Marketing i-mode
NTT DoCoMo: Marketing i-mode
Why was NTT DoCoMo so successful? What is the most critical reason for its success?
DoCoMo’s i-mode delivered a service that met the incipient need of a large target group in the market, namely a world wide web-like content service on a mobile phone, and rapid easy messaging; this was the critical driver of its success. Most of their strategic and marketing decisions, such as its choice of content, advertising, pricing, technology and hardware, revolved around appealing to young Japanese customers. Its consistent marketing approach created a service that consumers were previously not able to articulate. The service was a “blue ocean” (Kim &
Mauborgne, 2005) - a standalone service that uniquely integrated the most appealing aspects of the internet and mobile communications.
The following are the key decisions that supported the success of DoCoMo:
Content
DoCoMo chose not to control the entire value chain from content to network, but rather involved the work of third-party entrepreneurs to build content. Partners like Bandai (Moon et al., 2002, p.6),
Japan’s largest producer of toys and video games, supplied emotionally appealing content for teenagers and young adults. In addition, a centralized and seamless billing structure facilitated payment to content providers by subscribers who valued convenience and who disliked small purchases made with credit cards. This service proved popular; in 2001 around half of i-mode’s customers were subscribing to at least one premium site (Moon et al., 2002, p.7).
Advertising
Advertisements downplayed the advanced technology behind i-mode and instead focused on the content, which appealed to customers emotions. This focus on content was also appreciated by the content providers which were so critical to the success of the platform (Moon et al., 2002, p.6).
Technology
DoCoMo took a somewhat contrarian position in its adoption of cHTML over WAP technology.
Despite the apparent
Why was NTT DoCoMo so successful? What is the most critical reason for its success?
DoCoMo’s i-mode delivered a service that met the incipient need of a large target group in the market, namely a world wide web-like content service on a mobile phone, and rapid easy messaging; this was the critical driver of its success. Most of their strategic and marketing decisions, such as its choice of content, advertising, pricing, technology and hardware, revolved around appealing to young Japanese customers. Its consistent marketing approach created a service that consumers were previously not able to articulate. The service was a “blue ocean” (Kim &
Mauborgne, 2005) - a standalone service that uniquely integrated the most appealing aspects of the internet and mobile communications.
The following are the key decisions that supported the success of DoCoMo:
Content
DoCoMo chose not to control the entire value chain from content to network, but rather involved the work of third-party entrepreneurs to build content. Partners like Bandai (Moon et al., 2002, p.6),
Japan’s largest producer of toys and video games, supplied emotionally appealing content for teenagers and young adults. In addition, a centralized and seamless billing structure facilitated payment to content providers by subscribers who valued convenience and who disliked small purchases made with credit cards. This service proved popular; in 2001 around half of i-mode’s customers were subscribing to at least one premium site (Moon et al., 2002, p.7).
Advertising
Advertisements downplayed the advanced technology behind i-mode and instead focused on the content, which appealed to customers emotions. This focus on content was also appreciated by the content providers which were so critical to the success of the platform (Moon et al., 2002, p.6).
Technology
DoCoMo took a somewhat contrarian position in its adoption of cHTML over WAP technology.
Despite the apparent
References: Moon, Y., Egawa, M., Lane, D. and Mougeot Stroock, L. (2002) NTT DoCoMo: marketing I-mode. HBS case #9-502-031 Kim, W. and Mauborgne, R. (2005) Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make Competition Irrelevant. Harvard Business Press Levitt, T. (1960) Marketing Myopia. Harvard Business Review