Gulf War
COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN THE GULF WAR: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS
THOMAS KEANEY
The Gulf War of 1991 introduced a new set of issues concerning collateral damage. Although the U.S. military had faced controversy concerning the targeting and effects of aerial bombing in previous wars of the 20th Century, the day-by-day reporting and political context of the Gulf War brought increased scrutiny of the air attacks. Ironically, attention increased even as the employment of precision weapons decreased the occurrence of unintentional damage. This paper discusses these experiences by exploring the various factors that shaped the incidents of collateral damage in the Gulf War, how the U.S. military viewed collateral damage, and the lessons learned. The term ‘collateral damage’ has particular relevance in discussing the legal and moral dimensions of warfare as codified and as derived from traditional Just War doctrine. However, the political effects of such damage are also important to address. In the Gulf War, political effects included the reactions of the U.S. leadership to incidents of civilian deaths from aerial bombing, even in those cases in which the Coalition air campaign had adhered to the legal constraints on targeting as defined in the laws of war. An examination of U.S. military lessons learned from the Gulf War requires an introduction to the conditions in the region and the circumstances under which operations unfolded. First, physical conditions in the theater limited the occurrence of collateral damage. A great majority of the aerial attacks were against the Iraqi army and took place in what was called the Kuwaiti theater of operations, a region including Kuwait itself and the southeast portion of Iraq immediately adjacent. In this area, the Iraqi army was situated away from areas with significant civilian populations. The one exception was Kuwait City and its surrounding environment; the Iraqi army’s decision to evacuate that city quickly after the initiation of the
THOMAS KEANEY
The Gulf War of 1991 introduced a new set of issues concerning collateral damage. Although the U.S. military had faced controversy concerning the targeting and effects of aerial bombing in previous wars of the 20th Century, the day-by-day reporting and political context of the Gulf War brought increased scrutiny of the air attacks. Ironically, attention increased even as the employment of precision weapons decreased the occurrence of unintentional damage. This paper discusses these experiences by exploring the various factors that shaped the incidents of collateral damage in the Gulf War, how the U.S. military viewed collateral damage, and the lessons learned. The term ‘collateral damage’ has particular relevance in discussing the legal and moral dimensions of warfare as codified and as derived from traditional Just War doctrine. However, the political effects of such damage are also important to address. In the Gulf War, political effects included the reactions of the U.S. leadership to incidents of civilian deaths from aerial bombing, even in those cases in which the Coalition air campaign had adhered to the legal constraints on targeting as defined in the laws of war. An examination of U.S. military lessons learned from the Gulf War requires an introduction to the conditions in the region and the circumstances under which operations unfolded. First, physical conditions in the theater limited the occurrence of collateral damage. A great majority of the aerial attacks were against the Iraqi army and took place in what was called the Kuwaiti theater of operations, a region including Kuwait itself and the southeast portion of Iraq immediately adjacent. In this area, the Iraqi army was situated away from areas with significant civilian populations. The one exception was Kuwait City and its surrounding environment; the Iraqi army’s decision to evacuate that city quickly after the initiation of the