How Did Mao Observed The Shortcomings Of The Cultural Revolution
Had Mao not observed the shortcomings of the command economy the USSR was pioneering? If so, why didn’t he reform and adapt to the realistic needs of the Chinese people? Even if Mao didn’t live to see his country adapt to a more modern time, his successors did. Was Mao’s “cult of personality”- something he assured Stalin would never develop in China- too large for his own good, causing delusions in his governing? Perhaps so, since he often blamed “deliberate sabotage” by “class enemies” and incorrect “distortion of class policies.” One could argue that, while Mao was a megalomaniac whose main concern was the security of his own dictatorial status, his passion for the survival of the PRC was justification for his shortcomings and that those
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The betrayal felt by Mao was so strong that, now widely known, he thought Wu Han’s play Hai Ju’s Dismissal was in support of Tehuai (ergo, in attack of Mao), which launched the initial idea for the Cultural Revolution. Was one man’s pride worth the countless deaths that marked the Cultural Revolution? Similarly, Stalin’s choke on the Soviet Union was irreversibly tied to the several purges that occurred during his rule. However, while the Great Terror could be over-simplified into purism that far exceeded passion, there is an aspect to the Cultural Revolution that feels personal. The author argues the Revolution must have been in response, and an attempt to restore Mao’s ego after the “loss” felt by him through the failure of his political peers to act on his behalf vand attack the “traitor.” The many parallels between these nations can lead one to believe that the relations between the two were always …show more content…
Ironically, this “cleansing” was mainly motivated by Mao’s hatred towards “Khrushchev -type revisionists,” which can be realised in one of two ways- (1) Mao was an idealistic man from an earlier generation of Communists, and saw Khrushchev as a traitor to his beliefs, much like a Christian would feel if the Pope denounced Christianity and said God wasn’t real, or, (2) Mao saw the example Khrushchev was setting as a cue to the men within the CCP to overthrow and denounce Mao, then soon after making major changes to the fabric of the Party. Effectively, the author argues that Mao, like the dictators preceding and succeeding him, was paralysed by the thought of any change of power, and thus, paralysed his country. As long as Mao was alive, China would be marked by inadequacy and economic stagnation. Thus, when Deng Xiaoping came to power in a country which was already in economic and political chaos and in desperate need of adaptation, it’s not difficult to see why so many Chinese people were easily accepting of any reform the Xiaoping put forward. Meanwhile, the Brezhnev era was arguably too stable. The condition of Russian living was deteriorating, yes, but it was nowhere near the frustration felt by the PRC. Therefore, when Gorbachev came to power and Russia was too poor in the economic and
The betrayal felt by Mao was so strong that, now widely known, he thought Wu Han’s play Hai Ju’s Dismissal was in support of Tehuai (ergo, in attack of Mao), which launched the initial idea for the Cultural Revolution. Was one man’s pride worth the countless deaths that marked the Cultural Revolution? Similarly, Stalin’s choke on the Soviet Union was irreversibly tied to the several purges that occurred during his rule. However, while the Great Terror could be over-simplified into purism that far exceeded passion, there is an aspect to the Cultural Revolution that feels personal. The author argues the Revolution must have been in response, and an attempt to restore Mao’s ego after the “loss” felt by him through the failure of his political peers to act on his behalf vand attack the “traitor.” The many parallels between these nations can lead one to believe that the relations between the two were always …show more content…
Ironically, this “cleansing” was mainly motivated by Mao’s hatred towards “Khrushchev -type revisionists,” which can be realised in one of two ways- (1) Mao was an idealistic man from an earlier generation of Communists, and saw Khrushchev as a traitor to his beliefs, much like a Christian would feel if the Pope denounced Christianity and said God wasn’t real, or, (2) Mao saw the example Khrushchev was setting as a cue to the men within the CCP to overthrow and denounce Mao, then soon after making major changes to the fabric of the Party. Effectively, the author argues that Mao, like the dictators preceding and succeeding him, was paralysed by the thought of any change of power, and thus, paralysed his country. As long as Mao was alive, China would be marked by inadequacy and economic stagnation. Thus, when Deng Xiaoping came to power in a country which was already in economic and political chaos and in desperate need of adaptation, it’s not difficult to see why so many Chinese people were easily accepting of any reform the Xiaoping put forward. Meanwhile, the Brezhnev era was arguably too stable. The condition of Russian living was deteriorating, yes, but it was nowhere near the frustration felt by the PRC. Therefore, when Gorbachev came to power and Russia was too poor in the economic and