Evaluating Thomas Nagel's What Is It Like To Be A Bat
Nagel is probably most widely known within the field of philosophy of mind as an advocate of the idea that consciousness and subjective experience cannot be reduced to brain activity. In this essay, I will critically evaluate Thomas Nagel’s What is it Like to be a Bat? His paper isn't really about the sensory world of bats; it's more of a critique of reductionist theories of the mind. Nagel argues that consciousness has a subjective aspect, and that understanding other mental states is difficult or impossible for those not able to experience those mental states. I will explain this by introducing the content and by explaining the importance of consciousness as well as the subjective character of experience.
Nagel states that reductionists …show more content…
It might look like a random looking lump of matter. If the Martian saw monkeys peeling it to eat, then the Martian will know that it is edible or it is some sort of food source. The point is that by reducing an object to its most simplistic form of experience and understanding, usually gives it a more accurate description of what that thing is. Nagel wants to say that in the case of certain mental states, this reductionist model does not produce the most accurate description of what that thing is. “If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity – that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint – does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it” (Nagel, 223) This argument shows inherent difficulty in the reductionist approach with respect to mental states. This argument by Nagel is quite vague about moving towards greater objectivity, especially when nobody has a clue about what we are supposed to be reducing in the first place. Reduction could in fact be coherent; we might simply lack the technology to utilize
Nagel states that reductionists …show more content…
It might look like a random looking lump of matter. If the Martian saw monkeys peeling it to eat, then the Martian will know that it is edible or it is some sort of food source. The point is that by reducing an object to its most simplistic form of experience and understanding, usually gives it a more accurate description of what that thing is. Nagel wants to say that in the case of certain mental states, this reductionist model does not produce the most accurate description of what that thing is. “If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity – that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint – does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it” (Nagel, 223) This argument shows inherent difficulty in the reductionist approach with respect to mental states. This argument by Nagel is quite vague about moving towards greater objectivity, especially when nobody has a clue about what we are supposed to be reducing in the first place. Reduction could in fact be coherent; we might simply lack the technology to utilize