February 4, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Enron Collapse:
An Overview of Financial Issues
Mark Jickling, Coordinator
Specialist in Public Finance
Government and Finance Division
Summary
Only months before Enron Corp.’s bankruptcy filing in December 2001, the firm was widely regarded as one of the most innovative, fastest growing, and best managed businesses in the United States. With the swift collapse, shareholders, including thousands of Enron workers who held company stock in their 401(k) retirement accounts, lost tens of billions of dollars. Investigations of wrongdoing may take years to conclude, but Enron’s failure already raises financial oversight issues with wider applications. Why didn’t the watchdogs bark? This report briefly examines the accounting system that failed to provide a clear picture of the firm’s true condition, the independent auditors and board members who were unwilling to challenge Enron’s management, the Wall Street stock analysts and bond raters who missed the trouble ahead, the rules governing employer stock in company pension plans, and the unregulated energy derivatives trading that was the core of Enron’s business. The report will be updated regularly as further reliable information about Enron’s downfall – which is now extremely limited – becomes available.
Other contributors to this report include Bob Lyke, Patrick Purcell, and Gary Shorter.
Formed in 1985 from a merger of Houston Natural Gas and Internorth, Enron Corp. was the first nationwide natural gas pipeline network. Over time, the firm’s business focus shifted from the regulated transportation of natural gas to unregulated energy trading markets. The guiding principle seems to have been that there was more money to be made in buying and selling financial contracts linked to the value of energy assets (and to other economic variables) than in actual ownership of physical assets.
Until