subjective. Valuation (Werturteil) as well as value (Wert) became a keen issue.
According to Rickert 's definitive elaboration, valuation precedes values. He posits that the “in-dividual,” as opposed to mere “individual,” phenomenon can be isolated as a discrete subject of our historical inquiry when we ascribe certain subjective values to the singular coherence and indivisibility that are responsible for its uniqueness. In his theory of value-relation (Wertbeziehung), Rickert argues that relating historical objects to values can still retain objective validity when it is based on a series of explicitly formulated conceptual distinctions; that between the investigator 's values and those of the historical actor under investigation, between personal or private values and general cultural values of the time, and between subjective value-judgment and objective value-relations.
In so positing, however, Rickert is making two highly questionable assumptions. One is that there are certain values in every culture that are universally accepted within that culture as valid, and the other, that a historian free of bias must agree on what these values are. Just as natural science must assume “unconditionally and universally valid laws of nature,” so, too, cultural-historical science must assume that there are “unconditionally and universally valid values.” If so, an “in-dividual” historical event has to be reduced to an “individual” manifestation of the objective process of history, a conclusion that essentially implies that Rickert returned to the German Idealist faith in the meaningfulness of history and the objective validity of the diverse values to be found in history. An empirical study in historical science, in the end, cannot do without a metaphysics of history. Bridging irrational reality and rational concept in historical science, or overcoming hiatus irrationalis (à la Lask) without recourse to a metaphysics of history still remained a problem as acutely as before. While accepting the broadly neo-Kantian conceptual template as Rickert elaborated it, Weber 's methodological writings would turn mostly on this issue.

2.2 Ethics: Kant and Nietzsche

German Idealism seems to have exerted another enduring influence on Weber, discernible in his ethical worldview more than in his epistemological position. This was the strand of Idealist discourse in which a broadly Kantian ethic and its Nietzschean critique figure prominently.
The way in which Weber understood Kant seems to have been through the conceptual template set by moral psychology and philosophical anthropology. In conscious opposition to the utilitarian-naturalistic justification of modern individualism, Kant viewed moral action as simultaneously principled and self-disciplined and expressive of genuine freedom and autonomy. On this Kantian view, freedom and autonomy are to be found in the instrumental control of the self and the world (objectification) according to a law formulated solely from within (subjectification). Furthermore, such a paradoxical compound is made possible by an internalization or willful acceptance of a transcendental rational principle, which saves it from falling prey to the hedonistic justification of a subjectification that Kant found in Enlightenment naturalism and which he so detested. Kant in this regard follows Rousseau in condemning utilitarianism; instrumental-rational control of the world in the service of our desires and needs just degenerates into organized egoism. In order to prevent it, mere freedom of choice based on elective will (Willkür) has to be replaced by the exercise of purely rational will (Wille). Instrumental transformation of the self is thus the crucial benchmark of autonomous moral agency for Kant as well as for Locke, but its basis has been fundamentally altered in Kant; it should be done with the purpose of serving a higher end, that is, the universal law of reason for Kant. A willful self-transformation is demanded now in the service of a higher law based on reason or, one might say, of an “ultimate value” in Weber 's parlance.
Weber 's understanding of this Kantian ethical template was strongly tinged by the Protestant theological debate taking place in the Germany of his time between (orthodox Lutheran) Albrecht Ritschl and Matthias Schneckenburger (of Calvinist persuasion), a context with which Weber became acquainted through his Heidelberg colleague, Troeltsch. Suffice it to note in this connection that Weber 's sharp critique of Ritschl 's Lutheran communitarianism seems reflective of his broadly Kantian preoccupation with radically subjective individualism and the methodical transformation of the self [Graf 1995]. All in all, one might say that:“the preoccupations of Kant and of Weber are really the same. One was a philosopher and the other a sociologist, but there… the difference ends” [Gellner 1974, 184].
That which also ends, however, is Weber 's subscription to a Kantian ethic of duty when it comes to the possibility of a universal law of reason. Weber was keenly aware of the fact that the Kantian linkage between growing self-consciousness, the possibility of a universal law, and principled and thus free action had been irrevocably severed. Kant managed to preserve the precarious duo of non-arbitrary action and subjective freedom by asserting such a linkage, which Weber believed to be unsustainable in his allegedly Nietzschean age.
According to Nietzsche, “will to truth” cannot be content with the metaphysical construction of a grand metanarrative, whether it be monotheistic religion or modern science, and growing self-consciousness, or “intellectualization” à la Weber, can lead only to a radical skepticism, value relativism, or, even worse, nihilism. According to such a Historicist diagnosis of modernity that culminates in the “death of God,” the alternative seems to be either a radical self-assertion and self-creation that runs the risk of being arbitrary (as in Nietzsche) or a complete desertion of the modern ideal of self-autonomous freedom (as in early Foucault). If the first approach leads to a radical divinization of humanity, one possible extension of modern humanism, the second leads inexorably to a “dedivinization” of humanity, a postmodern antihumanism [Vattimo 1988, 31–47].
Seen in this light, Weber 's ethical sensibility is built on a firm rejection of a Nietzschean divination and Foucaultian resignation alike, both of which are radically at odds with a Kantian ethic of duty. In other words, Weber 's ethical project can be described as a search for a non-arbitrary form of freedom (his Kantian side) in what he perceived as an increasingly post-metaphysical world (his Nietzschean side). According to Paul Honigsheim, his pupil and distant cousin, Weber 's ethic is that of “tragedy” and “nevertheless.” [Honigsheim 2003, 113] This deep tension between the Kantian moral imperatives and a Nietzschean diagnosis of the modern cultural world is apparently what gives such a darkly tragic and agnostic shade to Weber 's ethical worldview.

3. History

3.1 Rationalization as a Thematic Unity

Weber 's main contribution as such, nonetheless, lies neither in epistemology nor in ethics. Although they deeply informed his thoughts to an extent still under-appreciated, his main preoccupation lay elsewhere. He was after all one of the founding fathers of modern social science. Beyond the recognition, however, that Weber is not simply a sociologist par excellence as Talcott Parsons 's Durkheimian interpretation made him out to be, identifying an idée maîtresse throughout his disparate oeuvre has been debated ever since his own days and is still far from settled. Economy and Society, his alleged magnum opus, was a posthumous publication based upon his widow 's editorship, the thematic architectonic of which is unlikely to be reconstructed beyond doubt even after its recent reissuing under the rubric of Max Weber Gesamtausgabe [MWG hereafter]. GARS forms a more coherent whole since its editorial edifice was the work of Weber himself; and yet, its relationship to his other sociologies of, for instance, law, city, music, domination, and economy, remains controvertible. Accordingly, his overarching theme has also been variously surmised as a developmental history of Western rationalism (Wolfgang Schluchter), the universal history of rationalist culture (Friedrich Tenbruck), or simply the Menschentum as it emerges and degenerates in modern rational society (Wilhelm Hennis). The first depicts Weber as a comparative-historical sociologist; the second, a latter-day Idealist historian of culture reminiscent of Jacob Burckhardt; and the third, a political philosopher on a par with Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. Important as they are for in-house Weber scholarship, however, these philological disputes need not hamper our attempt to grasp the gist of his ideas. Suffice it for us to recognize that, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis, these different interpretations all converge on the thematic centrality of rationality, rationalism, and rationalization in making sense of Weber.
At the outset, what immediately strikes a student of Weber 's rationalization thesis is its seeming irreversibility and Eurocentrism. The apocalyptic imagery of the “iron cage” that haunts the concluding pages of the Protestant Ethic is commonly taken to reflect his dark fatalism about the inexorable unfolding of rationalization and its culmination in the complete loss of freedom and meaning in the modern world. The “Author 's Introduction” (Vorbemerkung to GARS) also contains oft-quoted passages that allegedly disclose Weber 's belief in the unique singularity of Western civilization 's achievement in the direction of rationalization, or lack thereof in other parts of the world. For example:
A child of modern European civilization (Kulturwelt) who studies problems of universal history shall inevitably and justfiably raise the question (Fragestellung): what combination of circumstances have led to the fact that in the West, and here only, cultural phenomena have appeared which — at least as we like to think — came to have universal significance and validity [Weber 1920/1992, 13: translation altered]?
Taken together, then, the rationalization process as Weber narrated it seems quite akin to a metahistorical teleology that irrevocably sets the West apart from and indeed above the East.
At the same time, nonetheless, Weber adamantly denied the possibility of a universal law of history in his methodological essays. Even within the same pages of Vorbemerkung, he said, “rationalizations of the most varied character have existed in various departments of life and in all areas of culture” [Ibid., 26]. He also made clear that his study of various forms of world religions was to be taken for its heuristic value rather than as “complete analyses of cultures, however brief” [Ibid., 27]. It was meant as a comparative-conceptual platform on which to erect the edifying features of rationalization in the West. If merely a heuristic device and not a universal law of progress, then, what is rationalization and whence comes his uncompromisingly dystopian vision?

3.2 Calculability, Predictability, and World-Mastery

Roughly put, taking place in all areas of human life from religion and law to music and architecture, rationalization means a historical drive towards a world in which “one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” [Weber 1919/1946, 139]. For instance, modern capitalism is a rational mode of economic life because it depends on a calculable process of production. This search for exact calculability underpins such institutional innovations as monetary accounting (especially double-entry bookkeeping), centralization of production control, separation of workers from the means of production, supply of formally free labour, disciplined control on the factory floor, and other features that make modern capitalism qualitatively different from all other modes of organizing economic life. The enhanced calculability of the production process is also buttressed by that in non-economic spheres such as law and administration. Legal formalism and bureaucratic management reinforce the elements of predictability in the sociopolitical environment that encumbers industrial capitalism by means of introducing formal equality of citizenship, a rule-bound legislation of legal norms, an autonomous judiciary, and a depoliticized professional bureaucracy. Further, all this calculability and predictability in political, social, and economic spheres was not possible without changes of values in ethics, religion, psychology, and culture. Institutional rationalization was, in other words, predicated upon the rise of a peculiarly rational type of personality, or a “person of vocation” (Berufsmensch) as outlined in the Protestant Ethic. The outcome of this complex interplay of ideas and interests was modern rational Western civilization with its enormous material and cultural capacity for relentless world-mastery.

3.3 Knowledge, Impersonality, and Control

On a more analytical plateau, all these disparate processes of rationalization can be surmised as increasing knowledge, growing impersonality, and enhanced control [Brubaker 1991, 32–35]. First, knowledge. Rational action in one very general sense presupposes knowledge. It requires some knowledge of the ideational and material circumstances in which our action is embedded, since to act rationally is to act on the basis of conscious reflection about the probable consequences of action. As such, the knowledge that underpins a rational action is of a causal nature conceived in terms of means-ends relationships, aspiring towards a systematic, logically interconnected whole. Modern scientific and technological knowledge is a culmination of this process that Weber called intellectualization, in the course of which, the germinating grounds of human knowledge in the past, such as religion, theology, and metaphysics, were slowly pushed back to the realm of the superstitious, mystical, or simply irrational. It is only in modern Western civilization, according to Weber, that this gradual process of disenchantment (Entzauberung) has reached its radical conclusion.
Second, impersonality. Rationalization, according to Weber, entails objectification (Versachlichung). Industrial capitalism, for one, reduces workers to sheer numbers in an accounting book, completely free from the fetters of tradition and non-economic considerations, and so does the market relationship vis-à-vis buyers and sellers. For another, having abandoned the principle of Khadi justice (i.e., personalized ad hoc adjudication), modern law and administration also rule in strict accordance with the systematic formal codes and sine irae et studio, that is, “without regard to person.” Again, Weber found the seed of objectification not in material interests alone, but in the Puritan vocational ethic (Berufsethik) and the life conduct that it inspired, which was predicated upon a disenchanted monotheistic theodicy that reduced humans to mere tools of God 's providence. Ironically, for Weber, modern inward subjectivity was born once we lost any inherent value qua humans and became thoroughly objectified vis-à-vis God in the course of the Reformation. Modern individuals are subjectified and objectified all at once.
Third, control. Pervasive in Weber 's view of rationalization is the increasing control in social and material life. Scientific and technical rationalization has greatly improved both the human capacity for a mastery over nature and institutionalized discipline via bureaucratic administration, legal formalism, and industrial capitalism. The calculable, disciplined control over humans was, again, an unintended consequence of the Puritan ethic of rigorous self-discipline and self-control, or what Weber called “innerworldly asceticism (innerweltliche Askese).” Here again, Weber saw the irony that a modern individual citizen equipped with inviolable rights was born as a part of the rational, disciplinary ethos that increasingly penetrated into every aspect of social life.

4. Modernity

4.1 The “Iron Cage” and Value-fragmentation

Thus seen, rationalization as Weber postulated it is anything but an unequivocal historical phenomenon. As already pointed out, first, Weber views it as a process taking place in disparate fields of human life with a logic of each field 's own and varying directions; “each one of these fields may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another” [Weber 1920/1992, 27]. Second, and more important, its ethical ramification for Weber is deeply ambivalent. To use his own dichotomy, the formal-procedural rationality (Zweckrationalität) to which Western rationalization tends does not necessarily go with a substantive-value rationality (Wertrationalität). On the one hand, exact calculability and predictability in the social environment that formal rationalization has brought about dramatically enhances individual freedom by helping individuals understand and navigate through the complex web of institutions in order to realize the ends of their own choice. On the other hand, freedom and agency are seriously curtailed by the same force in history when individuals are reduced to a “cog in a machine,” or trapped in an “iron cage” that formal rationalization has spawned with irresistible efficiency and at the expense of substantive rationality. Thus his famous lament in the Protestant Ethic:
No one knows who will live in this cage (Gehäuse) in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For the “last man” (letzten Menschen) of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: “Specialist without spirit, sensualist without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of humanity (Menschentums) never before achieved” [Weber 1904–05/1992, 182: translation altered].
Third, Weber envisions the future of rationalization not only in terms of “mechanized petrification,” but also of a chaotic, even atrophic, inundation of subjective values. In other words, the bureaucratic “iron cage” is only one side of the modernity that rationalization has brought about; the other is a “polytheism” of value-fragmentation. At the apex of rationalization, we moderns have suddenly found ourselves living “as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons” [Weber 1919/1946, 148]. Modern Western society is, Weber seems to say, once again enchanted as a result of disenchantment. How did this happen and with what consequences?

