Philosophical Zombie
The notion of Philosophical zombie is used generally in a thought experiment to support arguments against the idea of physicalism. David Chalmers, a famous philosopher of mind, adopts the dualism of Decartes that mental and physical things are entirely different and argues that a world of philosophical zombie is possible except they do not have any conscious experience. However, most physicalist’s responses refuse the premise of a zombie world is possible. Although the argument of Charlmer has received great advocacy, I argue that there are problems associated with the philosophical zombie argument. First, the argument of Charlmers goes like this. If zombies are logically possible, then zombies are metaphysically possible. If zombies are metaphysically possible then physicalism is false. In this argument, anti-zombie philosophers point out that the logical possibility is an unconvincing notion that is not applicable in the analysis of a physicalism. In my opinion, a notion of possibility is not a good framework in reality. There are a lot of things that are possible in human’s mind but that are not fact realized in the real world. For example, the idea of squaring the circle can be driven by the imagination but does not make sense in reality. Another anti-zombie argument is based on the idea of Daniel Dennett’s consciousness. He claims that while consciousness and subjective experience exist in some sense, it I not applicable to the zombie argument. The experience of pain is not something that can be thought of from person’s mental without differentiating the behavior and physiology. For example, when a zombie falls over a jagged stone and it does not feel any pain. However, it behaves exactly as it does feel pain though it has no experience which person normally does. To conclude, the argument of Charlmer’s philosophical zombie has no independence point to refuse the idea of physicalism. In addition, the argument is strongly criticized by