How Did the Culture of Nasa & Morton Thiokol Contribute to the Development of Group Think
How did the culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol contribute to the development of group think?
In his book, Vital Lies, Simple Truths, The Psychology of Self-Deception, Dan Goleman cites a passage credited to Irving Janis. The passage cited is: The leader does not deliberately try to get the group to tell him what he wants to hear … nevertheless, subtle constraints, which the leader may force inadvertently, prevent a member from fully exercising his critical powers and from openly expressing doubts when most others in the group appear to have reached consensus.(Goleman, 1985, p. 181)
Janis points out that a leader may unknowingly constrain group. Group-think is a natural outcome when faced with pressure from above. Is it possible that some of these subtle constraints also existed at NASA resulting in group-think? With the Challenger explosion, one has to look at some of the key reasons that led to the disaster. As documented by the commission, there was not necessarily conflict at NASA or at Morton Thiokol, but more a hesitancy to “raise a red flag.” Questions were raised, but the flag was not waved high enough. During the course of the investigation, it was discovered that NASA and Morton Thiokol had vigorously debated the wisdom of operating the shuttle in the cold temperatures predicted for the next day. The investigation also revealed a NASA culture that gradually began to accept escalating risk, and a safety program that was largely silent and ineffective (CAIB, 2003, p. 25). The argument between Morton Thiokol and NASA regarding launch-time temperatures should have resulted in an investigation. It appears the decision to launch in colder temperatures was brought about by feelings of invulnerability due to the success of the Apollo program, as well as the fact they had flown previously in somewhat similar conditions. NASA management still pushed to meet its schedule, and subconsciously relegated safety and quality to a minor role. During the per flight
In his book, Vital Lies, Simple Truths, The Psychology of Self-Deception, Dan Goleman cites a passage credited to Irving Janis. The passage cited is: The leader does not deliberately try to get the group to tell him what he wants to hear … nevertheless, subtle constraints, which the leader may force inadvertently, prevent a member from fully exercising his critical powers and from openly expressing doubts when most others in the group appear to have reached consensus.(Goleman, 1985, p. 181)
Janis points out that a leader may unknowingly constrain group. Group-think is a natural outcome when faced with pressure from above. Is it possible that some of these subtle constraints also existed at NASA resulting in group-think? With the Challenger explosion, one has to look at some of the key reasons that led to the disaster. As documented by the commission, there was not necessarily conflict at NASA or at Morton Thiokol, but more a hesitancy to “raise a red flag.” Questions were raised, but the flag was not waved high enough. During the course of the investigation, it was discovered that NASA and Morton Thiokol had vigorously debated the wisdom of operating the shuttle in the cold temperatures predicted for the next day. The investigation also revealed a NASA culture that gradually began to accept escalating risk, and a safety program that was largely silent and ineffective (CAIB, 2003, p. 25). The argument between Morton Thiokol and NASA regarding launch-time temperatures should have resulted in an investigation. It appears the decision to launch in colder temperatures was brought about by feelings of invulnerability due to the success of the Apollo program, as well as the fact they had flown previously in somewhat similar conditions. NASA management still pushed to meet its schedule, and subconsciously relegated safety and quality to a minor role. During the per flight