4.2 Reenchantment via Disenchantment

In point of fact, Weber 's rationalization thesis can be understood with richer nuance when we approach it as, for lack of better terms, a dialectics of disenchantment and reenchantment rather than as a one-sided, unilinear process of secularization. Disenchantment had ushered in monotheistic religions in the West. In practice, this means that ad hoc maxims for life-conduct had been gradually displaced by a unified total system of meaning and value, which historically culminated in the Puritan ethic of vocation. Here, the irony was that disenchantment was an ongoing process nonetheless. Disenchantment in its second phase pushed aside monotheistic religion as something irrational, thus delegitimating it as a unifying worldview in the modern secular world.
Modern science, which was singularly responsible for this late development, was initially welcomed as a surrogate system of orderly value-creation, as Weber found in the convictions of Bacon (science as “the road to true nature”) and Descartes (as “the road to the true god”) [Weber 1919/1946, 142]. For Weber, nevertheless, modern science is a deeply nihilistic enterprise in which any scientific achievement worthy of the name must “ask to be surpassed and made obsolete” in a process “that is in principle ad infinitum,” at which point, “we come to the problem of the meaning of science.” He went on to ask: “For it is simply not self-evident that something which is subject to such a law is in itself meaningful and rational. Why should one do something which in reality never comes to an end and never can?” [Ibid., 138: translation altered]. In short, modern science has relentlessly deconstructed other sources of value-creation, in the course of which its own meaning has also been dissipated beyond repair. The result is the “Götterdämmerung of all evaluative perspectives” including its own [Weber 1904/1949, 86].
Irretrievably gone as a result is a unifying worldview, be it religious or scientific, and what ensues is its fragmentation into incompatible value spheres. Weber, for instance, observed: “since Nietzsche, we realize that something can be beautiful, not only in spite of the aspect in which it is not good, but rather in that very aspect” [Weber 1919/1946, 148]. That is to say, aesthetic values now stand in irreconcilable antagonism to religious values, transforming “value judgments (Werturteile) into judgments of taste (Geschmacksurteile) by which what is morally reprehensible becomes merely what is tasteless” [Weber 1915/1946, 342].
Weber is, then, not envisioning a peaceful dissolution of the grand metanarratives of monotheistic religion and universal science into a series of local narratives and the consequent modern pluralist culture in which different cultural practices follow their own immanent logic. His vision of polytheistic reenchantment is rather that of an incommensurable value-fragmentation into a plurality of alternative metanarratives, each of which claims to answer the same metaphysical questions that religion and science strove to cope with in their own ways. The slow death of God has reached its apogee in the return of gods and demons who “strive to gain power over our lives and again ... resume their eternal struggle with one another” [Weber 1919/1946, 149].
Seen this way, it makes sense that Weber 's rationalization thesis concludes with two strikingly dissimilar prophecies — one is the imminent iron cage of bureaucratic petrification and the other, the Hellenistic pluralism of warring deities. The modern world has come to be monotheistic and polytheistic all at once. What seems to underlie this seemingly self-contradictory imagery of modernity is the problem of modern humanity (Menschentum) and its loss of freedom and moral agency. Disenchantment has created a world with no objectively ascertainable ground for one 's conviction. Under the circumstances, according to Weber, a modern individual tends to act only on one 's own aesthetic impulse and arbitrary convictions that cannot be communicated in the eventuality; the majority of those who cannot even act on their convictions, or the “last men who invented happiness” à la Nietzsche, lead the life of a “cog in a machine.” Whether the problem of modernity is accounted for in terms of a permeation of objective, instrumental rationality or of a purposeless agitation of subjective values, Weber viewed these two images as constituting a single problem insofar as they contributed to the inertia of modern individuals who fail to take principled moral action. The “sensualists without heart” and “specialists without spirit” indeed formed two faces of the same coin that may be called the disempowerment of the modern self.

4.3 Modernity contra Modernization

Once things were different, Weber claimed. An unflinching sense of conviction that relied on nothing but one 's innermost personality once issued in a highly methodical and disciplined conduct of everyday life — or, simply, life as a duty. Born amidst the turmoil of the Reformation, this archetypal modern self drew its strength solely from within in the sense that one 's principle of action was determined by one 's own psychological need to gain self-affirmation. Also, the way in which this deeply introspective subjectivity was practiced, that is, in self-mastery, entailed a highly rational and radically methodical attitude towards one 's inner self and the outer, objective world. Transforming the self into an integrated personality and mastering the world with tireless energy, subjective value and objective rationality once formed “one unbroken whole” [Weber 1910/1978, 319]. Weber calls the agent of this unity the “person of vocation” (Berufsmensch) in his religious writings, “personality” (Persönlichkeit) in the methodological essays, “genuine politician” (Berufspolitiker) in the political writings, and “charismatic individual” in Economy and Society.[1] The much-celebrated Protestant Ethic thesis was indeed a genealogical account of this idiosyncratic moral agency in modern times [Goldman 1992].
Once different, too, was the mode of society constituted by and in turn constitutive of this type of moral agency. Weber 's social imagination revealed its keenest sense of irony when he traced the root of the cohesive integration, intense socialization, and severe communal discipline of the “sectlike society” (Sektengesellschaft) to the isolated and introspective subjectivity of the Puritan person of vocation. The irony was that the self-absorbed, anxiety-ridden and even antisocial virtues of the person of vocation could be sustained only in the thick disciplinary milieu of small-scale associational life. Membership in exclusive voluntary associational life is open, and it is such membership, or “achieved quality,” that guarantees the ethical qualities of the individuals with whom one interacts. “The old ‘sect spirit’ holds sway with relentless effect in the intrinsic nature of such associations,” Weber observed, for the sect was the first mass organization to combine individual agency and social discipline in such a systematic way. Weber thus claimed that “the ascetic conventicles and sects … formed one of the most important foundations of modern individualism” [Weber 1920/1946, 321]. It seems clear that what Weber was trying to outline here is an archetypical form of social organization that can empower individual moral agency by sustaining group disciplinary dynamism, a kind of pluralistically organized social life we would now call a “civil society” [Kim 2007, 57–94].
To summarize, the irony with which Weber accounted for rationalization was driven by the deepening tension between modernity and modernization. Weber 's problem with modernity originates from the fact that it required a historically unique constellation of cultural values and social institutions, and yet, modernization has effectively undermined the cultural basis for modern individualism and its germinating ground of disciplinary society, which together had given the original impetus to modernity. The modern project has fallen victim to its own success, and in peril is the individual moral agency and freedom. Under the late modern circumstances characterized by the “iron cage” and “warring deities,” then, Weber 's question becomes: “How is it at all possible to salvage any remnants of ‘individual’ freedom of movement in any sense given this all-powerful trend” [Weber 1918/1994, 159]?

5. Knowledge

Such an appreciation of Weber 's main problematic, which culminates in the question of modern individual freedom, may help shed light on some of the controversial aspects of Weber 's methodology. In accounting for his methodological claims, it needs to be borne in mind that Weber was not at all interested in writing a systematic epistemological treatise in order to put an end to the “strife over methods” (Methodenstreit) of his time between historicism and positivism. His ambition was much more modest and pragmatic. Just as “the person who attempted to walk by constantly applying anatomical knowledge would be in danger of stumbling” [Weber 1906/1949, 115; translation altered], so can methodology be a kind of knowledge that may supply a rule of thumb, codified a posteriori, for what historians and social scientists do, but it could never substitute for the skills they use in their research practice. Instead, Weber 's attempt to mediate historicism and positivism was meant to aid an actual researcher make a practical value-judgment (Werturteil) that is fair and acceptable in the face of the plethora of subjective values that one encounters when selecting and processing historical data. After all, the questions that drove his methodological reflections were what it means to practice science in the modern polytheistic world and how one can do science with a sense of vocation. In his own words, “the capacity to distinguish between empirical knowledge and value-judgments, and the fulfillment of the scientific duty to see the factual truth as well as the practical duty to stand up for our own ideals constitute the program to which we wish to adhere with ever increasing firmness” [Weber 1904/1949, 58]. Sheldon Wolin thus surmises that Weber “formulated the idea of methodology to serve, not simply as a guide to investigation but as a moral practice and a mode of political action” [Wolin 1981, 414]. In short, Weber 's methodology was as ethical as it was epistemological.

5.1 Understanding (Verstehen)

Building on the Neo-Kantian nominalism outlined above [2.1], thus, Weber 's contribution to methodology turned mostly on the question of objectivity and the role of subjective values in historical and cultural concept formation. On the one hand, he followed Windelband in positing that historical and cultural knowledge is categorically distinct from natural scientific knowledge. Action that is the subject of any social scientific inquiry is clearly different from mere behaviour. While behaviour can be accounted for without reference to inner motives and thus can be reduced to mere aggregate numbers, making it possible to establish positivistic regularities, and even laws, of collective behaviour, an action can only be interpreted because it is based on a radically subjective attribution of meaning and values to what one does. What a social scientist seeks to understand is this subjective dimension of human conduct as it relates to others. On the other hand, an understanding(Verstehen) in this subjective sense is not anchored in a non-cognitive empathy or intuitive appreciation that is arational by nature; it can gain objective validity when the meanings and values to be comprehended are explained causally, that is, as a means to an end. A teleological contextualization of an action in the means-end nexus is indeed the precondition for a causal explanation that can be objectively ascertained. So far, Weber is not essentially in disagreement with Rickert.
From Weber 's perspective, however, the problem that Rickert 's formulation raised was the objectivity of the end to which an action is held to be oriented. As pointed out, Rickert in the end had to rely on a certain transhistorical, transcultural criterion in order to account for the purpose of an action, an assumption that cannot be warranted in Weber 's view. To be consistent with the Neo-Kantian presuppositions, instead, the ends themselves have to be conceived of as no less subjective. Imputing an end to an action is of a fictional nature in the sense that it is not free from the subjective valuation that conditions the researcher 's thematization of a certain subject matter out of “an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events” [Weber 1904/1949, 72]. Although a counterfactual analysis might aid in stabilizing the process of causal imputation, it cannot do away completely with the subjective nature of the researcher 's perspective.
In the end, the kind of objective knowledge that historical and cultural sciences may achieve is precariously limited. An action can be interpreted with objective validity only at the level of means, not ends. An end, however, even a “self-evident” one, is irreducibly subjective, thus defying an objective understanding; it can only be reconstructed conceptually based on a researcher 's no less subjective values. Objectivity in historical and social sciences is, then, not a goal that can be reached with the aid of a correct method, but an ideal that must be striven for without a promise of ultimate fulfillment. In this sense, one might say that the so-called “value-freedom” (Wertfreiheit) is less a methodological principle for Weber than an ethical virtue that a personality fit for modern science must possess.

5.2 Ideal Type

The methodology of “ideal type” (Idealtypus) is another testimony to such a broadly ethical intention of Weber. According to Weber 's definition, “an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view” according to which “concrete individual phenomena … are arranged into a unified analytical construct” (Gedankenbild); in its purely fictional nature, it is a methodological “utopia [that] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality” [Weber 1904/1949, 90]. Keenly aware of its fictional nature, the ideal type never seeks to claim its validity in terms of a reproduction of or a correspondence with reality. Its validity can be ascertained only in terms of adequacy, which is too conveniently ignored by the proponents of positivism. This does not mean, however, that objectivity, limited as it is, can be gained by “weighing the various evaluations against one another and making a ‘statesman-like’ compromise among them” [Weber 1917/1949, 10], which is often proposed as a solution by those sharing Weber 's kind of methodological perspectivism. Such a practice, which Weber calls “syncretism,” is not only impossible but also unethical, for it avoids “the practical duty to stand up for our own ideals” [Weber 1904/1949, 58].
According to Weber, a clear value commitment, no matter how subjective, is both unavoidable and necessary. It is unavoidable, for otherwise no meaningful knowledge can be attained. Further, it is necessary, for otherwise the value position of a researcher would not be foregrounded clearly and admitted as such — not only to the readers of the research outcome but also to the very researcher him/herself. In other words, Weber 's emphasis on “one-sidedness” (Einseitigkeit) not only affirms the subjective nature of scientific knowledge but also demands that the researcher be self-consciously subjective. The ideal type is devised for this purpose, for “only as an ideal type” can subjective value — “that unfortunate child of misery of our science” — “be given an unambiguous meaning” [Ibid., 107]. Along with value-freedom, then, what the ideal type methodology entails in ethical terms is, on the one hand, a daring confrontation with the tragically subjective foundation of our historical and social scientific knowledge and, on the other, a public confession of one 's own subjective value. Weber 's methodology in the end amounts to a call for the heroic character-virtue of clear-sightedness and intellectual integrity that together constitute a genuine person of science — a scientist with a sense of vocation who has a passionate commitment to one 's own specialized research, yet is utterly “free of illusions” [Löwith 1982, 38].

6. Politics and Ethics

Even more explicitly ethical than was his methodology, Weber 's political project also discloses his entrenched preoccupation with the willful resuscitation of certain character traits in modern society. At the outset, it seems undeniable that Weber was a deeply liberal political thinker especially in a German context that is not well known for liberalism. This means that his ultimate value as a political thinker was locked on individual freedom, that “old, general type of human ideals” [Weber 1895/1994, 19]. He was also a bourgeois liberal, and self-consciously so, in a time of great transformations that were undermining the social conditions necessary to support classical liberal values and bourgeois institutions, thereby challenging liberalism to attempt a radical self-redirection. To that extent, he belongs to that generation of liberal political thinkers in fin-de-siècle Europe who clearly perceived the general crisis of liberalism and sought to resolve it in their own liberal ways [Bellamy 1992, 157–216]. Weber 's own way was to address the problem of classical liberal characterology that was, in his view, being progressively undermined by the indiscriminate bureaucratization of modern society.

6.1 Charismatic Leadership Democracy

Such a concern with ethical character is clearly discernible in Weber 's stark political realism. Utterly devoid of any normative qualities, for instance, the modern state is defined simply as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory [Weber 1919/1994, 310],” whether that legitimacy derives from charisma, tradition, or law. Further, he held that, even in a democratic state, domination of the ruled by the ruler(s) is simply an unavoidable political fact. If the genuine self-rule of the people is impossible, the only choice is one between leaderless and leadership democracy (Führerdemokratie). When advocating a sweeping democratization of post-war Germany, thus, Weber envisioned democracy in Germany as a political marketplace in which strong charismatic leaders can be identified and elected by winning votes in a free competition, even struggle, among themselves. Preserving and enhancing this element of struggle in politics is important since it is only through a dynamic electoral process that national leaders strong enough to control an otherwise omnipotent bureaucracy can be made. The primary concern for Weber in devising democratic institutions has, in other words, less to do with the values and institutions that can realise the ideals of democracy as such than with the cultivation of a certain character fit for national leadership. So far, Weber 's theory of democracy seems to contain certain authoritarian elements that can support Jürgen Habermas 's famous critique that Carl Schmitt, “the Kronjurist of the Third Reich,” was “a legitimate pupil of Weber 's” [Stammer (ed.), 1971, 66].
Leadership democracy is, however, not solely reliant upon the quality of its leaders, let alone that of a caesaristic dictator. In addition to electoral competition, Weber saw localized, yet public associational life as a breeding ground for the formation of charismatic leaders. When leaders are identified and trained at the level of, say neighborhood choral societies and bowling clubs [Weber 2002], the alleged authoritarian elitism of leadership democracy comes across as more pluralistic in its conceptualization, far from its usual identification with demagogic dictatorship and unthinking mass following. Insofar as a civil society, or “sectlike society” in his own parlance, functions as an effective medium for the horizontal diffusion of charismatic qualities among lay people, his notion of charisma can retain a strongly democratic tone to the extent that he also suggested social pluralism as a sociocultural ground for the political education of the lay citizenry from which genuine leaders would hail. In short, the charismatic leadership ideal in Weber 's political project also requires a heterogeneous and pluralistically organized civil society as its corollary. Together, Weber expected, strong national leadership and a robust civil society would form a bulwark of political dynamism in times of bureaucratic petrification.

6.2 Nationalism and Power-Politics

Weber 's preoccupation with civic education runs like a thread through his nationalism as well. There can be no denying that Weber was an ardent nationalist. And yet, his nationalism was unambiguously free from the obsession with primordial ethnicity and race that was prevalent in Wilhelmine Germany. Even in the Freiburg Address of 1895, which unleashed his nationalist zeal with an uninhibited and youthful rhetorical force, he makes it clear that the ultimate rationale for the nationalist value-commitment that should guide all political judgments, even political and economic sciences as well, has less to do with the promotion of the German national interests per se than with a civic education of the citizenry in general and political maturity of the bourgeois class in particular. At a time when “the ultimate, most sublime values have retreated from the public sphere” [Weber 1919/1946, 155], Weber found an instrumental value in nationalism insofar as it can imbue patriotic feelings among the otherwise apathetic citizenry and thereby increase their participation in public affairs.
Crucial to this civic educational project was, according to Weber, exposing citizens to the harsh reality of “eternal struggle,” or power-politics (Machtpolitik) among the nation-states with which Germany had to engage actively [Weber 1895/1994, 16]. Weber observed with more than a hint of envy, for example, that it was “the reverberation of a position of world power” that exposed the English citizens “to ‘chronic’ political schooling,” and it was this political education that made possible both the empire-building and liberal democracy [Ibid., 26]. In this sense, Weber 's nationalism can be surmised as a variant of liberal imperialism, or social imperialism (Sozialimperialismus) as it was called in Germany; to that extent, one might say that his political thinking is not free from the problems of liberalism in turn-of-the-century Europe [Beetham 1989, 322]. Be that as it may, Weber 's liberal nationalism was still significantly different from his contemporaries ' in its preoccupation with a liberal characterology and civic education [Kim 2002, 435–441, 455–457]. The next question that Weber 's ethico-political project raises is, then, what kind of character virtues are necessary for the kind of leadership and citizenship that can together make a great nation, while holding inevitable bureaucratization in check.

