Diplomacy and Propaganda in the Kashmir War
Diplomacy and propaganda in the Kashmir War
Abstract: The conflict between Hindu and Muslims over the Kashmir region is one of the bloodiest religious wars in history, exceeding in violence the Crusades or the “Thirty years war’’. As long as the Indian colony was under British rule, the tensions were kept under control, but during the decolonization movement , the two religions who hatred and feared each other more than they feared the colonial masters, developed in the first phase separate national movements ; the Hindu under Ghandi and the Muslims under Mohammed Ali Jinnah . And after the power transfer in 1947, two states emerged from the ex colony, Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan who have engaged from that moment on in a bloody conflict which lasts until today. The essay presents, using a conflict resolution model, an analysis of the indo – Pakistani war and the interplay between propaganda and diplomacy. I will describe the four major conflicts in the area: the 1947 war, 1965, 1971 the Karghil War from 1999, and the post 2000 situation. While the propaganda had a crucial role in escalating the conflict, the diplomacy of joint Indo – Pakistani efforts or third parties implication succeeded in mitigate it. But the conflict was never settled, resulting in Johan Galtung’s terms a “negative peace’’. There were of course specialized institutions in launching the propaganda machine such as the Pakistani “ISI’’ (Inter Service Intelligence). A crucial aspect of the problem is that both Pakistani and Indian propaganda is empowered by a cultural violence, deeply rooted in the social aspect of life. A significant part of the article will focus on the so called “bus diplomacy’’ and the 2001 “road map’’ for the implementation of a stable peace in the region of Kashmir. Also, we will see that third parties peace initiatives were less successful than those which came direct from the combatants.
Key terms: conflict escalation – de escalation, structural violence,
Abstract: The conflict between Hindu and Muslims over the Kashmir region is one of the bloodiest religious wars in history, exceeding in violence the Crusades or the “Thirty years war’’. As long as the Indian colony was under British rule, the tensions were kept under control, but during the decolonization movement , the two religions who hatred and feared each other more than they feared the colonial masters, developed in the first phase separate national movements ; the Hindu under Ghandi and the Muslims under Mohammed Ali Jinnah . And after the power transfer in 1947, two states emerged from the ex colony, Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan who have engaged from that moment on in a bloody conflict which lasts until today. The essay presents, using a conflict resolution model, an analysis of the indo – Pakistani war and the interplay between propaganda and diplomacy. I will describe the four major conflicts in the area: the 1947 war, 1965, 1971 the Karghil War from 1999, and the post 2000 situation. While the propaganda had a crucial role in escalating the conflict, the diplomacy of joint Indo – Pakistani efforts or third parties implication succeeded in mitigate it. But the conflict was never settled, resulting in Johan Galtung’s terms a “negative peace’’. There were of course specialized institutions in launching the propaganda machine such as the Pakistani “ISI’’ (Inter Service Intelligence). A crucial aspect of the problem is that both Pakistani and Indian propaganda is empowered by a cultural violence, deeply rooted in the social aspect of life. A significant part of the article will focus on the so called “bus diplomacy’’ and the 2001 “road map’’ for the implementation of a stable peace in the region of Kashmir. Also, we will see that third parties peace initiatives were less successful than those which came direct from the combatants.
Key terms: conflict escalation – de escalation, structural violence,
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