Raz's Argument On Legitimate Authority
Raz’s argument from legitimate authority to the sources thesis is not sound. I make that argument in Part II after, in Part I, reconstructing Raz’s argument.
I
Does law claim legitimate authority? Raz says it does. Adhering to the prevailing view in jurisprudence, Raz appears to agree that legitimate authority consists in a right to rule paired with a correlative obligation among the authority’s subjects to obey. This talk of “rights” and “obligations” differs legitimate authority from illegitimate authority, and since the legal systems with which we are familiar do claim such a right (entailing our obligation to obey), it follows that they claim legitimate authority.
Fair enough. The next premise in Raz’s reasoning, albeit an implied one, is this: Any claim to legitimate authority—that is, a claim to possess the right to rule—must be justified. This follows from the absurdity of its logical opposite. The notion that a person or government may simply claim and ipso facto have the right to rule would have the absurd consequence of bestowing legitimacy on any regime, even the most despotic, that claims authority. Indeed, if Adolf Hitler had a right to rule (one believes he at least claimed to have it), then Nazi officials serving under him were in fact morally obligated to carry out the Holocaust. I take it for granted that no one believes this. …show more content…
In the ordinary case, I accept advice when a person whose judgment I respect has heard my reasons for and against a particular action and has rendered a verdict on the question. Raz’s normal justification thesis builds on this intuition: If some entity claiming authority X can do a better job than I of hearing and adjudicating my reasons for action regarding some action, then it has authority over me insofar as that action is concerned. X, in other words, has a right to rule over
I
Does law claim legitimate authority? Raz says it does. Adhering to the prevailing view in jurisprudence, Raz appears to agree that legitimate authority consists in a right to rule paired with a correlative obligation among the authority’s subjects to obey. This talk of “rights” and “obligations” differs legitimate authority from illegitimate authority, and since the legal systems with which we are familiar do claim such a right (entailing our obligation to obey), it follows that they claim legitimate authority.
Fair enough. The next premise in Raz’s reasoning, albeit an implied one, is this: Any claim to legitimate authority—that is, a claim to possess the right to rule—must be justified. This follows from the absurdity of its logical opposite. The notion that a person or government may simply claim and ipso facto have the right to rule would have the absurd consequence of bestowing legitimacy on any regime, even the most despotic, that claims authority. Indeed, if Adolf Hitler had a right to rule (one believes he at least claimed to have it), then Nazi officials serving under him were in fact morally obligated to carry out the Holocaust. I take it for granted that no one believes this. …show more content…
In the ordinary case, I accept advice when a person whose judgment I respect has heard my reasons for and against a particular action and has rendered a verdict on the question. Raz’s normal justification thesis builds on this intuition: If some entity claiming authority X can do a better job than I of hearing and adjudicating my reasons for action regarding some action, then it has authority over me insofar as that action is concerned. X, in other words, has a right to rule over