6.3 The Ethics of Conviction and Responsibility

Weber suggested two sets of ethical virtues that a proper political education should cultivate — the ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) and the ethic of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik). According to the ethic of responsibility, on the one hand, an action is given meaning only as a cause of an effect, that is, only in terms of its causal relationship to the empirical world. The virtue lies in an objective understanding of the possible causal effect of an action and the calculated reorientation of the elements of an action in such a way as to achieve a desired consequence. An ethical question is thereby reduced to a question of technically correct procedure, and free action consists of choosing the correct means. By emphasizing the causality to which a free agent subscribes, in short, Weber prescribes an ethical integrity between action and consequences, instead of a Kantian emphasis on that between action and intention.
According to the ethic of conviction, on the other hand, a free agent should be able to choose autonomously not only the means, but also the end; “this concept of personality finds its ‘essence’ in the constancy of its inner relation to certain ultimate ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ of life” [Weber 1903–06/1975, 192]. In this respect, Weber 's problem hinges on the recognition that the kind of rationality applied in choosing a means cannot be used in choosing an end. These two kinds of reasoning represent categorically distinct modes of rationality, a boundary further reinforced by modern value fragmentation. With no objectively ascertainable ground of choice provided, then, a free agent has to create a purpose ex nihilo: “ultimately life as a whole, if it is not to be permitted to run on as an event in nature but is instead to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul — as in Plato — chooses its own fate” [Weber 1917/1949, 18]. This ultimate decision and the Kantian integrity between intention and action constitute the essence of what Weber calls an ethic of conviction.
It is often held that the gulf between these two types of ethic is unbridgeable for Weber. Demanding an unmitigated integrity between one 's ultimate value and political action, that is to say, the deontological ethic of conviction cannot be reconciled with that of responsibility which is consequentialist in essence. In fact, Weber himself admitted the “abysmal contrast” that separates the two. This frank admission, nevertheless, cannot be taken to mean that he privileged the latter over the former as far as political education is concerned.
Weber clearly understood the deep tension between consequentialism and deontology, but he still insisted that they should be forcefully brought together. The former recognition only lends urgency to the latter agenda. Resolving this analytical inconsistency in terms of certain “ethical decrees” did not interest Weber at all. Instead, he sought for a moral character that can produce this “combination” with a sheer force of will. He called such a character a “politician with a sense of vocation” (Berufspolitiker) who combines a passionate conviction in supra-mundane ideals that politics has to serve and a sober rational calculation of its realizability in this mundane world. Weber thus concluded: “the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility are not absolute opposites. They are complementary to one another, and only in combination do they produce the true human being who is capable of having a ‘vocation for politics’” [Weber 1919/1994, 368].
In the end, Weber 's ethical project is not about formal analysis of moral maxims, nor is it about substantive virtues that reflect some kind of ontic telos. It is too formal to be an Aristotelean virtue ethics, and it is too concerned with moral character to be a Kantian deontology narrowly understood. The goal of Weber 's ethical project, rather, aims at cultivating a character who can willfully bring together these conflicting formal virtues to create what he calls “total personality” (Gesamtpersönlichkeit). It culminates in an ethical characterology or philosophical anthropology in which passion and reason are properly ordered by sheer force of individual volition. In this light, Weber 's political virtue resides not simply in a subjective intensity of value commitment nor in a detached intellectual integrity, but in their willful combination in a unified soul.

7. Concluding Remarks

Seen this way, we find a remarkable consistency in Weber 's thought. Weber 's main problematic turned on the question of individual autonomy and freedom in an increasingly rationalized society. His dystopian and pessimistic assessment of rationalization drove him to search for solutions through politics and science, which broadly converge on a certain practice of the self. What he called the “person of vocation,” first outlined famously in The Protestant Ethic, provided a bedrock for his various efforts to resuscitate a character who can willfully combine unflinching conviction and methodical rationality even in a society besieged by bureaucratic petrification and value fragmentation. It is also in this entrenched preoccupation with an ethical characterology under modern circumstances that we find the source of his enduring influences on twentieth-century political and social thought.
On the left, Weber 's articulation of the tension between modernity and modernization found resounding echoes in the “Dialectics of Enlightenment” thesis by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer; György Lukács 's own critique of the perversion of capitalist reason owes no less to Weber 's problematization of instrumental rationality on which is also built Jürgen Habermas 's elaboration of communicative rationality as an alternative. Different elements in Weber 's political thought, e.g., intense political struggle as an antidote to modern bureaucratic petrification, leadership democracy and plebiscitary presidency, uncompromising realism in international politics, and value-freedom and value-relativism in political ethics, were selected and critically appropriated by such diverse thinkers on the right as Carl Schmitt, Joseph Schumpeter, Leo Strauss, Hans Morgenthau, and Raymond Aron. Even the postmodernist project of deconstructing Enlightenment selfhood finds, as Michel Foucault does, a precursor in Weber. All in all, across the vastly different ideological and methodological spectrum, Max Weber 's thought will continue to be a deep reservoir of fresh inspiration as long as an individual 's fate under (post)modern circumstances does not lose its privileged place in the political, social, cultural, and philosophical self-reflections of our time.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works) have been published continuously since 1984 by J. C. B. Mohr(Paul Siebeck), the original publisher of Weber 's works, in Tübingen, Germany. Commissioned by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, the original editorial committee consisted of Horst Baier, M. Rainer Lepsius, Wolfgang Mommsen (deceased), Wolfgang Schluchter, and Johannes Winkelmann (deceased). This monumental project plans a total of forty-one volumes in three divisions, i.e., twenty-three volumes of Writings and Speeches, eleven volumes of Correspondences and six volumes of Lectures and Lecture Notes, of which about 2/3 have been published as of 2010. For updates, the reader is referred to the publisher 's web page for the Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe.

Primary Texts

In English, too, new translations have appeared over the past decade or so. Most notable among them would be The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Peter Baehr/Gordon C. Wells (Penguin Books, 2002) and Stephen Kalberg (Roxbury Publishing Co., 2002). Reflecting the latest Weber scholarship, both editions have many virtues, especially in terms of enhanced readability and adequate contextualization. Talcott Parson 's classic edition is still listed below because it is the most widely available text in English. • Weber, Max. 1895/1994. “The Nations State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address)” in Weber: Political Writings, P. Lassman and R. Speirs (ed. and trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. • –––, 1903–06/1975. Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics, G. Oakes (trans.), New York: Free Press. • –––, 1904/1949. “Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy” in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch (ed. and trans.), New York: Free Press. • –––, 1904–05/1992. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, T. Parsons (trans.), A. Giddens (intro), London: Routledge. • –––, 1906/1949. “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences: A Critique of Eduard Meyer’s Methodological Views,” in The Methodology of the Social Sciences. • –––, 1910/1978. “Antikritisches Schlußwort zum Geist des Kapitalismus,” in Max Weber: Die protestantische Ethik II: Kritiken und Antikritiken, ed. J. Winckelmann. Gerd Mohn: Gütersloher Verlaghaus. • –––, 1910/2002. “Voluntary Associational Life (Vereinswesen),” ed./trans. Sung Ho Kim, Max Weber Studies, 2:2 (2002). • –––, 1915/1946. “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions” in From Max Weber. • –––, 1917/1949. “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics ” in The Methodology of the Social Sciences. • –––, 1918/1994. “Parliament and Government in Germany Under a New Political Order” in Max Weber: Political Writings. • –––, 1919/1994. “The Profession and Vocation of Politics” in Max Weber: Political Writing. • –––, 1919/1946. “Science as a Vocation” in From Max Weber. • –––, 1920/1946. “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism” in From Max Weber. • –––, 1920/1992. “Author’s Introduction (Vorbemerkung to GARS),” in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. • –––, 1920. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 3 volumes, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1978. • –––, 1921–22/1978. Economy and Society, 2 volumes, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press. • –––, 1924. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck. • Weber, Marianne (ed.), 1926/1988. Max Weber: A Biography, H. Zohn (trans.), G. Roth (intro), New Brunswick: Transaction
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History of sociology in Europe

Origins

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Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406)
Sociological reasoning predates the foundation of the discipline. Social analysis has origins in the common stock of Western knowledge and philosophy, and has been carried out from as far back as the time of ancient Greek philosopher Plato if not before. The origin of the survey, i.e., the collection of information from a sample of individuals, can be traced back at least early as the Domesday Book in 1086,[8][9] while ancient philosophers such as Confucius wrote on the importance of social roles. There is evidence of early sociology in medieval Islam. Some consider Ibn Khaldun, a 14th-century Arab Islamic scholar from North Africa, to have been the first sociologist; his Muqaddimah was perhaps the first work to advance social-scientific reasoning on social cohesion and social conflict.[10][11][12][13][14][15] Most sociological concepts were used in English prior to their adoption as the technical language of sociology.[16]
The word sociology (or "sociologie") is derived from both Latin and Greek origins. The Latin word: socius, "companion"; the suffix -logy, "the study of" from Greek -λογία from λόγος, lógos, "word", "knowledge". It was first coined in 1780 by the French essayist Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès (1748–1836) in an unpublished manuscript.[17] Sociology was later defined independently by the French philosopher of science, Auguste Comte (1798–1857), in 1838.[18] Comte used this term to describe a new way of looking at society.[19] Comte had earlier used the term "social physics", but that had subsequently been appropriated by others, most notably the Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet. Comte endeavored to unify history, psychology and economics through the scientific understanding of the social realm. Writing shortly after the malaise of the French Revolution, he proposed that social ills could be remedied through sociological positivism, an epistemological approach outlined in The Course in Positive Philosophy [1830–1842] and A General View of Positivism (1848). Comte believed a positivist stage would mark the final era, after conjectural theological and metaphysical phases, in the progression of human understanding.[20] In observing the circular dependence of theory and observation in science, and having classified the sciences, Comte may be regarded as the first philosopher of science in the modern sense of the term.[21]
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Auguste Comte (1798-1857)
Comte gave a powerful impetus to the development of sociology, an impetus which bore fruit in the later decades of the nineteenth century. To say this is certainly not to claim that French sociologists such as Durkheim were devoted disciples of the high priest of positivism. But by insisting on the irreducibility of each of his basic sciences to the particular science of sciences which it presupposed in the hierarchy and by emphasizing the nature of sociology as the scientific study of social phenomena Comte put sociology on the map. To be sure, [its] beginnings can be traced back well beyond Montesquieu, for example, and to Condorcet, not to speak of Saint-Simon, Comte 's immediate predecessor. But Comte 's clear recognition of sociology as a particular science, with a character of its own, justified Durkheim in regarding him as the father or founder of this science, in spite of the fact that Durkheim did not accept the idea of the three states and criticized Comte 's approach to sociology.
— Frederick Copleston A History of Philosophy: IX Modern Philosophy 1974, [22]
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Karl Marx (1818-1883)
Both Auguste Comte and Karl Marx set out to develop scientifically justified systems in the wake of European industrialization and secularization, informed by various key movements in the philosophies of history and science. Marx rejected Comtean positivism[citation needed] but in attempting to develop a science of society nevertheless came to be recognized as a founder of sociology as the word gained wider meaning. For Isaiah Berlin, Marx may be regarded as the "true father" of modern sociology, "in so far as anyone can claim the title."[23]
To have given clear and unified answers in familiar empirical terms to those theoretical questions which most occupied men 's minds at the time, and to have deduced from them clear practical directives without creating obviously artificial links between the two, was the principle achievement of Marx 's theory. The sociological treatment of historical and moral problems, which Comte and after him, Spencer and Taine, had discussed and mapped, became a precise and concrete study only when the attack of militant Marxism made its conclusions a burning issue, and so made the search for evidence more zealous and the attention to method more intense.
— Isaiah Berlin Karl Marx: His Life and Environment 1937, [24]
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Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)
Herbert Spencer (27 April 1820 – 8 December 1903) was one of the most popular and influential 19th century sociologists. It is estimated that he sold one million books in his lifetime, far more than any other sociologist at the time. So strong was his influence that many other 19th century thinkers, including Émile Durkheim, defined their ideas in relation to his. Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society is to a large extent an extended debate with Spencer from whose sociology, many commentators now agree, Durkheim borrowed extensively.[25] Also a notable biologist, Spencer coined the term "survival of the fittest". Whilst Marxian ideas defined one strand of sociology, Spencer was a critic of socialism as well as strong advocate for a laissez-faire style of government. His ideas were highly observed by conservative political circles, especially in the United States and England.[26]

Foundations of the academic discipline

Main articles: Emile Durkheim and Social facts
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Émile Durkheim
Formal academic sociology was established by Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), who developed positivism as a foundation to practical social research. While Durkheim rejected much of the detail of Comte 's philosophy, he retained and refined its method, maintaining that the social sciences are a logical continuation of the natural ones into the realm of human activity, and insisting that they may retain the same objectivity, rationalism, and approach to causality.[27] Durkheim set up the first European department of sociology at the University of Bordeaux in 1895, publishing his Rules of the Sociological Method (1895).
[28] For Durkheim, sociology could be described as the "science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning".[29]
Durkheim 's seminal monograph, Suicide (1897), a case study of suicide rates amongst Catholic and Protestant populations, distinguished sociological analysis from psychology or philosophy. It also marked a major contribution to the theoretical concept of structural functionalism. By carefully examining suicide statistics in different police districts, he attempted to demonstrate that Catholic communities have a lower suicide rate than that of Protestants, something he attributed to social (as opposed to individual or psychological) causes. He developed the notion of objective suis generis "social facts" to delineate a unique empirical object for the science of sociology to study.[27] Through such studies he posited that sociology would be able to determine whether any given society is 'healthy ' or 'pathological ', and seek social reform to negate organic breakdown or "social anomie".
Sociology quickly evolved as an academic response to the perceived challenges of modernity, such as industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and the process of "rationalization".[30] The field predominated in continental Europe, with British anthropology and statistics generally following on a separate trajectory. By the turn of the 20th century, however, many theorists were active in the Anglo-Saxon world. Few early sociologists were confined strictly to the subject, interacting also with economics, jurisprudence, psychology and philosophy, with theories being appropriated in a variety of different fields. Since its inception, sociological epistemologies, methods, and frames of inquiry, have significantly expanded and diverged.[5]
Durkheim, Marx, and the German theorist Max Weber are typically cited as the three principal architects of social science.[31] Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, Lester F. Ward, Vilfredo Pareto, Alexis de Tocqueville, Werner Sombart, Thorstein Veblen, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel and Karl Mannheim are occasionally included on academic curricula as founding theorists. Each key figure is associated with a particular theoretical perspective and orientation.[32]
Marx and Engels associated the emergence of modern society above all with the development of capitalism; for Durkheim it was connected in particular with industrialization and the new social division of labor which this brought about; for Weber it had to do with the emergence of a distinctive way of thinking, the rational calculation which he associated with the Protestant Ethic (more or less what Marx and Engels speak of in terms of those 'icy waves of egotistical calculation '). Together the works of these great classical sociologists suggest what Giddens has recently described as 'a multidimensional view of institutions of modernity ' and which emphasizes not only capitalism and industrialism as key institutions of modernity, but also 'surveillance ' (meaning 'control of information and social supervision ') and 'military power ' (control of the means of violence in the context of the industrialization of war).
— John Harriss The Second Great Transformation? Capitalism at the End of the Twentieth Century 1992, [32]

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Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon, often referred to as Henri de Saint-Simon (October 17, 1760 - May 19, 1825), was a French social theorist and the founder of French socialism. In the wake of the French Revolution, Saint-Simon proposed a new and positive reorganization of society, controlled by the chiefs of industry, with scientists in the role of priests. The aim of this society would be to produce things useful to life, and peace would be assured by universal association. Saint-Simon’s call for a “science of society” influenced the development of sociology and economics as fields of scientific study. Saint-Simon’s vision influenced French and European society throughout the nineteenth century
His major work, Nouveau Christianisme (1825), announced that the world had arrived at the crisis, predicted by the Old Testament, which was to end in the establishment of a truly universal religion, the adoption by all nations of a pacific social organization, and the speedy betterment of the condition of the poor. Saint-Simon attempted to clear away the dogma which had developed in Catholicism and Protestantism, and to reduce Christianity to its simple and essential elements. Though he had few followers in his lifetime, shortly after his death, Olinde Rodrigues, Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin, and Amand Bazard, founded the school of Saint-Simonism, which attracted many able young scientists and thinkers. Saint-Simonism declared that history was progressing toward an era of peace and industrial development, and advocated state ownership of property. Saint-Simon proposed, as the precept of the new Christianity, that “The whole of society ought to strive towards the amelioration of the moral and physical existence of the poorest class; society ought to organize itself in the way best adapted for attaining this end.”
Saint-Simon’s “new Christianity” was a vision of a society that practiced the teachings of Jesus by devoting itself to the betterment of its least fortunate members. Saint-Simon rejected many of the doctrines and rituals which had been developed by the Christian churches and returned to the words of Jesus in the New Testament. He developed a concept in which the state owned and administered the means of production for the benefit of all. Later thinkers took these concepts in two directions, Christian socialism and atheistic communism.

