Multi-Domain Battle Analysis
While Army senior leaders expound upon the necessity of the Multi-Domain Battle concept, there are critics. Author and George Mason University PhD student Adam Elkus countered that Multi-Domain Battle is “yet another example of the recurring problem of military strategist and civilian analysts inventing new terminology to replace, yet perhaps more coherent concepts.” Another opponent of the new operational concept argued that a “cult of complexity leads to overhyping threats to US interests.” Although the subsequent doctrine which will operationalize Multi-Domain Battle is forthcoming, the Army’s recognition that maintaining the status quo on defense preparations and training is commendable. Adversarial intent is undeniable and to remain
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A tendency that has potential to emerge is the ‘six-thousand-mile screwdriver’ where the longing for information and control has previously encouraged higher headquarters to stymie initiative and deny tactical leaders from capturing or regaining the initiative. When denied a common operating picture, operational level headquarters may attempt to “revert to hierarchy as a means of control.” When now retired General Stanley A. McChrystal commanded the Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000s, he understood the complexities and evolutionary nature of the violent extremist threat. Because of the enemy’s speed of adaptation, General McChrystal knew that his forces had to adapt equally fast. “In order to realize this intent, McChrystal did not merely devolve decision-making authority to subordinates who acted on their own initiative,” he created a “shared consciousness” which allowed subordinates to “understand and react to the interdependence of the battlefield.” The Army’s mission command philosophy will become increasingly decisive in future degraded or denied
A tendency that has potential to emerge is the ‘six-thousand-mile screwdriver’ where the longing for information and control has previously encouraged higher headquarters to stymie initiative and deny tactical leaders from capturing or regaining the initiative. When denied a common operating picture, operational level headquarters may attempt to “revert to hierarchy as a means of control.” When now retired General Stanley A. McChrystal commanded the Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000s, he understood the complexities and evolutionary nature of the violent extremist threat. Because of the enemy’s speed of adaptation, General McChrystal knew that his forces had to adapt equally fast. “In order to realize this intent, McChrystal did not merely devolve decision-making authority to subordinates who acted on their own initiative,” he created a “shared consciousness” which allowed subordinates to “understand and react to the interdependence of the battlefield.” The Army’s mission command philosophy will become increasingly decisive in future degraded or denied