Principle of Fairness in Political Obligations
Political Science-II
Political Obligations and
Issues of Fair Play: A Critical Analysis
Submitted By:
Abhishek Choudhary (2034)
Table of Contents
Introduction
Modern theories in the pursuit of explaining the provenance of political obligations tend to display a warranted skepticism of traditional consent theories. Twentieth century political philosophers expended much of their energy in drawing attention to the utter absurdity of such theories by attacking the idea that citizens in nation-states undertake obligations as a result of deliberate consensual acts, a premise not very hard to disprove. This lack of coherence provided by traditional theories on political obligations have compelled theorists into looking for other possible justifications of one’s political obligations, most of which stem from the transactional relationships intrinsic to organized societies.
These transactional accounts assert that political obligations are acquired through morally imbued relationships between the citizen and his compatriots, or the citizen and the state. One such theory is the “principle of fair play” (sometimes referred to as the “principle of fairness”).1 Very simply put, authors of this principle argue that promises and deliberate consent are not the only possible grounds of special rights and obligations; instead the acceptance of benefits within certain sorts of cooperative schemes, they maintain, is by itself sufficient to generate such rights and obligations.2
It is this theory that forms the crux of the paper. The paper primarily seeks to examine the theoretical justification of the principle of fair play by tracing its evolution as an idea in search of the answer to that insurmountable problem faced by political theorists: why does a citizen have obligations to the state? The nature of presentation of the idea of fair play seeks to trace the original antecedents of fair play, as enunciated by Professor HLA Hart and John
Political Obligations and
Issues of Fair Play: A Critical Analysis
Submitted By:
Abhishek Choudhary (2034)
Table of Contents
Introduction
Modern theories in the pursuit of explaining the provenance of political obligations tend to display a warranted skepticism of traditional consent theories. Twentieth century political philosophers expended much of their energy in drawing attention to the utter absurdity of such theories by attacking the idea that citizens in nation-states undertake obligations as a result of deliberate consensual acts, a premise not very hard to disprove. This lack of coherence provided by traditional theories on political obligations have compelled theorists into looking for other possible justifications of one’s political obligations, most of which stem from the transactional relationships intrinsic to organized societies.
These transactional accounts assert that political obligations are acquired through morally imbued relationships between the citizen and his compatriots, or the citizen and the state. One such theory is the “principle of fair play” (sometimes referred to as the “principle of fairness”).1 Very simply put, authors of this principle argue that promises and deliberate consent are not the only possible grounds of special rights and obligations; instead the acceptance of benefits within certain sorts of cooperative schemes, they maintain, is by itself sufficient to generate such rights and obligations.2
It is this theory that forms the crux of the paper. The paper primarily seeks to examine the theoretical justification of the principle of fair play by tracing its evolution as an idea in search of the answer to that insurmountable problem faced by political theorists: why does a citizen have obligations to the state? The nature of presentation of the idea of fair play seeks to trace the original antecedents of fair play, as enunciated by Professor HLA Hart and John
Bibliography: 2. A. John Simmons, The Principle of Fair Play, Vol. 8(4) Philosophy and Public Affairs, 307, 337 (1979). 3. Calvin G. Normore, Consent and the Principle of Fairness, Stanford Economics and Finance, (2010). 4. Craig L. Carr, Fairness and Political Obligation, 28(1) Social Theory and Practice, 1, 28 (2002). 5. George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, 97(2) Ethics, 353, 362 (1987). 6. HLA Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 Philosophical Review, I85 (1955). 7. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs (Summer 1985). 9. Patrick Durning, Political Legitimacy and the Duty to Obey the Law, 33 Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 373, 390 (2003). 10. Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues. Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism, 1997. 2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (1971). 3. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 94 (1974).