Life

Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon, was born in Paris, France, October 17, 1760, to an impoverished aristocratic family. His grandfather’s cousin, the duc de Saint-Simon, had written a famous memoir of the court of Louis XIV. Henri was fond of claiming that he was a descendant of Charlemagne. At an early age Saint-Simon showed a certain disdain for tradition; at thirteen he refused to make his first Communion and was punished by imprisonment at Saint Lazare, from which he escaped. He claimed his education was directed by D 'Alembert, though no proof of this exists; likely Saint-Simon himself invented this intellectual pedigree. After being educated by private tutors, he entered military service at the age of seventeen. From his youth Saint-Simon was highly ambitious. He ordered his valet to wake him every morning with; "Remember, monsieur le comte, that you have great things to do." His regiment was among those sent by France to aid the American colonies. He served as captain of artillery at Yorktown in 1781, was later taken prisoner and freed only after the Treaty of Versailles. Before leaving America, he presented to the Viceroy of Mexico a plan to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific by a canal, and he devised another scheme to construct a canal from Madrid to the sea.
He remained in France during the French Revolution (1789), and bought up newly nationalized land with funds borrowed from a friend. During the Reign of Terror, he was imprisoned in the Palais de Luxembourg, and emerged extremely wealthy because the value of Revolutionary currency had depreciated. Saint-Simon lived a life of luxury, entertaining prominent people from all walks of life at his lavish and glittering salons. Within several years he was on the point of bankruptcy, and began to study science, taking courses at the École Polytechnique and acquainting himself with distinguished scientists. His first published work, Lettres d 'un habitant de Genève à ses contemporains (1803; Letters of an Inhabitant of Geneva to His Contemporaries), proposed that scientists should replace priests in the social order, and that the property owners who held political power could only hope to maintain themselves against the propertyless if they subsidized the advance of knowledge.
In August 1801, he married Mlle. de Champgrand. Less than a year later he divorced her, hoping to marry Mme. de Staël, who had just become a widow, but she refused. In 1805, completely ruined by his disordered life, he became a copyist at the Mont de Piété, working nine hours a day for £40 a year. He relied on his activities as a writer for his livelihood; failing in this, he lived on the generosity of a former valet, and finally solicited a small pension from his family. In 1823, he attempted suicide in despair. Late in his career, he made the acquaintance of Olinde Rodrigues, who became inspired by Saint-Simon’s social ideas and provided him with a living. When dying, Saint-Simon said to Rodrigues, "Remember that to do anything great you must be impassioned."
Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon, died on May 19, 1825, and was interred in Le Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris.

Thought and works

As a thinker Saint-Simon was not particularly systematic, but his influence on modern thought is undeniable, both as the historic founder of French socialism and as the origin of many ideas that were later elaborated into Comtism. In 1817 he began to propound his socialistic views in a treatise entitled L 'Industrie, which he further developed in L 'Organisateur (1819), a periodical on which Augustin Thierry and Auguste Comte collaborated. The first number caused a sensation, though it brought few converts. Du système industriel appeared in 1821, and in 1823–1824 Catéchisme des industriels. The last and most important expression of his views is the Nouveau Christianisme (1825), which he left unfinished.
The ideas of Saint-Simon for the reconstruction of society were conditioned by the French Revolution and by the feudal and military system still prevalent in France. In reaction to the destructive liberalism of the Revolution, he insisted on the necessity of a new and positive reorganization of society, and went so far as to appeal to Louis XVIII of France to initiate a new social order.
In opposition, however, to the military and feudal system, which had been strengthened by the restoration, Saint-Simon advocated an arrangement by which the industrial chiefs should control society. In place of the medieval church, the spiritual direction of society should fall to the men of science. Saint-Simon envisioned an industrialist state directed by modern science, in which universal association should suppress war. He believed that the men who are successfully able to organize society for productive labor are entitled to govern it. The social aim was to produce things useful to life. The conflict between labor and capital so much emphasized by later socialism was not present to Saint-Simon, who assumed that the industrial chiefs, to whom the control of production was to be committed, would rule in the interest of society. Later on he gave greater attention to the cause of the poor, until in his greatest work, The New Christianity, it took the form of a religion. This development of his teaching resulted in Saint-Simon’s final quarrel with Comte.
Saint-Simon’s call for a “science of society,” similar to the natural sciences, influenced his disciple Auguste Comte and the development of sociology and economics as fields of scientific study. Thomas Carlyle, Michel Chevalier, John Stuart Mill, Napoleon III, and the young Léon Walras were all inspired by Saint-Simonism. Saint-Simon’s vision influenced French and European society throughout the nineteenth century. Saint-Simon’s “scientism” also influenced the development of Marxist theory.
An excellent edition of the works of Saint-Simon and Enfantin was published by the survivors of the sect (47 vols., Paris, 1865–1878).

Nouveau Christianisme

Saint-Simon’s positivist and scientific studies directed him to found a purely practical and demonstrable moral code, while his sentimental and mystical tendencies led him to understand the need for a religion. He believed that Christianity had advanced human morality, but he thought that the reign of Christianity was at an end. His religious tendencies became gradually stronger, until he announced that the world had arrived at the crisis, predicted by the Old Testament, which was to end in the establishment of a truly universal religion, the adoption by all nations of a pacific social organization, and the speedy betterment of the condition of the poor. This vision was developed in "Le Nouveau Christianisme," which was unfinished at Saint-Simon’s death.
Saint-Simon had not concerned himself with theology previous to the writing of Nouveau Christianisme. He began with a belief in God, and set out to reduce Christianity to its simple and essential elements. He cleared away the dogmas and other excrescences and defects which had developed in the Catholic and Protestant interpretations of Christianity. He proposed, as the precept of the new Christianity, that, “The whole of society ought to strive towards the amelioration of the moral and physical existence of the poorest class; society ought to organize itself in the way best adapted for attaining this end.”

Saint-Simonism

The views of Saint-Simon had little influence during his lifetime, and he left only a small number of disciples, who regarded him as a prophet and continued to advocate his doctrines. The most important of these followers were Olinde Rodrigues, the favored disciple of Saint-Simon, and Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin, who together had received Saint-Simon 's last instructions. Their first step was to establish a journal, Le Producteur, but it was discontinued in 1826. The sect, however, had begun to grow, and before the end of 1828, had meetings not only in Paris but in many provincial towns.
In 1828, Amand Bazard gave a "complete exposition of the Saint-Simonian faith" in a long course of lectures in Paris, which were well attended. His Exposition de la doctrine de St Simon (2 vols., 1828–1830) won more adherents. The second volume was chiefly by Enfantin, who along with Bazard stood at the head of the society, but who was more metaphysical in his orientation, and prone to push his deductions to extremes. The revolution of July (1830) brought a new freedom to the socialist reformers. A proclamation was issued demanding the community of goods, the abolition of the right of inheritance, and the enfranchisement of women.
Early the next year, the school obtained possession of the Globe through Pierre Leroux, who had joined the school. It now numbered some of the ablest and most promising young men of France, many of whom were pupils of the École Polytechnique which had caught its enthusiasm. The members formed themselves into an association arranged in three grades, and constituting a society or family, which lived out of a common purse in the Rue Monsigny. Before long, however, dissensions began to arise in the sect. Bazard, a man of logical and more solid temperament, could no longer work in harmony with Enfantin, who desired to establish an arrogant sacerdotalism and had lax notions about marriage and the relation of the sexes.
After a time Bazard seceded, followed by many of the strongest supporters of the school. A series of extravagant entertainments given by the group during the winter of 1832 reduced its financial resources and greatly discredited its public reputation. The group finally moved to a property owned by Enfantin in Ménilmontant, where they lived in a communistic society, distinguished by a peculiar dress. Shortly afterward the leaders were tried and condemned for proceedings prejudicial to the social order; and the sect was entirely broken up (1832). Many of its members became famous as engineers, economists, and men of business.
The school of Saint-Simon advanced and clarified the vague and confused views of the master. They identified two types of epochs in the philosophy of history; the critical, or negative, and the organic, or constructive. The critical epochs, in which philosophy is the dominating force, are characterized by war, egotism, and anarchy. The organic epochs are dominated by religion, and marked by a spirit of obedience, devotion, and association. The two spirits of antagonism and association are the two great social principles, and the character of an epoch is determined by the one which prevails. The spirit of association, however, tends more and more to prevail over its opponent, extending from the family to the city, from the city to the nation, and from the nation to the federation. This principle of association is to be the basis of the social development of the future. Under the present system the industrial chief exploits the proletariat, the members of which, though nominally free, must accept his terms under pain of starvation. The only remedy for this is the abolition of the law of inheritance, and the union of all the instruments of labor in a social fund, which shall be exploited by association. Society thus becomes sole proprietor, entrusting to social groups and social functionaries the management of the various properties. The right of succession is transferred from the family to the state.
The school of Saint-Simon strongly advocated a social hierarchy in which each person would be placed according to his capacity and rewarded according to his works. Government would be a kind of spiritual or scientific autocracy. The school of Saint-Simon advocated the complete emancipation of women and her entire equality with men. The "social individual" is man and woman, who are associated in the exercise of the triple function of religion, the state and the family. In its official declarations, the school maintained the sanctity of the Christian law of marriage. Connected with these doctrines was a theory of the "rehabilitation of the flesh," deduced from the philosophic theory of the school, which rejected the dualism emphasized by Catholic Christianity in its mortification of the body, and held that the body should be restored to its due place of honor. This theory was unclear, and its ethical character differed according to various interpretations given to it by different members of the school of Saint-Simon. Enfantin developed it into a kind of sensual mysticism, a system of free love with a religious sanction.

Lester Frank Ward (June 18, 1841 – April 18, 1913), was an American botanist, paleontologist, and sociologist, and first president of the American Sociological Association. He is credited as one of those instrumental in establishing sociology as an academic field in the United States. His vision of a just society, with equality for women, all social classes and races, and the elimination of poverty was revolutionary for his time. He believed that human beings have the capability to accomplish such a society, and that social scientists, sociologists in particular, had the responsibility to guide humankind in that direction.

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Life

Lester Frank Ward was born in Joliet, Illinois, into the family of Justus Ward and Silence Rolph. His family did not have enough money to send Lester to school, so he was home-schooled. However, Lester’s intellectual abilities, especially his sense for foreign languages immediately became visible. Lester taught himself Latin, Greek, German, Russian, Japanese, and Hebrew. After his family moved to Myersburg, Pennsylvania, Ward started working with his brother in a wagon wheel shop. At the same time, Ward continued studying, mostly after work and at night. It was probably this experience of poverty and hard work that affected Ward, as he later dedicated his academic life to advocating for social justice.
When the American Civil War broke out in 1861, Ward joined the Pennsylvania regiment and was wounded at Chancellorville. In 1862, he married Elisabeth Caroline Bought. When the war ended, Ward started studying botany and law at George Washington University (then Columbian College) where he received an A.B. in 1869, the LL.B. degree in 1871, and the A.M. degree in 1872. At the same time he was working for the United States Treasury Department.
In 1882, Ward started to work for the United States Geological Survey, where he remained employed for the rest of his career. He first held the post of assistant geologist, and from 1889 to 1892 of geologist, and in 1892 he was promoted to paleontologist. At the same time he served as Honorary Curator of the Department of Fossil Plants in the U.S. National Museum.
In 1905, Ward became a professor at Brown University, and in 1906, the first president of the American Sociological Association. He also served as editor of the American Journal of Sociology from 1905. He remained active at Brown University until his death on April 18, 1913, in Washington, DC.

Work

Lester Ward believed that science should work for the improvement of the human condition. As he put it in the preface to Dynamic Sociology (1883):
The real object of science is to benefit man. A science which fails to do this, however agreeable its study, is lifeless. Sociology, which of all sciences should benefit man most, is in danger of falling into the class of polite amusements, or dead sciences. It is the object of this work to point out a method by which the breath of life may be breathed into its nostrils.
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Lester Frank Ward (seated at right)
Ward theorized that poverty could be minimized or eliminated by systematic state intervention. He believed that humankind is not helpless before the impersonal force of nature and evolution. Instead, through the power of mind, man could take control of the situation and direct the evolution of human society. This theory is known as "telesis."
According to Ward, a sociology that intelligently and scientifically directs the social and economic development of society should institute a universal and comprehensive system of education, regulate competition, connect the people together on the basis of equal opportunities and cooperation, and promote the happiness and freedom of everyone.
Ward was a strong advocate for equal rights for women and even theorized that women were naturally superior to men, much to the scorn of mainstream sociologists.
Ward placed himself in direct opposition to social Darwinism, especially to the work of Herbert Spencer. Although Ward admired Spencer, he believed that Spencer had lost his way when he tried to apply his ideas to the world of government and politics. Besides, Spencer 's American disciple, William Graham Sumner, who gained great fame (and wealth) in the American business community, was single-mindedly promoting the principles of laissez-faire and "survival of the fittest":
Ward was the first major scholar to attack this whole system of negativist and absolutist sociology and he remains the ablest…. Before Ward could begin to formulate that science of society which he hoped would inaugurate an era of such progress as the world had not yet seen, he had to destroy the superstitions that still held domain over the mind of his generation. Of these, laissez faire was the most stupefying, and it was on the doctrine of laissez faire that he trained his heaviest guns. The work of demolition performed in Dynamic Sociology, Psychic Factors and Applied Sociology was thorough (Commager 1959).

Legacy

Although Lester Frank Ward’s impact was not as great as of some of his contemporaries, like Albion W. Small or George Herbert Mead, he left his mark on the development of American sociology. At one point, Ward was considered one of America’s greatest thinkers, even called an “American Aristotle.”
Ward is best remembered for his pioneering work in sociology. His book Dynamic Sociology was truly advanced for his time. When laissez-faire economy and the Industrial Revolution shaped society, Ward argued that real progress could be achieved only through a planned society led by a benevolent government, advised by a council of sociologists, that would provide education and social justice for all. Ward’s ideas promoting equality of women, of social classes, and of races can also be seen as revolutionary for his time.

