Ishmael Analysis
I have a standard deal with my students that if they recommend a book to me, I will read it. One of my students recommended Ishmael by Daniel Quinn, which turned out to be my least favorite book ever.
After the first half, I jotted down some of the reasons why. Here is a list of problems I have with the book, most of which are either logical fallacies or just rhetorical stunts that annoy me.
replacing the progress fallacy with the doomsday fallacy
Quinn argues against the assumption that things are necessarily getting better, but he commits the opposite error, the assumption that things are necessarily getting worse.
It is almost certain that some things are getting better and some worse. If Quinn wants to make the argument that we …show more content…
He fails on two fronts: the law he presents is empirically false, and even if it were true, it still wouldn't make it possible to know what we should do. At best, it would help us predict the consequences of our actions, but that is not sufficient to derive an ethical system.
Why do I say his law is empirically false? Well, one counterexample is trees. Trees are engaged in a internecine competition for sunlight in which they squander resources on preposterously long trunks, deprive other species of their food source, and poison their environments to eliminate competitors. Ever look at the floor of a dense pine forest? Nothing but pine needles.
the Lorax fallacy
Quoth the Lorax, "I am the Lorax, and I speak for the trees!" To which I reply (1) what makes you think you know what the trees want, and (2) what makes the trees so special?
It is probably wrong to assume that nature has intent, but in any case it is ridiculous to presume that we know what its intent is. To see how ridiculous this is, consider the unpublished first draft of "The Lorax," in which another irritating troll appears and shouts, "I am the Borax, and I speak for the grass, and I say, chop down those trees -- they're blocking all the …show more content…
I am the Snorax, and I speak for the dung beetles, and I say, please breed enormous numbers of cattle."
Then, "I am the Thorax, and I speak for the slime molds, and I say, please make big piles of decaying organic matter."
And so on. You can see why it wasn't a big hit.
the biocentrism fallacy
Quinn argues against anthrocentrism, the view that the universe was made for humans and that we have the right to do what we want with it.
The alternative is biocentrism, an ethical system in which animals and other parts of nature have rights as well. It is often (wrongly) assumed that an ethical system that extends rights to more entities is morally superior to one that is more stingy.
Of course, we already extend some rights to some animals, and we could extend more rights to more animals, but that does not change the fact that (a) we're still the ones extending the rights and it's still our choice, and (b) we would still be in the position of trying to figure out the intent of nature, if there is one.
Anthrocentrism may seem self-centered, but there is no sensible alternative.
inconsistency regarding the role of
After the first half, I jotted down some of the reasons why. Here is a list of problems I have with the book, most of which are either logical fallacies or just rhetorical stunts that annoy me.
replacing the progress fallacy with the doomsday fallacy
Quinn argues against the assumption that things are necessarily getting better, but he commits the opposite error, the assumption that things are necessarily getting worse.
It is almost certain that some things are getting better and some worse. If Quinn wants to make the argument that we …show more content…
He fails on two fronts: the law he presents is empirically false, and even if it were true, it still wouldn't make it possible to know what we should do. At best, it would help us predict the consequences of our actions, but that is not sufficient to derive an ethical system.
Why do I say his law is empirically false? Well, one counterexample is trees. Trees are engaged in a internecine competition for sunlight in which they squander resources on preposterously long trunks, deprive other species of their food source, and poison their environments to eliminate competitors. Ever look at the floor of a dense pine forest? Nothing but pine needles.
the Lorax fallacy
Quoth the Lorax, "I am the Lorax, and I speak for the trees!" To which I reply (1) what makes you think you know what the trees want, and (2) what makes the trees so special?
It is probably wrong to assume that nature has intent, but in any case it is ridiculous to presume that we know what its intent is. To see how ridiculous this is, consider the unpublished first draft of "The Lorax," in which another irritating troll appears and shouts, "I am the Borax, and I speak for the grass, and I say, chop down those trees -- they're blocking all the …show more content…
I am the Snorax, and I speak for the dung beetles, and I say, please breed enormous numbers of cattle."
Then, "I am the Thorax, and I speak for the slime molds, and I say, please make big piles of decaying organic matter."
And so on. You can see why it wasn't a big hit.
the biocentrism fallacy
Quinn argues against anthrocentrism, the view that the universe was made for humans and that we have the right to do what we want with it.
The alternative is biocentrism, an ethical system in which animals and other parts of nature have rights as well. It is often (wrongly) assumed that an ethical system that extends rights to more entities is morally superior to one that is more stingy.
Of course, we already extend some rights to some animals, and we could extend more rights to more animals, but that does not change the fact that (a) we're still the ones extending the rights and it's still our choice, and (b) we would still be in the position of trying to figure out the intent of nature, if there is one.
Anthrocentrism may seem self-centered, but there is no sensible alternative.
inconsistency regarding the role of