Tnd the analysis, Billy Beane went to work finding a roster of inexpensive players who could get on base and hit. Remarkably – or perhaps predictably – the A’s made the playoffs that year, shocking the baseball world, given a lineup mostly regarded as a bunch of under-achievers
s. FinHis high school batting average had plummeted by his senior year, and he did not deal well with adversity, launching into temper tantrums after strikeouts and struggling to adjust to the changing patterns of opposing pitchers. In addition, Beane was not enthusiastic about playing professional ball as opposed to attending college. In the end, a sizable bonus swayed him to sign with the Mets.
The results were, in terms of his playing career, frustrating. Beane struggled mightily, even in the minor leagues. His raw tools were good enough to give him a shot in the major leagues as a fringe utility player, but by 1993 he had opted to pursue a career in Oakland’s front office instead. He ultimately became General Manager Sandy Alderson’s assistant, inheriting Alderson’s scientific approach to the game as well as his appreciation of bases on balls and the importance of on-base percentage. When Alderson moved on, Beane became the general manager. He not only continued in Alderson’s footsteps but also heartily reinforced his predecessor’s …show more content…
His attitude had also predicted failure. Finally, Beane had been signed out of high school. This gave scouts far less data on his abilities than they had for college players. For Beane, ability to make solid contact would trump the more spectacular tools. A player’s makeup would be of paramount consideration. College players would be preferred to high schoolers. These priorities put Beane into conflict with much of his organization. A’s scouts still drooled over young stallions and undervalued less flashy players. Coaches craved speed and were infatuated with the stolen base. Part of Beane’s task, therefore, was to give solid organizational expression to his philosophy. This he did by making the on-field management completely subordinate to the front