Anthropology (from the Greek word ἄνθρωπος, "human" or "person") consists of the study of humanity (see genus Homo). The discipline is a holistic study, concerned with all humans, at all times, in all humanity 's dimensions. Anthropology is traditionally distinguished from other disciplines by its emphasis on cultural relativity, in-depth examination of context, and cross-cultural comparisons.
Anthropology is methodologically diverse, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, such as firsthand case studies of living cultures, careful excavations of material remains, and interpretations of both living and extinct linguistic practices. In North America and other Western cultures, anthropology is traditionally broken down into four main divisions: physical anthropology, archaeology, cultural anthropology (also known as social anthropology), and linguistic anthropology. Each sub-discipline uses different techniques, taking different approaches to study human beings at all points in time. Through bringing together the results of all these endeavors humans can hope to better understand themselves, and learn to live in harmony, fulfilling their potential as individuals and societies, taking care of each other and the earth that is their home.

Historical and institutional context

Did you know?
The anthropologist Eric Wolf once described anthropology as "the most scientific of the humanities, and the most humanistic of the sciences."
The anthropologist Eric Wolf once described anthropology as "the most scientific of the humanities, and the most humanistic of the sciences." Anthropology can best be understood as an outgrowth of the Age of Enlightenment, a period when Europeans attempted to study human behavior systematically. The traditions of jurisprudence, history, philology, and sociology then evolved into something more closely resembling the modern views of these disciplines and informed the development of the social sciences, of which anthropology was a part. At the same time, the romantic reaction to the Enlightenment produced thinkers, such as Johann Gottfried Herder and later Wilhelm Dilthey, whose work formed the basis for the "culture concept," which is central to the discipline.
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Table of natural history, 1728 Cyclopaedia
Institutionally, anthropology emerged from the development of natural history (expounded by authors such as Buffon) that occurred during the European colonization of the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Programs of ethnographic study have their origins in this era as the study of the "human primitives" overseen by colonial administrations. There was a tendency in late eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought to understand human society as natural phenomena that behaved in accordance with certain principles and that could be observed empirically.[1] In some ways, studying the language, culture, physiology, and artifacts of European colonies was not unlike studying the flora and fauna of those places.
Drawing on the methods of the natural sciences and developing new techniques involving not only structured interviews, but unstructured "participant observation," and drawing on the new theory of evolution through natural selection, the branches of anthropology proposed the scientific study of a new object: humankind, conceived of as a whole. Crucial to this study is the concept of "culture," which anthropologists defined both as a universal capacity and a propensity for social learning, thinking, and acting (which they saw as a product of human evolution and something that distinguishes Homo sapiens—and perhaps all species of genus Homo—from other species), and as a particular adaptation to local conditions, which takes the form of highly variable beliefs and practices. Thus, culture not only transcends the opposition between nature and nurture, but absorbs the peculiarly European distinction among politics, religion, kinship, and the economy as autonomous domains. Anthropology thus transcended the divisions between the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities to explore the biological, linguistic, material, and symbolic dimensions of humankind in all forms.
Anthropology grew increasingly distinct from natural history, and by the end of the nineteenth century, it had begun to crystallize into its modern form. By 1935, for example, it was possible for T. K. Penniman to write a history of the discipline entitled A Hundred Years of Anthropology. Early anthropology was dominated by proponents of unilinealism, who argued that all societies passed through a single evolutionary process, from the most primitive to the most advanced. Non-European societies were thus seen as evolutionary "living fossils," which could be studied in order to understand the European past. Scholars wrote histories of prehistoric migrations that were sometimes valuable, but often also fanciful. It was during this time that Europeans, such as Paul Rivet, first accurately traced Polynesian migrations across the Pacific Ocean—though some of them believed those emigrations had originated in Egypt. Finally, concepts of race were developed with a view to better understand the nature of the biological variation within the human species, and tools such as anthropometry were devised as a means of measuring and categorizing this variation, not just within the genus Homo, but in fossil hominids and primates as well. Unfortunately, racialist concepts were abused by a few and gave rise to theories of scientific racism, which died out by the middle of the twentieth century, around the time that race was disqualified as a legitimate scientific category by anthropologists.

Academic Branches

Anthropology consists of two major divisions: physical anthropology, which deals with the human physical form from the past to the present, and cultural anthropology, which studies human culture in all its aspects. Additionally, the areas of archaeology, which studies the remains of historical societies, and linguistic anthropology, which studies variation in language across time and space and its relationship to culture, are considered sub-disciplines in North America.

Physical Anthropology

Main article: Physical anthropology
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Skulls from Punuk Island, Bering Sea, Alaska
Physical anthropology is the field that considers the biology and physiology of humanity, from primate ancestors to modern-day humans. Physical anthropology’s origins actually lie in the geology revolution, when the Earth was revealed to be much older than the previously accepted biblical scale, and fossilized human remains and tools spurred the debate of "man 's antiquity." Coupled with Charles Darwin 's explosive theory of evolution, physical anthropology became the leading authority on the evidence of human evolution.
By the mid-twentieth century, a general geneological tree of human ancestors had been established, based upon fossils discovered by Donald C. Johanson, Paul Abell, and Mary, Louis, and Richard Leakey among others. While fossils found in Africa, Asia, and even South America challenged both the timeline and circumstances surrounding humanity 's evolution, the basic paradigm is still accepted: millions of years ago, evolutionary adaptations in small mammals, such as stereoscopic vision, led to the development of the early primate line of descendants. Humans, gorillas, and chimpanzees were the last species to develop their own branches, from which the human line branched off into many different dead-end lines and closely related species, but the most direct line lead from the Australopithecine species, then evolving into the Homo lines. Homo habilis, Homo rudolfensis, Homo erectus, and Homo neanderthalensis were the first direct ancestors, with increased cranial capacity. [2] It should be noted that the exact place of human ancestors in the evolutionary scheme is challenged nearly every year, and that new categories are emerging so that a conclusive paradigm has yet to be produced.
Since the primary focus of physical anthropology is with human evolution, primatology is a closely linked sub-field of the discipline. Understanding human’s closest relatives, the primates, helps understand the evolutionary process from ape to man. Primatologists, such as Jane Goodall and Dian Fossey, have pioneered research observing primates in the wild, noting behavior that would have been common to human ancestors.
Not all physical anthropologists deal with the far past and hominid variants of the Homo sapiens line. Forensic anthropologists are used around the world to identify the remains of murder and disaster victims. One of the most famous forensic anthropologists, Clyde Snow, made his career identifying the remains of mass murders and genocides in war-torn countries. [3]
Another emerging sub-discipline is population genetics, which tracks and studies contemporary groups of people and the physical/genetic differences between modern-day people, which similar studies had in the early and mid-twentieth century proved that notions of race were scientifically unsubstantial. One of the major discoveries in the field was how to track lineage through mitochondrial DNA and Y chromosomes, in effect, to tracking the origins of the modern humankind to human’s African genetic ancestors.
Other sub-fields of the discipline include: • Paleobotany • Paleopathology • Paleozoology • Medical anthropology • Paleoanthropology (also known as human paleontology)

Cultural Anthropology

Main article: Cultural anthropology
The primary focus of cultural anthropology, also referred to as social anthropology and ethnology, is the study of human culture. In regards to humanity, culture can deal with a host of subjects, such as religion, mythology, art, music, government systems, social structures and hierarchies, family dynamics, traditions, and customs as well as cuisine, economy, and relationship to the environment. Any and all of these factors make up important aspects of culture and behavior, and are some of the pieces of human history that cultural anthropology tries to put to together into a larger, more comprehensive picture of the human experience.
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With the rise of history and humanities studies, along with the natural sciences, during the nineteenth century, such scholars as Edward Burnett Tylor and James Frazer began to plant the seeds of cultural anthropology, wondering why people living in different parts of the world sometimes had similar beliefs and practices. This question became the underlying concern of cultural anthropology. Grafton Elliot Smith argued that different groups must somehow have learned from one another, as if cultural traits were being spread from one place to another, or “diffused.” Others argued that different groups had the capability of inventing similar beliefs and practices independently. Some of those who advocated "independent invention," like Lewis Henry Morgan, additionally supposed that similarities meant that different groups had passed through the same stages of cultural evolution.
Ethnography, the backbone of cultural anthropology methodology, was developed by Bronislaw Malinowski in his work in the Trobriand Islands of Melanesia between 1915 and 1918. Although nineteenth-century ethnologists saw "diffusion" and "independent invention" as mutually exclusive and competing theories, most ethnographers quickly reached a consensus that both processes occur, and that both can plausibly account for cross-cultural similarities.
In the 1950s and mid-1960s, anthropology tended increasingly to model itself after the natural sciences. Some anthropologists, such as Lloyd Fallers and Clifford Geertz, focused on processes of modernization by which newly independent states could develop. Others, such as Julian Steward and Leslie White, focused on how societies evolve and fit their ecological niche—an approach popularized by Marvin Harris. Economic anthropology through the influence of Karl Polanyi focused on how traditional economics ignored cultural and social factors. In England, British social anthropology 's paradigm began to fragment as Max Gluckman and Peter Worsley experimented with Marxism and others incorporated Lévi-Strauss 's structuralism into their work.
Structuralism also influenced a number of developments in the 1960s and 1970s, including cognitive anthropology and componential analysis. Authors such as David Schneider, Clifford Geertz, and Marshall Sahlins developed a more fleshed-out concept of culture as a web of meaning or signification, which proved very popular within and beyond the discipline. In keeping with the times, much of anthropology became politicized through the Algerian War of Independence and opposition to the Vietnam War. By the 1970s, the authors of volumes such as Reinventing Anthropology worried about anthropology 's relevance.
In the 1980s issues of power, such as those examined in Eric Wolf 's Europe and the People without History, were central to the discipline. Books like Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter pondered anthropology 's ties to colonial inequality, while the immense popularity of theorists such as Michel Foucault moved issues of power and hegemony into the spotlight. Gender and human sexuality became popular topics, as did the relationship between history and anthropology, and the relationship between social structure and individual agency.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, authors such as George Marcus and James Clifford pondered ethnographic authority, particularly how and why anthropological knowledge was possible and authoritative. Ethnographies became more reflexive, explicitly addressing the author 's methodology and cultural positioning, and their influence on his or her ethnographic analysis. This was part of a more general trend of postmodernism that was popular contemporaneously. Currently, anthropologists have begun to pay attention to globalization, medicine and biotechnology, indigenous rights, and the anthropology of industrialized societies.
Sub-fields include: • Anthropology of art • Anthropology of religion • Applied anthropology • Cross-cultural studies • Cyber anthropology • Economic anthropology • Ecological anthropology • Ethnobotany • Ethnography • Ethnomusicology • Ethnozoology • Psychological anthropology (also known as culture-and-personality studies) • Political anthropology • Urban anthropology • Visual anthropology

Archaeology

Main article: Archaeology
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Monte Albán archeological site
Archaeology studies human cultures through the recovery, documentation, and analysis of material remains and environmental data, including architecture, artifacts, biofacts, human remains, and landscapes. While there are numerous goals pertaining to its various sub-disciplines, the main goal of archaeology is to create the most thorough understanding of how and why both historical and prehistoric people lived, to understand the evolution of human society and civilizations, and to use knowledge of human ancestors’ history to discover insights into modern-day societies. Through such efforts, it is hoped that archaeology will support increased understanding among the various peoples of the world, and thus aid in the growth of peace and harmony among all humankind.
Archaeology as a serious academic discipline did not emerge until the end of the nineteenth century, the byproduct of a number of scientific discoveries and new theories. The discovery that the Earth was older than previously understood, and therefore that humankind had been around longer than the established timeframe of the Bible, spurred scientific curiosity in exploring human origins. Similarly, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of the Species (1859) introduced the theory of evolution, inciting a furor of academic debate and research. Even more important for archaeology was C. J. Thomsen’s establishment of the "Three Age System," in which man’s history was categorized into three eras based on technological advancement: the Stone Age, Bronze Age, and Iron Age. The chronological history of humankind became an exciting academic field. Soon, teams of archaeologists were working around the world, discovering long-lost ruins and cities. [4]
Archaeology took form in the 1960s, when a number of academics, most notably Lewis Binford, proposed a "new archaeology," which would be more "scientific" and "anthropological." It began using hypothesis testing and scientific methods, such as the newly established dating tests, as well as focusing upon the social aspects of the findings. Archaeology became less focused on categorizing, and more on understanding how the evolution of civilization came about, later being dubbed “processual archaeology.”
In the 1980s, a new movement arose, led by the British archaeologists Michael Shanks, Christopher Tilley, Daniel Miller, and Ian Hodder, questioning processualism 's appeals to science and impartiality, and emphasizing the importance of relativism, becoming known as post-processual archaeology. Further adaptation and innovation in archaeology has continued.
Contemporary sub-fields of archaeology include: • Ariel Archaeology • Archaeoastronomy • Archaeological Science • Archaeobotany • Archaeozoology • Computational Archaeology • Ethnoarchaeology • Experimental Archaeology • Landscape Archaeology • Maritime Archaeology • Museum Studies • Paleopathology • Taphonomy

Linguistic Anthropology

Main article: Linguistic anthropology
Linguistic anthropology is rooted largely in general linguistic studies which deals with the components of language, mainly phonetics, morphology, and even the kinesics of language. Linguistic anthropology grew out of cultural anthropology, when anthropologists realized what information the study of language can bring.
The first main branch of the discipline is historical linguistics, which studies the evolution of language. All languages have a genealogical tree structure that shows their evolution. For instance, modern English comes from a combination of French, Latin, and Germanic sources, which can all traces their roots back to a common origin, the Indo-European language from the steppes of Russia. The ability of anthropological linguists to trace a language 's origins based on the morphological and phonetic changes also can be used to track human migration patterns. Lexicostatistical dating is the technique used for migration tracing, and one of the most famous examples is the pattern of Native American settlement thousands of years ago on such a linguistic approach.
The second major linguistic study in anthropology is called ethnolinguistics. There are two historically different approaches in the discipline, the first being the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis," proposed in the mid-twentieth century by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf. They argued that "Each language provides particular grooves of linguistic expression that predispose speakers of that language to perceive the world in a certain way. ... The picture of the universe shifts from tongue to tongue."[5] The other approach generally accepts that culture and language predispose people to particular perspectives, but regards language as a continually evolving phenomena that is constantly consuming different influences and changing the society 's perspective. Both perspectives agree that language, as one of humankind 's most distinguishing features, is a valuable source of information about culture and psychology, capable of revealing the abstract and cognitive aspects of our minds.

