Political Dynasty
Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and
Political Dynasties in the Philippines∗
Pablo Querubin
Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies
October, 2011
Abstract
Research in political economy emphasizes the tendency of elites to persist and reproduce their power over time, potentially undermining the effectiveness of institutional reforms. One particular form of elite persistence is illustrated by the existence of political dynasties. A natural question is whether certain political reforms can break dynastic patterns and open up the political system. In this paper I study the extent to which the introduction of term limits by the 1987 Philippine Constitution effectively broke the hold of incumbent families on power. The ability of term limits to dismantle political dynasties is not obvious, as termlimited incumbents may be replaced by relatives or may run for a different elected office.
Whether these strategies undermine the direct effects of term-limits in reducing the time an individual can hold office is an empirical question. I find no evidence of a statistically significant impact of term limits on curbing families’ persistence in power. Moreover, term limits deter high-quality challengers from running prior to the expiration of an incumbent’s term. Challengers prefer to wait for the incumbent to be termed-out and run in an open-seat race. As a consequence, incumbents are safer in their early terms prior to the limit. These results suggest that political reforms that do not modify the underlying sources of dynastic power are often ineffective in changing the political equilibrium.
∗I would like to thank my thesis advisers, Daron Acemoglu, Esther Duflo, James Robinson and James M. Snyder
Jr. for all their comments and support. I would also like to thank participants at the MIT Development Lunch, the
MIT Political Economy Breakfast and the Harvard Political Economy Workshop for their questions and feedback.
I also
Political Dynasties in the Philippines∗
Pablo Querubin
Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies
October, 2011
Abstract
Research in political economy emphasizes the tendency of elites to persist and reproduce their power over time, potentially undermining the effectiveness of institutional reforms. One particular form of elite persistence is illustrated by the existence of political dynasties. A natural question is whether certain political reforms can break dynastic patterns and open up the political system. In this paper I study the extent to which the introduction of term limits by the 1987 Philippine Constitution effectively broke the hold of incumbent families on power. The ability of term limits to dismantle political dynasties is not obvious, as termlimited incumbents may be replaced by relatives or may run for a different elected office.
Whether these strategies undermine the direct effects of term-limits in reducing the time an individual can hold office is an empirical question. I find no evidence of a statistically significant impact of term limits on curbing families’ persistence in power. Moreover, term limits deter high-quality challengers from running prior to the expiration of an incumbent’s term. Challengers prefer to wait for the incumbent to be termed-out and run in an open-seat race. As a consequence, incumbents are safer in their early terms prior to the limit. These results suggest that political reforms that do not modify the underlying sources of dynastic power are often ineffective in changing the political equilibrium.
∗I would like to thank my thesis advisers, Daron Acemoglu, Esther Duflo, James Robinson and James M. Snyder
Jr. for all their comments and support. I would also like to thank participants at the MIT Development Lunch, the
MIT Political Economy Breakfast and the Harvard Political Economy Workshop for their questions and feedback.
I also
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