I Robot Research Paper
SYRACUSE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
LAW REPORTER
VOLUME 22
SPRING 2010
ARTICLE 1, PAGE 1
“I, Robot – I, Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes Reality:
Legal Liability of AI Robots committing Criminal Offenses
Gabriel Hallevy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Can society impose criminal liability upon robots? The technological world has changed rapidly. Simple human activities are being replaced by robots. As long as humanity used robots as mere tools, there was no real difference between robots and screwdrivers, cars or telephones.
When robots became sophisticated, we used to say that robots “think” for us. The problem began when robots evolved from “thinking” machines into thinking machines (without quotation marks)—or Artificial Intelligence …show more content…
Ll. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REV. 294,
295 (1954); Rollin M. Perkins, “Knowledge” as a Mens rea Requirement, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 953
(1978); and see, e.g., United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir. 1995); People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 847
(N.Y. 1992); State v. Sargent, 594 A.2d 401, 403 (Vt. 1991); State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 150
(W. Va. 1996).
34
See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 632, 632 (1963); Robert P. Fine & Gary M. Cohen, Is Criminal Negligence a
Defensible Basis for Criminal Liability?, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 780 (1966).
35
See, e.g., Jeremy Horder, Strict Liability, Statutory Construction and the Spirit of Liberty, 118
L. Q. REV. 458, 458 (2002); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 55 (1933); Stuart P. Green, Six Senses of Strict Liability: A Plea for Formalism, in
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 1 (A. P. Simester ed., 2005); A. P. Simester, Is Strict Liability
Always Wrong?, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 21 (A. P. Simester ed., 2005).
36
HALL, supra note 26.
37
Id. at 185-86.
Vol. …show more content…
v. Michael, 169 Eng. Rep. 48 (1840).
Vol. 22
SYRACUSE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW REPORTER
10
criminal state of mind to commit an offense,44 that person is criminally liable as a perpetrator-byanother.45 In such cases, the intermediary is regarded as a mere instrument, albeit a sophisticated instrument, while the party orchestrating the offense (the perpetrator-by-another) is the real perpetrator as a principal in the first degree and is held accountable for the conduct of the innocent agent.46 The perpetrator’s liability is determined on the basis of that conduct47 and his own mental state.48
The derivative question relative to AI Robots is: Who is the perpetrator-by-another?
There are two candidates: the first is the programmer of the AI software installed in the specific robot and the second is the user. A programmer of AI software might design a program in order to commit offenses via the AI robot. For example, a programmer designs software for an operating robot. The robot is intended to be placed in a factory, and its software is designed to torch the factory at night when no one is there. The robot committed the arson, but the programmer is deemed the perpetrator. The second person who might be considered
LAW REPORTER
VOLUME 22
SPRING 2010
ARTICLE 1, PAGE 1
“I, Robot – I, Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes Reality:
Legal Liability of AI Robots committing Criminal Offenses
Gabriel Hallevy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Can society impose criminal liability upon robots? The technological world has changed rapidly. Simple human activities are being replaced by robots. As long as humanity used robots as mere tools, there was no real difference between robots and screwdrivers, cars or telephones.
When robots became sophisticated, we used to say that robots “think” for us. The problem began when robots evolved from “thinking” machines into thinking machines (without quotation marks)—or Artificial Intelligence …show more content…
Ll. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REV. 294,
295 (1954); Rollin M. Perkins, “Knowledge” as a Mens rea Requirement, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 953
(1978); and see, e.g., United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir. 1995); People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 847
(N.Y. 1992); State v. Sargent, 594 A.2d 401, 403 (Vt. 1991); State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 150
(W. Va. 1996).
34
See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 632, 632 (1963); Robert P. Fine & Gary M. Cohen, Is Criminal Negligence a
Defensible Basis for Criminal Liability?, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 780 (1966).
35
See, e.g., Jeremy Horder, Strict Liability, Statutory Construction and the Spirit of Liberty, 118
L. Q. REV. 458, 458 (2002); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 55 (1933); Stuart P. Green, Six Senses of Strict Liability: A Plea for Formalism, in
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 1 (A. P. Simester ed., 2005); A. P. Simester, Is Strict Liability
Always Wrong?, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 21 (A. P. Simester ed., 2005).
36
HALL, supra note 26.
37
Id. at 185-86.
Vol. …show more content…
v. Michael, 169 Eng. Rep. 48 (1840).
Vol. 22
SYRACUSE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW REPORTER
10
criminal state of mind to commit an offense,44 that person is criminally liable as a perpetrator-byanother.45 In such cases, the intermediary is regarded as a mere instrument, albeit a sophisticated instrument, while the party orchestrating the offense (the perpetrator-by-another) is the real perpetrator as a principal in the first degree and is held accountable for the conduct of the innocent agent.46 The perpetrator’s liability is determined on the basis of that conduct47 and his own mental state.48
The derivative question relative to AI Robots is: Who is the perpetrator-by-another?
There are two candidates: the first is the programmer of the AI software installed in the specific robot and the second is the user. A programmer of AI software might design a program in order to commit offenses via the AI robot. For example, a programmer designs software for an operating robot. The robot is intended to be placed in a factory, and its software is designed to torch the factory at night when no one is there. The robot committed the arson, but the programmer is deemed the perpetrator. The second person who might be considered