Politics of anthropology

Anthropology, as the study of humankind in all its dimensions, has necessarily been involved in social issues. Anténor Firmin wrote De l 'égalité des races humaines (1885) as a direct rebuttal to Count de Gobineau’s polemical four-volume work Essai sur l 'inegalite des Races Humaines (1853–1855), which asserted the superiority of the Aryan race and the inferiority of blacks and other people of color. Firmin’s work argued the opposite, that "all men are endowed with the same qualities and the same faults, without distinction of color or anatomical form. The races are equal" (450). Firmin grew up in Haiti, and was admitted to the Societé d’ Anthropologie de Paris in 1884, while serving as a diplomat. His persuasive critique and rigorous analysis of many of that society’s leading scholars made him an early pioneer in the so-called vindicationist struggle in anthropology. Many scholars also associate his work with the very first ideas of Pan-Africanism.
American cultural anthropology developed during the first four decades of the twentieth century under the powerful influence of Franz Boas and his students, and their struggle against racial determinism and the ethnocentrism of nineteenth-century cultural evolutionism. With the additional impact of the Great Depression and World War II, American anthropology developed a pronounced liberal-left tone by the 1950s. The "politics of anthropology" has become a pervasive concern since that time. Whatever the realities, the notion of anthropology as somehow complicit in morally unacceptable projects has become a significant topic for debate.
Explicitly political concerns have to do with anthropologists’ entanglements with government intelligence agencies, on the one hand, and anti-war politics on the other. Franz Boas publicly objected to U.S. participation in World War I, and after the war he published a brief exposé and condemnation of the participation of several American archaeologists in espionage in Mexico under their cover as scientists. But by the 1940s, many of Boas ' anthropologist contemporaries were active in the allied war effort against the "Axis" (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan). Many served in the armed forces, but others worked in intelligence (for example, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War Information). David H. Price 's work on American anthropology during the Cold War provides detailed accounts of the pursuit and dismissal of several anthropologists for their vocal left-wing sympathies. Many anthropologists (students and teachers) were active in the antiwar movement during the Vietnam War years, and a great many resolutions condemning the war in all its aspects were passed overwhelmingly at the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association. In the decades since the Vietnam war, the tone of cultural and social anthropology, at least, has been increasingly politicized, reflecting Marxist, feminist, post-colonial, postmodern, and Foucaultian perspectives.

Spanish expeditions and colonization

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Ferdinand Magellan arrived in the Philippines on March 16, 1521.
Although they were not the first Europeans in the Philippines, the first well documented arrival of western Europeans in the archipelago was the Spanish expedition led by Portuguese Ferdinand Magellan, which first sighted the mountains of Samar at dawn on 16 March 1521 (Spanish calendar), making landfall the following day at the small, uninhabited island of Homonhon at the mouth of the Leyte Gulf.[1] Magellan had abandoned his Portuguese citizenship and became a Spanish subject prior to his contract with Spain. On Easter Sunday, 31 March 1521 (Spanish calendar), at Masao, Butuan, (now in Agusan Del Norte), he solemnly planted a cross on the summit of a hill overlooking the sea and claimed possession of the islands he had seen for Spain, naming them Archipelago of Saint Lazarus.[2]
Magellan sought friendship among the natives beginning with Datu Zula, the chieftain of Sugbu (now Cebu), and took special pride in converting them to Catholicism. Magellan got involved with political rivalries among the Cebuano natives and took part in a battle against Lapu-Lapu, chieftain of Mactan island and a mortal enemy of Datu Zula. At dawn on 27 April 1521, Magellan invaded Mactan Island with 60 armed men and 1,000 Cebuano warriors, but had great difficulty landing his men on the rocky shore. Lapu-Lapu had an army of 1,500 on land. Magellan waded ashore with his soldiers and attacked the Mactan defenders, ordering Datu Zula and his warriors to remain aboard the ships and watch. Magellan seriously underestimated the Lapu-Lapu and his men, and grossly outnumbered, Magellan and 14 of his soldiers were killed. The rest managed to reboard the ships. (See Battle of Mactan)
The battle left the Spanish too few to man three ships so they abandoned the "Concepción". The remaining ships - "Trinidad" and "Victoria" - sailed to the Spice Islands in present-day Indonesia. From there, the expedition split into two groups. The Trinidad, commanded by Gonzalo Gómez de Espinoza tried to sail eastward across the Pacific Ocean to the Isthmus of Panama. Disease and shipwreck disrupted Espinoza 's voyage and most of the crew died. Survivors of the Trinidad returned to the Spice Islands, where the Portuguese imprisoned them. The Victoria continued sailing westward, commanded by Juan Sebastián de El Cano, and managed to return to Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Spain in 1522. In 1529, Charles I of Spain relinquished all claims to the Spice Islands to Portugal in the treaty of Zaragoza. However, the treaty did not stop the colonization of the Philippine archipelago from New Spain.[3]
After Magellan 's voyage, subsequent expeditions were dispatched to the islands. Four expeditions were sent: that of Loaisa (1525), Cabot (1526), Saavedra (1527), Villalobos (1542), and Legazpi (1564).[4] The Legazpi expedition was the most successful as it resulted in the discovery of the tornaviaje or return trip to Mexico across the Pacific by Andres de Urdaneta.[5] This discovery started the trade of the famous Manila Galleons which lasted two and a half centuries.
In 1543, Ruy López de Villalobos named the islands of Leyte and Samar Las Islas Filipinas after Philip II of Spain.[6] Philip II became King of Spain on January 16, 1556, when his father, Charles I of Spain, abdicated the Spanish throne. Philip was in Brussels at the time and his return to Spain was delayed until 1559 because of European politics and wars in northern Europe. Shortly after his return to Spain, Philip ordered an expedition mounted to the Spice Islands, stating that its purpose was "to discover the islands to the west". In reality its task was to conquer the Philippines for Spain.[7]
On November 19 or 20, 1564 a Spanish expedition of a mere 500 men led by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi departed Barra de Navidad, New Spain, arriving off Cebu on February 13, 1565, not landing there due to Cebuano opposition.[8]:77
In 1569, Legazpi transferred to Panay and founded a second settlement on the bank of the Panay River. In 1570, Legazpi sent his grandson, Juan de Salcedo, who had arrived from Mexico in 1567, to Mindoro to punish Moro pirates who had been plundering Panay villages. Salcedo also destroyed forts on the islands of Ilin and Lubang, respectively South and Northwest of Mindoro.[8]:79
In 1570, Martín de Goiti, having been dispatched by Legazpi to Luzon, conquered the Kingdom of Maynila (now Manila).[8]:79 Legazpi then made Maynila the capital of the Philippines and simplified its spelling to Manila. His expedition also renamed Luzon Nueva Castilla. Legazpi became the country 's first governor-general. With time, Cebu 's importance fell as power shifted north to Luzon. The archipelago was Spain 's outpost in the orient and Manila became the capital of the entire Spanish East Indies. The colony was administered through the Viceroyalty of New Spain (now Mexico) until 1821 when Mexico achieved independence from Spain. After 1821, the colony was governed directly from Spain.
During most of the colonial period, the Philippine economy depended on the Galleon Trade which was inaugurated in 1565 between Manila and Acapulco, Mexico. Trade between Spain and the Philippines was via the Pacific Ocean to Mexico (Manila to Acapulco), and then across the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean to Spain (Veracruz to Cádiz). Manila became the most important center of trade in Asia between the 17th and 18th centuries. All sorts of products from China, Japan, Brunei, the Moluccas and even India were sent to Manila to be sold for silver 8-Real coins which came aboard the galleons from Acapulco. These goods, including silk, porcelain, spices, lacquerware and textile products were then sent to Acapulco and from there to other parts of New Spain, Peru and Europe.
The European population in the archipelago steadily grew although natives remained the majority. They depended on the Galleon Trade for a living. In the later years of the 18th century, Governor-General Basco introduced economic reforms that gave the colony its first significant internal source income from the production of tobacco and other agricultural exports. In this later period, agriculture was finally opened to the European population, which before was reserved only for the natives.
During Spain’s 333 year rule in the Philippines, the colonists had to fight off the Chinese pirates (who lay siege to Manila, the most famous of which was Limahong in 1574), Dutch forces, Portuguese forces, and indigenous revolts. Moros from western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago also raided the coastal Christian areas of Luzon and the Visayas and occasionally captured men and women to be sold as slaves.
Some Japanese ships visited the Philippines in the 1570s in order to export Japanese silver and import Philippine gold. Later, increasing imports of silver from New World sources resulted in Japanese exports to the Philippines shifting from silver to consumer goods. In the 1580s, the Spanish traders were troubled to some extent by Japanese pirates, but peaceful trading relations were established between the Philippines and Japan by 1590.[9] Japan 's kampaku (regent), Toyotomi Hideyoshi, demanded unsuccessfully on several occasions that the Philippines submit to Japan 's suzerainty.[10]
On February 8, 1597, King Philip II, near the end of his 42-year reign, issued a Royal Cedula instructing Francisco de Tello de Guzmán, then Governor-General of the Philippines to fulfill the laws of tributes and to provide for restitution of ill-gotten taxes taken from the natives. The decree was published in Manila on August 5, 1598. King Philip died on 13 September, just forty days after the publication of the decree, but his death was not known in the Philippines until middle of 1599, by which time a referendum by which the natives would acknowledge Spanish rule was underway. With the completion of the Philippine referendum of 1599, Spain could be said to have established legitimate sovereignty over the Philippines.[11]

Spanish rule

See also: Captaincy General of the Philippines and Spanish East Indies
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Political System

The Spanish quickly organized their new colony according to their model. The first task was the reduction, or relocation of native inhabitants into settlements. The earliest political system used during the conquista period was the encomienda system, which resembled the feudal system in medieval Europe. The conquistadores, friars and native nobles were granted estates, in exchange for their services to the King, and was given the privilege to collect tribute from its inhabitants. In return, the person granted the encomienda, known as an encomendero, was tasked to provide military protection to the inhabitants, justice and governance. In times of war, the encomendero was duty bound to provide soldiers for the King, in particular, for the complete defense of the colony from invaders such as the Dutch, British and Chinese. The encomienda system was abused by encomenderos and by 1700 was largely replaced by administrative provinces, each headed by an alcalde mayor (provincial governor)[12] The most prominent feature of Spanish cities was the plaza, a central area for town activities such as the fiesta, and where government buildings, the church, a market area and other infrastructures were located. Residential areas lay around the plaza. During the conquista, the first task of colonization was the reduction, or relocation of the indigenous population into settlements surrounding the plaza.
As in Europe, the church always had control over the state affairs of the colony. The friars controlled the sentiments of the native population and was more powerful than the governor-general himself. Among the issues that resulted to the Philippine revolution of 1898 that ended Spanish rule was the abuse of power by the religious orders.[citation needed]

National Government

On the national level, the King of Spain, through his Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias), governed through his sole representative in the Philippines: the Governor-General (Gobernador y Capitán General). With the seat of power in Intramuros, Manila, the Governor-General was given several duties: he headed the Supreme Court (Royal Audiencia), was Commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and was the economic planner of the country. All known executive power of the local government stemmed from him and as vice-regal patron, he had the right to supervise mission work and oversee ecclesiastical appointments. His yearly salary was P40,000. For obvious reasons, the Governor-General was usually a Peninsular (Spaniard born in Spain) to ensure loyalty of the colony to the crown.

Provincial Government

Main article: Provinces of the Philippines
On the provincial level, heading the pacified provinces (alcaldia), was the provincial governor (alcalde mayor). The unpacified military zones (corregimiento), such as Mariveles and Mindoro, were headed by the corregidores. City governments (ayuntamientos), were also headed by an alcalde mayor. Alcalde mayors and corregidores exercised multiple prerogatives as judge, inspector of encomiendas, chief of police, tribute collector, capitan-general of the province and even vice-regal patron. His annual salary ranged from P300 to P2000 before 1847 and P1500 to P1600 after it. But this can be augmented through the special privilege of "indulto de commercio" where all people were forced to do business with him. The alcalde mayor was usually an Insulares (Spaniard born in the Philippines). In the 19th century, the Peninsulares began to displace the Insulares which resulted in the political unrests of 1872, notably the execution of GOMBURZA, Novales Revolt and mutiny of the Cavite fort under La Madrid.

Municipal Government

Main articles: Municipalities of the Philippines and Cities of the Philippines
The pueblo or town is headed by the Gobernadorcillo or little governor. Among his administrative duties were the preparation of the tribute list (padron), recruitment and distribution of men for draft labor, communal public work and military conscription (quinto), postal clerk and judge in minor civil suits. He intervened in all administrative cases pertaining to his town: lands, justice, finance and the municipal police. His annual salary, however, was only P24 but he was exempted from taxation. Any native or Chinese mestizo, 25 years old, literate in oral or written Spanish and has been a Cabeza de Barangay of 4 years can be a Gobernadorcillo. Among those prominent is Emilio Aguinaldo, a Chinese Mestizo and who was the Gobernadorcillo of Cavite El Viejo (now Kawit). The officials of the pueblo were taken from the Principalía, the noble class of pre-colonial origin. Their names are survived by prominent families in contemporary Philippine society such as Lindo, Tupas, Gatmaitan, Liwanag, Pangilinan, Panganiban, Balderas, and Agbayani, Apalisok, Aguinaldo to name a few.

Barrio Government

Main article: Barangay
Barrio government (village or district) rested on the barrio administrator (cabeza de barangay). He was responsible for peace and order and recruited men for communal public works. Cabezas should be literate in Spanish and have good moral character and property. Cabezas who served for 25 years were exempted from forced labor. In addition, this is where the sentiment heard as, "Mi Barrio", first came from.

The Residencia and The Visita

To check the abuse of power of royal officials, two ancient castilian institutions were brought to the Philippines. The Residencia, dating back to the 5th century and the Visita differed from the residencia in that it was conducted clandestinely by a visitador-general sent from Spain and might occur anytime within the official’s term, without any previous notice. Visitas may be specific or general.

Maura Law

The legal foundation for municipal governments in the country was laid with the promulgation of the Maura Law on May 19, 1893. Named after its author, Don Antonio Maura, the Spanish Minister of Colonies at the time, the law reorganized town governments in the Philippines with the aim of making them more effective and autonomous. This law created the municipal organization that was later adopted, revised, and further strengthened by the American and Filipino governments that succeeded Spanish.

Economy

Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade

The Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade was the main source of income for the colony during its early years. Service was inaugurated in 1565 and continued into the early 19th century. The Galleon trade brought silver from New Spain, which was used to purchase Asian goods such as silk from China, spices from the Moluccas, lacquerware from Japan and Philippine cotton textiles.[13] These goods were then exported to New Spain and ultimately Europe by way of Manila. Thus, the Philippines earned its income through the trade of the Manila-Acapulco Galleon. The trade was very prosperous and attracted many merchants to Manila, especially the Chinese. However, initially it neglected the development of the colony 's local industries which affected the Indios since agriculture was their main source of income. In addition, the building and operation of galleons put too much burden on the colonists ' annual polo y servicio. However, it resulted in cultural and commercial exchanges between Asia and the Americas that led to the introduction of new crops and animals to the Philippines such as corn, potato, tomato, cotton and tobacco among others, that gave the colony its first real income. The trade lasted for over two hundred years, and ceased in 1815 just before the secession of American colonies from Spain.

Royal Society of Friends of the Country

José de Basco y Vargas, following a royal order to form a society of intellectuals who can produce new, useful ideas, formally established the Real Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais. Composed of leading men in business, industry and profession, the society was tasked to explore and exploit the island 's natural bounties. The society led to the creation of Plan General Economico of Basco which implemented the monopolies on the areca nut, tobacco, spirited liquors and explosives. It offered local and foreign scholarships and training grants in agriculture and established an academy of design. It was also credited to the carabao ban of 1782, the formation of the silversmiths and gold beaters guild and the construction of the first papermill in the Philippines in 1825. It was introduced on 1780, vanished temporarily on 1787-1819, 1820–1822 and 1875-1822 and ceased to exist in the middle of the 1890s.

