Foreign Policy 51 64essay
“The Period 1951-64 saw Britain lurch from one Foreign Policy mistake to another,” assess the validity of this statement.
In 1951, Britain was an Empire, heavily involved in global affairs and clinging to illusions of grandeur, however by 1964 the British foreign ethos was markedly different and the road to the new way of thinking was certainly a rocky one. Among other factors, this essay will consider decolonisation, the Suez Crisis and Europe. It will be argued that whilst it seemed that lady luck was not favouring the British, in fact the Blunders abroad were mostly self-inflicted.
The first set of failures in foreign policy during this period can be traced back to the re-elected Churchill, whose refusal to accept Britain’s diminished post-war role. A key mistake this led to was Churchill’s complete intolerance of any further decolonisation, despite the beginnings of the breakup of the Empire as far back as 1947 with India’s & Pakistan’s independence, Churchill’s delusions of Imperialism cost Britain greatly, his stubborn stance against decolonisation led to many violent uprisings, most notably in Malaya and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, both costly and ultimately unsuccessful for Britain. In took until MacMillan before decolonisation sped up, this meant a period of far too long when Britain attempted to cling on to the Empire, a very costly mistake. Britain’s global status was further diminished when Churchill’s key foreign policy of a ‘3-power Summit’ was dashed, again this highlighted that Britain was no longer a world-power but was yet realise the fact. As Dean Acheson – a US diplomat – said, “Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role,” a sentiment applicable no more so than to Winston Churchill.
In 1956, Britain’s illusions were shattered. The attempt to hang on to the role of a superpower finally came to a crashing halt as the Suez Crisis provided a brutal revelation of Britain’s financial and political weaknesses. The conspiracy between
In 1951, Britain was an Empire, heavily involved in global affairs and clinging to illusions of grandeur, however by 1964 the British foreign ethos was markedly different and the road to the new way of thinking was certainly a rocky one. Among other factors, this essay will consider decolonisation, the Suez Crisis and Europe. It will be argued that whilst it seemed that lady luck was not favouring the British, in fact the Blunders abroad were mostly self-inflicted.
The first set of failures in foreign policy during this period can be traced back to the re-elected Churchill, whose refusal to accept Britain’s diminished post-war role. A key mistake this led to was Churchill’s complete intolerance of any further decolonisation, despite the beginnings of the breakup of the Empire as far back as 1947 with India’s & Pakistan’s independence, Churchill’s delusions of Imperialism cost Britain greatly, his stubborn stance against decolonisation led to many violent uprisings, most notably in Malaya and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, both costly and ultimately unsuccessful for Britain. In took until MacMillan before decolonisation sped up, this meant a period of far too long when Britain attempted to cling on to the Empire, a very costly mistake. Britain’s global status was further diminished when Churchill’s key foreign policy of a ‘3-power Summit’ was dashed, again this highlighted that Britain was no longer a world-power but was yet realise the fact. As Dean Acheson – a US diplomat – said, “Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role,” a sentiment applicable no more so than to Winston Churchill.
In 1956, Britain’s illusions were shattered. The attempt to hang on to the role of a superpower finally came to a crashing halt as the Suez Crisis provided a brutal revelation of Britain’s financial and political weaknesses. The conspiracy between