research proposal-sample-good
对外经济贸易大学
University of International Business and Economics
硕士论文开题报告
Executive Compensation and Incentives:
Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in
China’s Listed Companies
（高管薪酬与激励:来自中国上市公司并购
交易的经验证据）
1
Contents
1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………………… 1
2. Literature Review …………………………………………………………………2
3. Methodology…………………………………………………………………… 4
4. Expectations………………………………………………………………………8
References ………………………………………………………………………… 9
目
录
一、前言 ………………………………………………………………………… 1
二、文献回顾 ……………………………………………………………………2
三、研究内容与方法……………………………………………………………… 4
四、结言 ………………………………………………………………………8
参考文献 ……………………………………………………………………… 9
Executive Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from Mergers and
Acquisitions in China’s Listed Companies
（高管薪酬与激励:来自中国上市公司并购交易的经验证据）
开题报告
1. Introduction
The subject of executive compensation has been a hot topic in financial studies. Jensen and
Ruback (1983) stated that “examination of the costs and benefits to competing management teams of success or failure in the takeover market will aid in understanding the forces that determine when and why takeovers are initiated, and why target managers oppose or acquiesce to such proposals.” Prior research has established possible links between executives’ self-interest and M&A activities.
Main driving factors of executives making mergers and/or acquisitions have been identified: hubris (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), diversification of personal risk (Morck et al. 1990; May,
1995), and the additional compensation associated with size (Murphy, 1985). Specifically, using
Western data, prior research has provided empirical evidence on the relationship of executives’ compensation and firms’ M&A activities. For example, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) show that bidder CEOs receive higher bonus compensation when M&A deals are larger; their results suggest that managerial power plays a significant role in determining M&A bonuses. Hartzell et al. (2004) document that
University of International Business and Economics
硕士论文开题报告
Executive Compensation and Incentives:
Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in
China’s Listed Companies
（高管薪酬与激励:来自中国上市公司并购
交易的经验证据）
1
Contents
1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………………… 1
2. Literature Review …………………………………………………………………2
3. Methodology…………………………………………………………………… 4
4. Expectations………………………………………………………………………8
References ………………………………………………………………………… 9
目
录
一、前言 ………………………………………………………………………… 1
二、文献回顾 ……………………………………………………………………2
三、研究内容与方法……………………………………………………………… 4
四、结言 ………………………………………………………………………8
参考文献 ……………………………………………………………………… 9
Executive Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from Mergers and
Acquisitions in China’s Listed Companies
（高管薪酬与激励:来自中国上市公司并购交易的经验证据）
开题报告
1. Introduction
The subject of executive compensation has been a hot topic in financial studies. Jensen and
Ruback (1983) stated that “examination of the costs and benefits to competing management teams of success or failure in the takeover market will aid in understanding the forces that determine when and why takeovers are initiated, and why target managers oppose or acquiesce to such proposals.” Prior research has established possible links between executives’ self-interest and M&A activities.
Main driving factors of executives making mergers and/or acquisitions have been identified: hubris (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), diversification of personal risk (Morck et al. 1990; May,
1995), and the additional compensation associated with size (Murphy, 1985). Specifically, using
Western data, prior research has provided empirical evidence on the relationship of executives’ compensation and firms’ M&A activities. For example, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) show that bidder CEOs receive higher bonus compensation when M&A deals are larger; their results suggest that managerial power plays a significant role in determining M&A bonuses. Hartzell et al. (2004) document that
References: [1] Bliss, Richard T. and Rosen, Richard J., “CEO Compensation and Bank Mergers,” Journal of Financial Economics 61, 2001, pp.107–138. [2] Chhaochharia,Vidhi and Grinstein, Yaniv, “CEO Compensation and Board Structure,” Journal of Finance 64, 2009, pp.231–261. [3] Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen, “Separation of ownership and control,” Journal of Law and Economics 26, 1983, pp.301–325. [4] Grinstein, Yaniv and Hribar, Paul, “CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses,” Journal of Financial Economics 73, 2004, pp.119–143. [5] Harford, Jarrad and Li, Kai, “Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs,” Journal of Finance 2, 2007, pp.917–949. banking industry,” Journal of Financial Economics 39, 1995, pp.105–130. [7] Jensen, Michael C. and Ruback, Richard S., “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics 11, 1983, pp.5–50. [8] Lambert, Richard, Larcker, Davidand and Verrecchia,Robert , “Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation,” Journal of Accounting Research 29, 1991, [9] Malmendiera, Ulrike and Tate, Geoffrey, “Who makes acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market 's Reaction,” Journal of Financial Economics 89, 2008, of Finance 50, 1995, pp.1291–1308. [11] Mehran, H., “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics 38, 1995, pp.163–184. [12] Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., “Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions? ” Journal of Finance 45, 1990, pp.31–49. [13] Murphy, K., “Corporate performance and Managerial Remuneration,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 1985, pp.11–42. [14] Ozkan, Neslihan, “CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data,” European Financial Management 17, 2009,