Rawls 'Essay' The Original Position
Rawls then introduces the concept of the difference principle, and connects it with democratic equality. Rawls explains that the theory behind the difference principle is that distributions in society are primarily based upon “social contingencies” and “natural fortunes.” Rawls indicates that, determining the distribution of goods, viz., wealth and income, is morally arbitrary. Hence, if you happen to be born to a wealthy family, your prospects of living “well” are higher than if you were born into poverty. This idea is counter-intuitive to the basic structure of democratic equality. Therefore, to have democratic equality, the difference principle is necessary to ensuring it. With the difference principle, the least advantaged members
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A main objection, and one recognized by Ronald Dworkin in his essay, “The Original Position,” is that even if the constraints placed on those in the original position, such as the “veil of ignorance,” worked, is that enough to assume that people would come to an agreement? More importantly, would they come to an agreement and choose Rawls' principles of justice? The simple and unsophisticated answer is “yes,” but only if the characteristics described by Rawls were actually the ones that divide people on issues of justice. Nevertheless, I am confident that Rawls would scold my simple answer, and tell me I am not even close to recognizing all the intricacies inherent to the peculiar psychological construct of the human psyche. Rawls understands objections, like the one above, and gives a “presentation of alternatives” in §21 of A Theory of Justice. Specifically, Rawls clarifies that arguments about self-interest are “Egoistic Conceptions.” Under the classification of “Egoistic Conceptions,” models of justice would have the following principles: 1. First-person dictatorship: Everyone is to serve my interests 2. Free-rider: Everyone is to act justly except for myself, if I choose not
A main objection, and one recognized by Ronald Dworkin in his essay, “The Original Position,” is that even if the constraints placed on those in the original position, such as the “veil of ignorance,” worked, is that enough to assume that people would come to an agreement? More importantly, would they come to an agreement and choose Rawls' principles of justice? The simple and unsophisticated answer is “yes,” but only if the characteristics described by Rawls were actually the ones that divide people on issues of justice. Nevertheless, I am confident that Rawls would scold my simple answer, and tell me I am not even close to recognizing all the intricacies inherent to the peculiar psychological construct of the human psyche. Rawls understands objections, like the one above, and gives a “presentation of alternatives” in §21 of A Theory of Justice. Specifically, Rawls clarifies that arguments about self-interest are “Egoistic Conceptions.” Under the classification of “Egoistic Conceptions,” models of justice would have the following principles: 1. First-person dictatorship: Everyone is to serve my interests 2. Free-rider: Everyone is to act justly except for myself, if I choose not