Royal Company of the Philippines

On March 10, 1785, Charles III created the Royal Philippine Company with a 25 year charter.[14] It was granted exclusive monopoly of bringing to Manila, Philippines; Chinese and Indian goods and shipping them directly to Spain via the Cape of Good Hope. It was stiffly objected by the Dutch and English who saw it as a direct attack on their trade of Asian goods. It was also vehemently opposed by the traders of the Galleon trade who saw it as competition. This gradually resulted into the death of both institutions: The Royal Philippine Company in 1814 and the Galleon trade in 1815.[15]

Taxation

To support the colony, several forms of taxes and monopolies were imposed. The buwis (tribute), which could be paid in cash or kind (tobacco,chickens, produce, gold, blankets, cotton, rice, etc., depending on the region of the country), was initially was fixed at 8 reales (one real being 8 centavos) and later increased to 15 reales, apportioned as follows: ten reales buwis, one real diezmos prediales (tithes), one real to the town community chest, one real sanctorum tax, and three reales for church support.[16]
Also collected was the bandalâ (from the Tagalog word mandalâ, a round stack of rice stalks to be threshed), an annual enforced sale and requisitioning of goods such as rice. Custom duties and income tax were also collected. By 1884, the tribute was replaced by the Cedula personal, wherein colonists were required to pay for personal identification. Everyone whose age was over 18 were obliged to pay.[17] The local gobernadorcillos had been responsible for collection of the tribute. Under the cedula system, however, taxpayers were individually responsible to Spanish authorities for payment of the tax, and were subject to summary arrest for failure to show a cedula receipt.[18]

Forced Labor (Polo y servicios)

The system of forced or corvée labor known as polo y servicios evolved from the encomienda system, introduced into the Latin American colonies by the Conquistadores and Catholic priests who accompanied them. Polo y servicios is the forced labor for 40 days of men ranging from 16 to 60 years of age who were obligated to give personal services to community projects. One could be exempted from polo by paying the falla (a corruption of the Spanish falta, meaning "absence"), a daily fine of one and a half real. In 1884, labor was reduced to 15 days. The polo system was patterned after the Mexican repartimento, selection for forced labor.[19]

Culture

See also: Filipino culture
By the 19th century, the Philippines had become an important possession. The early small number of European settlers, soldiers and missionaries brought with them aspects of European life, i.e. the Spanish menu,[20] religious festivals, manner of clothing and fashion. The colonists used the Gregorian calendar, the Latin script and used theocentric art, music, literature. Likewise, the European settlers and their descendants, known as Insulares (lit. "islanders"), also adapted to oriental culture learning to eat rice as their staple and use soy sauce, coconut vinegar, coconut oil and ginger. Today, Filipino culture is a blend of many different cultures.

British invasion

Main article: British occupation of Manila
In August 1759, Charles III ascended the Spanish throne. At the time, Britain and France were at war, in what was later called the Seven Years War. France, suffering a series of setbacks, successfully negotiated a treaty with Spain known as the Family Compact which was signed on 15 August 1761. By an ancillary secret convention, Spain was committed to making preparations for war against Britain.[21]
On 24 September 1762,[22] force of British Army regulars and British East India Company soldiers, supported by the ships and men of the East Indies Squadron of the British Royal Navy, sailed into Manila Bay from Madras in India and after a battle, took possession of Manila and its port, Cavite.[21] The expedition, led by Brigadier General William Draper and Rear-Admiral Samuel Cornish, captured Manila, "the greatest Spanish fortress in the western Pacific", and attempted to establish trade with China.[23]
The early success at Manila did not enable the British to control the Philippines. Spanish-Filipino forces (made up mostly of Filipinos) kept the British confined to Manila. Nevertheless, the British were confident of eventual success after receiving the written surrender of captured Catholic Archbishop Rojo on 30 October 1762.[24]
The surrender was rejected as illegal by Don Simón de Anda y Salazar, who claimed the title of Governor-General under the statutes of the Council of Indies. He led Spanish-Filipino forces that kept the British confined to Manila and sabotaged or crushed British fomented revolts. Anda intercepted and redirected the Manila galleon trade to prevent further captures by the British. The failure of the British to consolidate their position led to troop desertions and a breakdown of command unity which left the British forces paralysed and in an increasingly precarious position.[25]
The Seven Years War was ended by the Peace of Paris signed on 10 February 1763. At the time of signing the treaty, the signatories were not aware that the Manila was under British occupation and was being administered as a British colony. Consequently no specific provision was made for the Philippines. Instead they fell under the general provision that all other lands not otherwise provided for be returned to the Spanish Crown.[26]

Resistance against Spanish rule

Spanish rule of the Philippines was constantly threatened by indigenous rebellions and invasions from the Dutch, Chinese, Japanese and British.
The previously dominant groups resisted Spanish rule, refusing to pay Spanish taxes and rejecting Spanish excesses. All were defeated by the Spanish and their Filipino allies. In many areas, the Spanish left indigenous groups to administer their own affairs but under Spanish overlordship.

Early resistance

Main articles: Philippine revolts against Spain and Spanish-Moro Conflict
Resistance against Spain did not immediately cease upon the conquest of the Austronesian cities. After Tupas of Cebu, random native nobles resisted Spanish rule. The longest recorded native rebellion was that of Francisco Dagohoy which lasted a century.[27]
During the British occupation of Manila (1762–1764), Diego Silang was appointed by them as governor of Ilocos and after his assassination by fellow natives, his wife Gabriela continued to lead the Ilocanos in the fight against Spanish rule. Resistance against Spanish rule was regional in character, based on ethnolinguistic groups.[28]
Hispanization did not spread to the mountainous center of northern Luzon, nor to the inland communities of Mindanao. The highlanders were more able to resist the Spanish invaders than the lowlanders.
The Moros, most notably the sultanates, had a more advanced political system than their counterparts in the Visayas and Luzon. Spanish cities in Mindanao were limited to the coastal areas of Zamboanga and Cagayan de Oro.

The opening of the Philippines to world trade

In Europe, the Industrial Revolution spread from Great Britain during the period known as the Victorian Age. The industrialization of Europe created great demands for raw materials from the colonies, bringing with it investment and wealth, although this was very unevenly distributed. Governor-General Basco had opened the Philippines to this trade. Previously, the Philippines was seen as a trading post for international trade but in the nineteenth century it was developed both as a source of raw materials and as a market for manufactured goods. The economy of the Philippines rose rapidly and its local industries developed to satisfy the rising demands of an industrializing Europe. A small flow of European immigrants came with the opening of the Suez Canal, which cut the travel time between Europe and the Philippines by half. New ideas about government and society, which the friars and colonial authorities found dangerous, quickly found their way into the Philippines, notably through the Freemasons, who along with others, spread the ideals of the American, French and other revolutions, including Spanish liberalism.

Rise of Filipino nationalism

Main article: Filipino nationalism
The development of the Philippines as a source of raw materials and as a market for European manufactures created much local wealth. Many Filipinos prospered. Everyday Filipinos also benefited from the new economy with the rapid increase in demand for labor and availability of business opportunities. Some Europeans immigrated to the Philippines to join the wealth wagon, among them Jacobo Zobel, patriarch of today 's Zobel de Ayala family and prominent figure in the rise of Filipino nationalism. Their scions studied in the best universities of Europe where they learned the ideals of liberty from the French and American Revolutions. The new economy gave rise to a new middle class in the Philippines, usually not ethnic Filipinos.
In the early 19th century, the Suez Canal was opened which made the Philippines easier to reach from Spain. The small increase of Peninsulares from the Iberian Peninsula threatened the secularization of the Philippine churches. In state affairs, the Criollos, known locally as Insulares (lit. "islanders"). were displaced from government positions by the Peninsulares, whom the native Insulares regarded as foreigners. The Insulares had become increasingly Filipino and called themselves Los hijos del país (lit. "sons of the country"). Among the early proponents of Filipino nationalism were the Insulares Padre Pedro Peláez, archbishop of Manila, who fought for the secularization of Philippine churches and expulsion of the friars; Padre José Burgos whose execution influenced the national hero José Rizal; and Joaquín Pardo de Tavera who fought for retention of government positions by natives, regardless of race. In retaliation to the rise of Filipino nationalism, the friars called the Indios (possibly referring to Insulares and mestizos as well) indolent and unfit for government and church positions. In response, the Insulares came out with Indios agraviados, a manifesto defending the Filipino against discriminatory remarks. The tension between the Insulares and Peninsulares erupted into the failed revolts of Novales and the Cavite Mutiny of 1872 which resulted to the deportation of prominent Filipino nationalists to the Marianas and Europe who would continue the fight for liberty through the Propaganda Movement. The Cavite Mutiny implicated the priests Mariano Gómez, José Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora (see Gomburza) whose executions would influence the subversive activities of the next generation of Filipino nationalists, José Rizal, who then dedicated his novel, El filibusterismo to the these priests.

Rise of Spanish liberalism

See also: Liberalism and radicalism in Spain
The Liberals won the Spanish Revolution of 1869. Carlos María de la Torre was sent to the Philippines to serve as governor-general (1869–1871). He was one of the most loved governors-general in the Philippines having implemented reforms in the colony. At one time, his supporters serenaded him in front of the Malacañan Palace. Among those who serenaded were Padre Burgos and Joaquín Pardo de Tavera. When the Reactionaries regained power in Spain, de la Torre was recalled and replaced by Governor-General Izquierdo who vowed to rule with an iron fist.

