Rivising the Tragedy of the Commons
REVISITING THE
”TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS”
University Sciences Po Paris Semester: Fall 2011/2012 Student: Sönke-Timo Kisker Student – ID: 100033186 Course: Thinking and Acting the Environment Course-ID: 23811 Course Coordinaton: Florence Faucher-King; Thomas Léon Assignment: Mid-term paper Word-count: 2746 Date: 18.10.2011 |
Agenda
I. Introduction 2 II. Specifying a framework 2 a. Defining ‘global public good’ 2 b. Defining the “Tragedy,”within Game theory 3 III. Revisiting Hardin 's main assumptions and argumentations 4 c. Variables influencing rational choices of Individuals 4 d. The concept value and ethics in decisionmaking 5 IV. Practical examples of dealing with the commons 6 e. Mc Evoy 's findings of assigning responsibility 6 f. Co-Management 6 g. Ostrom contradicting the call to redefine property rights 7 V. Collective Action in the Ecological Crisis: How to make politics work 7 VI. Conclusion 7
VII. References 8
I. Introduction
In 1968, Garrett Hardin first introduced a new framework to specify
”TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS”
University Sciences Po Paris Semester: Fall 2011/2012 Student: Sönke-Timo Kisker Student – ID: 100033186 Course: Thinking and Acting the Environment Course-ID: 23811 Course Coordinaton: Florence Faucher-King; Thomas Léon Assignment: Mid-term paper Word-count: 2746 Date: 18.10.2011 |
Agenda
I. Introduction 2 II. Specifying a framework 2 a. Defining ‘global public good’ 2 b. Defining the “Tragedy,”within Game theory 3 III. Revisiting Hardin 's main assumptions and argumentations 4 c. Variables influencing rational choices of Individuals 4 d. The concept value and ethics in decisionmaking 5 IV. Practical examples of dealing with the commons 6 e. Mc Evoy 's findings of assigning responsibility 6 f. Co-Management 6 g. Ostrom contradicting the call to redefine property rights 7 V. Collective Action in the Ecological Crisis: How to make politics work 7 VI. Conclusion 7
VII. References 8
I. Introduction
In 1968, Garrett Hardin first introduced a new framework to specify
References: Begossi, A. 2006. Temporal stability in fishing spots: conservation and co-management in Brazilian artisanal coastal fisheries. Ecology and Society 11(1): 5. [online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art5/ Connelly, J David M. McEvoy & John K. Stranlund, 2007. "Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries," Working Papers 2007-11, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. Dobson, A Easterlyn, R. (2004). Feedong the illusion of growth and happiness: A replyto hagerty and Veenhoven. Retrieved on Oct. 18th, 2011 from:http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~easterl/papers/HVcomment.pdf Hardin, G Hardin, G. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons". Science 162 (3859): 1243–1248. 1968. doi:10.1126/science.162.3859.1243. PMID 5699198 Inglehart, R Kahnemann, D. & Deaton, A. (2010). High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being Kaul, Grunberg & Stern, (1999). Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: OUP USA. Maslow, A. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological Review 50(4) :370-96. Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-40599-8. Seabright, P. (1993). Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 113-134 Taylor, M., 2009 Vedeld, Trond (2010). A New Global Game - And How Best to Play It. The NIBR International Blog