George Davis Case
Although Davis argues generally that the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence, we discern from his brief two specific arguments as to why the circuit court should have granted his motion to correct an illegal sentence. First, Davis asserts that “Count 1-Robbery with a Dangerous and Deadly weapon, Count two First Degree Assault, [and] Count 8 Use of a Handgun in the Commission of violence” should merge. Secondly, Davis contends that he was deprived of procedural due process when his motion to correct an illegal sentence was denied without a hearing, without having given Davis the opportunity to respond to the States opposition to Davis’s motion, and without the trial judge having sufficiently articulate
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The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Refusing To Merge Davis’s Sentences. In his argument, Davis alleges that “Count 1-Robbery with a Dangerous and Deadly weapon, Count two First Degree Assault, [and] Count 8 Use of a Handgun in the Commission of violence” should merge. For the reasons stated herein, Davis is precluded from asserting that first degree assault and robbery with a dangerous weapon should have merged. Moreover, the offenses of use of a handgun and robbery with a dangerous weapon should not have merged. We, therefore, hold that Davis’s rights under the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution were not …show more content…
. . . Under the doctrine, once an appellate court rules upon a question presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling, which is considered to be the law of the case . . . . Not only are lower courts bound by the law of the case, but decisions rendered by a prior appellate panel will generally govern the second appeal at the same appellate level as well, unless the previous decision is incorrect because it is out of keeping with controlling principles announced by a higher court and following the decision would result in manifest injustice.”
Haskins v. State, 171 Md. App. 182, 189-90 (2006) (quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170, 183-84 (2004)). In the instant action, Davis has already presented us with the question as to whether his sentences for first-degree assault and robbery with a dangerous weapon should have merged. In an opinion filed March 4, 2005, we affirmed his cumulative sentences because separate instances of conduct gave rise to each of his sentences. Indeed, we held
The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Refusing To Merge Davis’s Sentences. In his argument, Davis alleges that “Count 1-Robbery with a Dangerous and Deadly weapon, Count two First Degree Assault, [and] Count 8 Use of a Handgun in the Commission of violence” should merge. For the reasons stated herein, Davis is precluded from asserting that first degree assault and robbery with a dangerous weapon should have merged. Moreover, the offenses of use of a handgun and robbery with a dangerous weapon should not have merged. We, therefore, hold that Davis’s rights under the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution were not …show more content…
. . . Under the doctrine, once an appellate court rules upon a question presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling, which is considered to be the law of the case . . . . Not only are lower courts bound by the law of the case, but decisions rendered by a prior appellate panel will generally govern the second appeal at the same appellate level as well, unless the previous decision is incorrect because it is out of keeping with controlling principles announced by a higher court and following the decision would result in manifest injustice.”
Haskins v. State, 171 Md. App. 182, 189-90 (2006) (quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170, 183-84 (2004)). In the instant action, Davis has already presented us with the question as to whether his sentences for first-degree assault and robbery with a dangerous weapon should have merged. In an opinion filed March 4, 2005, we affirmed his cumulative sentences because separate instances of conduct gave rise to each of his sentences. Indeed, we held