Freemasonry

Freemasonry had gained a generous following in Europe and the Americas during the 19th century and found its way to the Philippines. The Western World was quickly changing and sought less political control from the Roman Catholic Church.
The first Filipino Masonic lodge was Revoluccion. It was established by Graciano Lopez Jaena in Barcelona and was recognized in April 1889. It did not last long after he resigned from being its worshipful master on November 29, 1889.
In December 1889, Marcelo H. del Pilar established, with the help of Julio Llorente, the Solidaridad in Madrid. Its first worshipful master was Llorente. A short time later, the Solidaridad grew. Some its members included José Rizal, Pedro Serrano Laktaw, Baldomero Roxas, and Galicano Apacible.
In 1891, Del Pilar sent Laktaw to the Philippines to establish a Masonic lodge. Laktaw established on January 6, 1892, the Nilad, the first Masonic lodge in the Philippines. It is estimated that there were 35 masonic lodges in the Philippines in 1893 of which nine were in Manila. The first Filipina freemason was Rosario Villaruel. Trinidad and Josefa Rizal, Marina Dizon, Romualda Lanuza, Purificacion Leyva, and many others join the masonic lodge.
Freemasonry was important during the time of the Philippine Revolution. It pushed the reform movement and carried out the propaganda work. In the Philippines, many of those who pushed for a revolution were member of freemasonry like Andrés Bonifacio. In fact, the organization used by Bonifacio in establishing the Katipunan was derived from the Masonic society. It may be said that joining masonry was one activity that both the reformists and the Katipuneros shared.
The Philippines was accidentally discovered by the European powers in their continuous search for a route to the Indies where they imported the much coveted spices. On March 17, 1521, Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese naval captain under the service of Spain, landed in the small island of Homonhon in Samar in the southern Philippines to look for food and water. Due to hardships in the heretofore unknown and unnavigated sea, and mutiny by his sailors, Magellan had only three ships (out of 5) left when he landed in the Philippines.
Magellan befriended the Sultan of Cebu and succeeded in Christianizing the natives. To prove the military might of his soldiers and to champion the cause of his new vassals, he decided to "punish and teach a lesson" to Lapu Lapu, a chieftain of the island of Mactan who did not acknowledge the sovereignty of Cebu over his island.
Thus leading to the battle of Mactan. The battle was fought on April 25, 1521, during low tide in the shallow shores of Mactan. The Spaniards, burdened with their heavy metal armors, were no match to Lapu Lapu and his men who were armed only with bamboo spears, bows and arrows, and kampilans (native machetes). Magellan was hit by a poisoned arrow and eventually died from the wound. The victorious natives drove back the rest of the invaders to their boats. Lapu Lapu thus became the first Filipino to rise against western aggression and domination.
Permanent Spanish settlement was finally established in 1565 when Miguel López de Legazpi, the first royal governor, arrived in Cebu from New Spain (Mexico). He gave the islands their present name in honor of king Philip II of Spain. Six years later while moving north, he defeating a local Muslim ruler, Rajah Sulayman. Legazpi 's conquest of Maynilad (on the site of modern Manila) in 1571 extended the area under Spanish control. He established his capital at Manila, a location that offered the excellent harbor of Manila Bay, a large population, and proximity to the ample food supplies of the central Luzon rice lands. Manila remained the center of Spanish civil, military, religious, and commercial activity in the islands.
Spain had three objectives in its policy toward the Philippines, its only colony in Asia: to acquire a share in the spice trade, to develop contacts with China and Japan in order to further Christian missionary efforts there, and to convert the Filipinos to Christianity. Occupation of the islands was accomplished with relatively little bloodshed, partly because most of the population (except the Muslims) offered little armed resistance initially.
Church and state were inseparably linked in carrying out Spanish policy. Responsibility for conversion of the indigenous population to Christianity was assigned to several religious orders: the Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians (known collectively as the friars) and to the Jesuits.
Religion played a significant role in Spain 's relations with and attitudes toward the indigenous population. The Spaniards considered conversion through baptism to be a symbol of allegiance to their authority. Although they were interested in gaining a profit from the colony, the Spanish also recognized a responsibility to protect the property and personal rights of these new Christians.
The church 's work of converting Filipinos was facilitated by the absence of other organized religions, except for Islam, which predominated in the south. The missionaries had their greatest success among women and children, although the church had a wide appeal, it was reinforced by the incorporation of Filipino social customs into religious observances. The eventual outcome was a new cultural community of the main Malay lowland population, from which the Muslims (known by the Spanish as Moros, or Moors) and the upland tribal peoples of Luzon remained detached and alienated.
Indirect rule helped create in rural areas a Filipino upper class, principalía or the principales (principal ones). This group had local wealth; high status and prestige; and certain privileges. The principalía was larger and more influential than the preconquest nobility, and it created and perpetuated for Spanish control.
As time went on, many uprisings occurred to protest the Spanish maltreatment of the natives such as forced taxes and labor, and indiscriminate incarceration for no major reasons at all. Both the clergy and the government officials were guilty.
These early "disturbances" were dealt with effectively by the Spanish authorities by employing the divide and conquer strategy. Ilocanos or Kapampangans from the north, for instance, were sent to quell the rebellion in the Bicolanos or the Visayans in the south, or Bicolanos were dispatched to troubled areas in the north or in the Tagalog region.
Taking advantage of the clannishness of the Filipinos, this shrewd tactic served the Spaniards well and for a long time. It was only much later that a gradual awakening of latent nationalism took place among the Filipino people.
Spain ruled the country for 327 years. In the 1800 's a movement was born to revolt against the Spainards. Jose Rizal was one of the men that was in the movement for reform and anti-clerical learning. Rizal was executed, which started the Philippine Revolution in 1896 that was lead by Andres Bonifacio. Bonifacio was the founder of a secret anti-Spanish organization called Katipunan which stood for Brotherhood. On June 12, 1898 Philippine republic was proclaimed independent. The republic was short-lived and the Spanish-American war broke out.
The Spanish found neither spices nor exploitable precious metals in the Philippines. The ecology of the islands was little changed by Spanish importations and technical innovations, with the exception of corn cultivation and some extension of irrigation in order to increase rice supplies for the growing urban population. The colony was not profitable, and a long war with the Dutch in the seventeenth century and intermittent conflict with the Moros nearly bankrupted the colonial treasury. Annual deficits were made up by a subsidy from Mexico.
Among the most significant and enduring changes that occurred under Spanish rule was that the Filipino idea of communal use and ownership of land was replaced with the concept of private, individual ownership and the conferring of titles on members of the principalía. Spain also laid the foundation for a feudal health care system
"Do all the good you can, To all people you can, In everyway you can."
1521, Mar 16. A Spanish expedition, sailing across the Pacific Ocean from east to west, and led by the Portuguese Ferdinand Magellan (died Apr 27, 1521) lands on Homonhon Island east of Samar with three small ships, named the Concepcion, Trinidad and Victoria. Magellan calls the place San Lazaro Island since March 16 is Saint Lazarus day.
1521, Mar 28. Directing his ships southwestward, Magellan reaches Limasawa Island, south of Leyte. It is ruled by Rajah Kulambo, who becomes Magellan 's friend.
1521, Mar 29. To seal the friendship between Magellan and Rajah Kulambo, they solemnize a blood compact. This is the first recorded blood compact in Philippine history.
1521, Mar 31. The first mass on Philippine soil is celebrated on Limasawa.
1521, Apr 7. After sailing to Cebu Island, Magellan enters a new blood compact with the local chieftain, Rajah Humabon.
1521, Apr 27. Magellan dies in a battle with Lapu-Lapu, chieftain of Mactan, an island near Cebu.
1525. Spain sends an expedition under Juan Garcia Jofre de Loaysa to the Philippines. The expedition expects to find gold and spices but fails to do so. Loaysa and many members of his crew die in the Philippines.
1526. Spain sends a third expedition to the Philippines under the leadership of Juan Cabot. This expedition never reaches the archipelago as three years are wasted in South America, trying to find a new route to the East.
1527. The fourth expedition sent by Spain to The Country is under the command of Alvaro de Saavedra. It is the first Spanish expedition starting from Mexico. It reaches Mindanao but on the way to Cebu Saavedra 's ship is carried by strong winds to the Moluccas.
1529. Saavedra 's expedition returns to Spain without Saavedra who died on the way home.
1536. The Loaysa expedition returns to Spain. One of its survivors is Andres de Urdaneta, its chronicler.
1543, Feb 2. The leader of the most successful Spanish expedition after Magellan, Ruy Lopez de Villalobos (died Apr 4, 1546) arrives in the archipelago. He names the islands the Philippines in honor of the son of King Charles I, Philip II (1556-1598) of Spain. Villalobos reaches Sarangani Island off the eastern coast of Mindanao and settles there for 8 months. But because of the scarcity of food, the expedition is forced to leave the place and sails to the Moluccas where Villalobos dies.
1565, Feb 13. With four ships and 380 men, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi arrives in the Philippines.
1565, May 8. The Island of Cebu is surrendered to Legaspi by its ruler King Tupas. Legaspi establishes the first permanent Spanish settlement on Cebu and becomes the first Spanish Governor-General. By his order, tributes are collected from all Filipino males aged 19 to 60.
1568. The Portuguese, under the command of General Gonzalo de Pereira, attack Cebu and blockade its port.
1570. The Portuguese again attack the colony and are repulsed. The series of attacks stems from Portugal 's claim to the territory based on the provision of the Treaty of Tordisillas entered into by Spain and Portugal on June 7, 1474, in which their respective spheres of influence, trade and conquest were defined. The Portuguese believe that the Philippines falls within their sphere.
1570, May. Legaspi sends an expedition under the leadership of Martin de Goiti to Manila. Manila is ruled by Rajah Suliman, whose friendship is won by de Goiti.
1571, May 19. Rajah Suliman wages war against the Spaniards due to a move by de Goiti which he mistakes for an assault. De Goiti 's army defeats Suliman 's troops and occupies the town.
1571, Jun 24. Legaspi establishes his government in Manila and proclaims it the capital of the Philippines, calling it the "distinguished and ever loyal city".
1572, Aug 20. Legaspi dies and Guido de Lavezares (died 1575) succeeds him as governor. Lavezares extends colonization to the Bicol region.
1574, Nov 23. The Chinese pirate captain Limahong attacks Manila but the Spaniards win with the help of the Filipinos.
1574, Dec 2. Limahong again attacks Manila, this time with 1,500 soldiers, but cannot conquer the city.
1574, Dec. In Tondo (now a district of Manila) Lakandula leads a short revolt against the Spanish.
1580. The Spanish King Philip II receives the throne of Portugal upon the death of the Portuguese King Sebastian. This puts an end to the Portuguese harassment of the Philippine archipelago.
1580. The Spaniards institute forced labor on all male natives aged 16 to 60.
1583, Aug. A great fire in Manila which starts from the candles around the bier of governor Penalosa.
1589. The Spaniards establish the first school in the Philippines, the College of San Ignacio.
1600. The Dutch attack the archipelago in a tactical offensive during the European war between Spain and the Netherlands.
1600. Governor Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera begins collecting the bandala from the natives. Bandala is an annual quota of products assigned to the natives for compulsory sale to the government.
1600. The Galleon trade between Manila and Acapulco, Mexico begins. But Manila serves merely as a transshipment port for the exchange of goods between Spain and Mexico on the one side and China on the other. Silver from Mexico is traded for any kind of Chinese merchandise. Because of the Galleon trade 's quick returns, Spain lacks interest in developing the Philippine economy during the first 200 years of its occupation.
1603. Chinese insurrection in Manila.
1622. An early revolt takes place in Bohol. It is headed by Tamblot, a babaylan or priest of the native religion. Revolts in Leyte, Samar and Panay follow, all protesting the collection of tributes.
1744. One of the most successful revolts in Philippine history breaks out, once more in Bohol, and provides the island a kind of independence from the Spaniards for the following 85 years. The first leader of the revolt is Francisco Dagohoy.
1754, May 15. Mt Taal emits magma and destroys the towns of Lipa, Sala, Tanauan and Talisay.
1762, Sep 22. In a side encounter of the European Seven Years War, the British attack Manila with 13 vessels and 6,830 men under the command of General William Draper and Admiral Samuel Corning. The British win the battle and occupy the city.
1762, Oct 5. The British take control of the Philippines and Darsonne Drake becomes Governor-General. The British open the colony to international trade and ultimately change its economic life.
1762, Dec 14. A revolt under the leadership of Diego Silang (Dec 16, 1730 - May 28, 1763) breaks out in the Ilocos region.
1763, May 28. The revolt ends as Diego Silang is assassinated by his former friend Miguel Viscos.
1763, Feb 10. The Treaty of Paris between England, Spain and France is signed, ending the Seven Years War in Europe as well as the British occupation of the Philippines.
1774, Nov 9. Parishes are secularized by order of King Charles III of Spain. Natives are also permitted to enter the Catholic priesthood.
1808, May. French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte installs his brother Joseph as King of Spain. French-influenced liberals support the king but the people do not.
1809, Jan 22. As an effect of the appointment of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain, all Spanish colonies including the Philippines are made integral parts of Spain by the Spanish Central Junta. Filipinos are given the privileges of Spanish citizenship as well as representation in the Spanish Cortes (parliament).
1812, Mar 19. The Spanish Cortes promulgates the Cadiz Constitution. It is a liberal constitution, vesting sovereignty in the people, recognizing the equality of all men and the individual liberty of the citizen, and granting the right of suffrage, but providing for a hereditary monarchy and for Catholicism as the state religion.
1812, Sep 24. The first Philippine delegates to the Spanish Cortes, Pedro Perez de Tagle and Jose Manuel Coretto take their oath of office in Madrid, Spain.
1813, Mar 17. Spain officially implements the Cadiz Constitution in Manila.
1813, Oct 16 to 19. The Battle of the Nations near Leipzig, Germany; it ends with Napoleon and the French defeated.
1813, Oct. Following the French defeat at Leipzig, the British General Duke of Wellington drives the Napoleonic forces out of Spain.
1814. Ferdinand VII, son of Charles IV, is recognized as King of Spain.
1815, Jun 18. Napoleon Bonaparte is defeated in a battle with another multi-national army under Wellington at Waterloo, Belgium.
1815, Oct 15. Bonaparte is exiled to St. Helena 's Island in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of West Africa.
1816, May 24. After the defeat of Napoleon in Europe and his brother 's loss of the Spanish throne, conservative forces again dominate Spanish politics. The Spanish Cortes rejects the Cadiz Constitution which means, among other things, that Philippine representation in the Cortes is abolished.
1820. Changes in Philippine economic life, partially introduced by the British, lead to some internal prosperity. In agriculture, crops are relegated by region so that tobacco becomes the chief crop of the north, sugar the main crop of the Visayas, and abaca the mainstay of the Bicol region. The same year, foreigners are massacred in Binondo. They were under suspicion of poisoning Pasig river and thus being responsible for a severe epidemic of cholera.
1828. An earthquake lasting between 2 to 3 minutes damage a number of buildings and churches in Manila.
1830. The Port of Manila is opened to the world market.
1835. The Chamber of Commerce is installed. Francisco Rodriguez establishes the first Filipino bank.
1848. Glowing avalanche from Mt Hibok-Hibok on Camiguin island
1852, Dec 4 to 6. Glowing avalanche from Mt Hibok-Hibok.
1863. The educational system in the archipelago is reformed, allowing the natives higher levels of training. Wealthier native families start sending their children to study in Spain.
1863, Jun 3. At 19:00, a terrific earthquake shakes Manila and ruins most buildings in the city, including the cathedral. Of major structures, only the San Agustin church remains standing.
1869, Nov 17. The Suez Canal is opened, establishing a regular steamship service between the Philippines and Europe. This allows not only the influx of more goods into the colony but also of new ideas.
1872, Feb 17. Three martyr priests are publicly garroted as alleged leaders of the Cavite Conspiracy, a movement for secularization and nationalism, which is distasteful to the Spanish friars. They are Jose Burgos (born Feb 9, 1837), Mariano Gomez (born Aug 2, 1799) and Jacinto Zamora (born Aug 14, 1835). The incident gives the Filipinos an impetus to unite and to develop national consciousness. It also gives birth to a reform movement among Filipinos in Spain, known as the Propaganda Movement.
1880. Manila is connected through telegraphic cable to the Western world by Eastern Telecom.
1880, Jul 18 & 20. Two shocks of an earthquake create destruction from Manila to Santa Cruz, Luguna. Tremors continue until Aug 6.
1882, Mar 3. A talented offspring of the native elite, Jose Protacio Rizal Mercado y Alonso Realonda (Jun 19, 1861 - Dec 30, 1896) leaves Manila for Barcelona to continue his studies in medicine.
1882, Jun 2. In Madrid, Rizal begins writing Noli me tangere, a political novel set in the Philippines.
1884. Exaction of tribute from all male natives is ended and the required forced labor of 40 days a year is reduced to 15 days.
1884, Jun 21. Rizal finishes his medical studies in Spain.
1887, May 29. Noli me tangere is published in Madrid and Barcelona.
1887, Oct. Rizal begins writing the novel El Filibusterismo, a continuation of Noli me tangere.
1888, Dec 13. Filipinos in Barcelona establish the organization La Solidaridad. It demands for the Philippines freedom of press, speech and assembly, equality before the law, participation in governmental affairs, social and political freedom and representation in the Spanish Cortes. The demands are published and circulated in Barcelona for the purpose of reaching the Spanish King 's ear. Among the members are: Jose Rizal, Lopez Jaena (Dec 18, 1856 - Jan 20, 1897), Marcelo del Pilar (Aug 30, 1850 - Dec 3, 1920), Antonio Luna (Oct 29, 1866 - Jun 5, 1899) and Mariano Ponce (Mar 23, 1863 - May 23, 1918).
1891, Mar 28. Rizal finishes writing El Filibusterismo in Biarritz, France.
1892, Jun 26. Rizal arrives in the Philippines via Hong Kong.
1892, Jul 3. In Ilaya St, Tondo, Rizal founds La Liga Filipina to give the people a chance for direct involvement in the reform movement. Andres Bonifacio (Nov 30, 1863 - May 10, 1897) is one of Rizal 's partners.
1892, Jul 7. The Spanish authorities arrest Rizal for organizing La Liga Filipina.
1892, Jul 17. Rizal is exiled to Dapitan, Mindanao.
1894, Jul 8. Andres Bonifacio forms the Katipunan. Its members come from the lower and the middle class. The organization wants to awaken nationalism and free the Filipino people from Spanish oppression and friar despotism. The organization believes that reforms can only be obtained by means of a revolution.
1896, Jul 1. Rizal receives a telegram from Governor Ramon Blanco requiring his services as a physician for the Spanish army in Cuba.
1896, Aug 6. Rizal returns to Manila.
1896, Aug 19. Spanish authorities discover the Katipunan when one of its members, Teodoro Paterno, betrays the organization to an Agustinian priest, Fr. Mariano Gil. All those implicated are ordered arrested but many Katipuneros evade arrest and flee to the hills of Balintawak.
1896, Aug 23. A revolution is proclaimed by Bonifacio. The event is marked in history as the Cry of Balintawak. In this instance, Filipinos tear up their cedulas (I.D. cards) issued by the Spanish government and thereby mark the beginning of the uprising against the Spaniards.
1896, Aug 26. Rizal goes to Cavite where he boards a ship for Barcelona. In the following night, Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto and other Katipuneros are able to surreptitiously board Rizal 's ship. They offer to rescue him from the Spaniards, but Rizal refuses.
1896, Aug 30. After the spread of the Katipunan revolt throughout The Country the first real battle for Philippine independence takes place at San Juan del Monte. The Spanish Governor Ramon Blanco proclaims a state of war in the 8 provinces that took up arms. The provinces are Manila, Laguna, Cavite, Batangas, Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija.
1896, Sep 2. Aboard the ship Isla de Panay, Rizal leaves Cavite for Barcelona.
1896, Oct 3. Rizal arrives in Barcelona.
1896, Oct 4. By order of Capt. Gen. Despujol, Rizal is incarcerated in Montjuich.
1896, Oct 6. On orders from Madrid, Rizal is sent back to Manila as a prisoner.
1896, Oct 31. A new group of the Katipunan is formed in Cavite; it discards the leadership of Andres Bonifacio and is headed by Emilio Aguinaldo (Mar 22, 1869 - Feb 6, 1964).
1896, Nov 13. Rizal arrives in Manila and is immediately imprisoned at Fort Santiago.
1896, Nov 20. Rizal is interrogated the first time on charges of partaking in an uprising against the Spanish government.
1896, Dec 20. Rizal is sentenced to death by a Spanish court martial, and Governor Camilo Polavieja orders his execution.
1896, Dec 30. The Spaniards execute Jose Rizal in
Bagumbayan (today 's Rizal Park).
1897, Mar 22. The Katipunan holds its election. Aguinaldo is elected as president while Bonifacio is elected only as director of war. Bonifacio is insulted by the election results and refuses to recognize the new leadership.
1897, Apr 29. Katipuneros arrest Andres Bonifacio and his brothers Procopio and Ciriaco on orders of Aguinaldo, who considers the former a threat. The Bonifacios are charged with sedition and treason before a military court of the Katipunan.
1897, May 8. The Katipunan court finds the Bonifacios guilty. They are sentenced to death.
1897, May 10. Andres Bonifacio and his brothers are executed at Mt. Buntis, Maragondon, Cavite.
1897, May 31. Aguinaldo establishes a Philippine republican government in Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan.
1897, Aug 10. Aguinaldo begins negotiating with the Spaniards, represented by Pedro Paterno.
1897, Aug 15. An earthquake at estimated intensity of 7.9 centered on Luzon 's northwest coast shakes Batanes and northern Luzon.
1897, Nov 1. The Constitution of Biak-na-Bato is signed. It was prepared and written by Isabelo Artache and Felix Ferrer. The government of the Biak-na-Bato Republic has the following officers: Emilio Aguinaldo, President; Mariano Trias, Vice President; Isabelo Artache, Secretary of Interior; Antonio Montenegro, Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Baldomero Aguinaldo, Secretary of Treasury and Emiliano Riego de Jesus, Secretary of War. The Biak-na-Bato Republic fails as its leader, Aguinaldo, resigns to the fact that the Filipinos are not yet ready to confront the Spanish forces. This belief also drives him to negotiate with the Spaniards for the Pact of Biak-na-Bato.
1897, Dec 14. The Pact of Biak-na-Bato between the Spanish and Aguinaldo is signed. In this pact, Aguinaldo agrees to surrender all arms and to go with his companions into exile in Hong Kong upon payment of 800,000 pesos and an additional 900,000 pesos for the non-combatants who suffered losses because of the war.
1897, Dec 27. Aguinaldo and his companions leave for Hong Kong where they live on the interest from their money.

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