Peter Van Inwagen's An Essay On Free Will
2.1 The Consequence Argument
Freedom to do otherwise as a requirement for moral responsibility triggers many problems in philosophy such as fatalism, causal determinism and divine foreknowledge.The problems are generally concerning about the compatibility between moral responsibility and causal determinism, which can be found among the debates on the Consequent Argument. The argument is introduced by Peter van Inwagen (1983) in An Essay on Free Will. Contemporary philosophers who participate in this argument are either support or reject this argument. Fischer presents the argument informally as follow:
“Suppose that causal determinism obtains and I do X at time t. It follows from the definition of causal determinism that the facts about the past, together with the laws of nature, entail that I do X at t. For me to refrain from doing X at t, either the past (with respect to t) or natural laws (or both) would have to be different. But the past and the natural laws are not up to me or in my control: I am not free so to act that the past or natural laws (or both) are different. Therefore, if causal determinism is true, then (despite my sense of my own freedom) I am not able to refrain from what I actually do—I do not have the sort of control that involves genuine access to alternative possibilities (Fischer, …show more content…
He claims that his position of semicompatibilism is different from other compatibilists, because he takes the Consequence Argument seriously. The semicompatibilism position might accept the conclusion of the Consequence Argument, but still believes that it is, at the same time, compatible with moral responsibility. However, semicompatibilism needs not to accept the conclusion of the Consequence Argument to sustain the position (Fischer, 2012,
Freedom to do otherwise as a requirement for moral responsibility triggers many problems in philosophy such as fatalism, causal determinism and divine foreknowledge.The problems are generally concerning about the compatibility between moral responsibility and causal determinism, which can be found among the debates on the Consequent Argument. The argument is introduced by Peter van Inwagen (1983) in An Essay on Free Will. Contemporary philosophers who participate in this argument are either support or reject this argument. Fischer presents the argument informally as follow:
“Suppose that causal determinism obtains and I do X at time t. It follows from the definition of causal determinism that the facts about the past, together with the laws of nature, entail that I do X at t. For me to refrain from doing X at t, either the past (with respect to t) or natural laws (or both) would have to be different. But the past and the natural laws are not up to me or in my control: I am not free so to act that the past or natural laws (or both) are different. Therefore, if causal determinism is true, then (despite my sense of my own freedom) I am not able to refrain from what I actually do—I do not have the sort of control that involves genuine access to alternative possibilities (Fischer, …show more content…
He claims that his position of semicompatibilism is different from other compatibilists, because he takes the Consequence Argument seriously. The semicompatibilism position might accept the conclusion of the Consequence Argument, but still believes that it is, at the same time, compatible with moral responsibility. However, semicompatibilism needs not to accept the conclusion of the Consequence Argument to sustain the position (Fischer, 2012,