Part OneIntroductionSpeech Is Fundamentally A Social
Part One
Introduction
“Speech is fundamentally a social act of doing things with words” (McGregor 142)
The Speech Act Theory is a reputable pragmatic concept that has been imbued with research since its first appearance in 1962 till now. The historical tracers of this theory state that it has been first engendered by Wittgenstein, the German philosopher, but has been given some linguistic tint by Austin and Searle, later on.
Speech act theory is a technical term in linguistics and the philosophy of language. It considers language a sort of action rather than a medium to convey and express. It can be defined as the ability of language users to perform social acts in the form of utterances they make. Speech Act Theory arose as a tool to interpret the meaning and function of words in different speech situations. Simply put, it is a theory about what people set out to accomplish when they choose to speak. Ndimele (2007: 33) observes that the essence of speech act theory is that utterances are acts in themselves capable of producing enormous and far reaching results or consequences. Speech act theory according to Brown and Yule (1985: 23) originated from Austin’s (1962) observation that speech acts are used systematically to accomplish particular communication purposes and while sentences can often be used to report states of affair, the utterance of some sentences must in specified circumstances, be treated as the performance of an act. The contemporary Speech act theory was elaborated by J. L. Austin, a British philosopher of language; he introduced this theory in 1975 in his well-known book ‘How do things with words’. He was persuaded that we do not use language to tell only things, meaning to make statements, but also to do things, that is to perform actions (Thomas, 1995: 28-31). This is the core element of his theory. The term speech act was used by Austin (1962) to refer to an utterance and the total situation in which the utterance is issued. That is to say
Introduction
“Speech is fundamentally a social act of doing things with words” (McGregor 142)
The Speech Act Theory is a reputable pragmatic concept that has been imbued with research since its first appearance in 1962 till now. The historical tracers of this theory state that it has been first engendered by Wittgenstein, the German philosopher, but has been given some linguistic tint by Austin and Searle, later on.
Speech act theory is a technical term in linguistics and the philosophy of language. It considers language a sort of action rather than a medium to convey and express. It can be defined as the ability of language users to perform social acts in the form of utterances they make. Speech Act Theory arose as a tool to interpret the meaning and function of words in different speech situations. Simply put, it is a theory about what people set out to accomplish when they choose to speak. Ndimele (2007: 33) observes that the essence of speech act theory is that utterances are acts in themselves capable of producing enormous and far reaching results or consequences. Speech act theory according to Brown and Yule (1985: 23) originated from Austin’s (1962) observation that speech acts are used systematically to accomplish particular communication purposes and while sentences can often be used to report states of affair, the utterance of some sentences must in specified circumstances, be treated as the performance of an act. The contemporary Speech act theory was elaborated by J. L. Austin, a British philosopher of language; he introduced this theory in 1975 in his well-known book ‘How do things with words’. He was persuaded that we do not use language to tell only things, meaning to make statements, but also to do things, that is to perform actions (Thomas, 1995: 28-31). This is the core element of his theory. The term speech act was used by Austin (1962) to refer to an utterance and the total situation in which the utterance is issued. That is to say
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