Negotiations of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Introduction By 1962, the Soviet Union was considerably behind the United States in the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union had limited range missiles that were only capable of being launched against Europe, but the United States possessed missiles that were capable of striking anywhere within the entire Soviet Union. As it is often said, when it comes to national security, leaders sometimes make irrational decisions. In an effort to restore the balance of power Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev devised the idea of placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba (14 days in October). This deployment of weapons in Cuba would double the Soviet strategic arsenal and provide a credible deterrent to a potential U.S. attack against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was able to capitalize on Fidel Castro’s fear that the United States was out to overthrow his socialist government. For the United States, having a communist country in the Western Hemisphere was an embarrassment and national security risk. The Soviet Union presented this plan to Cuba as insurance against a United States invasion, such as the failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Realizing that this was the best means of holding onto power in Cuba against a belligerent neighbor, Fidel Castro accepted the proposal, thus the Soviet Union worked quickly and secretly to build missile installations in Cuba. On October 16, 1962. President John F. Kennedy discovered through reconnaissance photographs that the Soviet Union was constructing missile installations on Cuban soil. This meant that only 90 miles of ocean separated the United States from nuclear missiles. In response to this threat, President Kennedy organized the Executive Committee (EX-COMM), which was comprised from Kennedy’s twelve most important advisors to help manage the crisis (14 days in October). For seven days there was considerable and intense debate as to how the United States should respond to this threat. Not