Philosophy and Democracy
1. RONALD DWORKIN:
According to Dworkin, democracy is an egalitarian perception to political equality (). Dworkin argues for a substantive approach to democratic procedure; in effort to secure an equal distribution of political power to citizens as a whole (9; 117). Dworkin’s consequential approach classifies two types of political decisions: “choice-sensitive” and “choice-insensitive” issues (132). Dworkin defines choice-sensitive issues in terms of justice that: “depends essentially on character and distribution of preferences within the political community” (132). For example, Dworkin asserts: “The decision whether to use available public funds to build a new sports center or a new road system is typically choice-sensitive” (132). In other words, support from the majority-perspective facilitates the acceptance of correct choice-sensitive decisions by the public (132). On the other hand, Dworkin argues that a choice-insensitive issue develops from a second-order question about the choice-sensitivity of any first-order question (132). In addition, an older interpretation by Dworkin classifies issues of policy as “choice-sensitive;” while interpreting issues of principle as choice-insensitive (132).
Dworkin’s interpretation of democracy is one of either a “dependent” or “detached” conception (117). Detached conceptions qualify democracy entirely on its procedure; more specific, as judgments of fairness based solely on its equal distribution of political power (118). In opposition, Dworkin argues that dependent conceptions are those which infer: “…the best form of democracy is whatever form is most likely to produce the substantive decisions and results that treat all members of the community with equal concern;” thereby constituting as the best consequential means to interpret democratic production of equal outcome in terms of choice-insensitive issues (118;135). Moreover, Dworkin argues that a dependent conception of democracy is best satisfied when
According to Dworkin, democracy is an egalitarian perception to political equality (). Dworkin argues for a substantive approach to democratic procedure; in effort to secure an equal distribution of political power to citizens as a whole (9; 117). Dworkin’s consequential approach classifies two types of political decisions: “choice-sensitive” and “choice-insensitive” issues (132). Dworkin defines choice-sensitive issues in terms of justice that: “depends essentially on character and distribution of preferences within the political community” (132). For example, Dworkin asserts: “The decision whether to use available public funds to build a new sports center or a new road system is typically choice-sensitive” (132). In other words, support from the majority-perspective facilitates the acceptance of correct choice-sensitive decisions by the public (132). On the other hand, Dworkin argues that a choice-insensitive issue develops from a second-order question about the choice-sensitivity of any first-order question (132). In addition, an older interpretation by Dworkin classifies issues of policy as “choice-sensitive;” while interpreting issues of principle as choice-insensitive (132).
Dworkin’s interpretation of democracy is one of either a “dependent” or “detached” conception (117). Detached conceptions qualify democracy entirely on its procedure; more specific, as judgments of fairness based solely on its equal distribution of political power (118). In opposition, Dworkin argues that dependent conceptions are those which infer: “…the best form of democracy is whatever form is most likely to produce the substantive decisions and results that treat all members of the community with equal concern;” thereby constituting as the best consequential means to interpret democratic production of equal outcome in terms of choice-insensitive issues (118;135). Moreover, Dworkin argues that a dependent conception of democracy is best satisfied when