Consequentialist Ethical Theory
The purpose of law is to protect the health of the public and to provide welfares such as fundamental rights and basic liberties and social assistance. The motives of carrying out such duties is the basis of many democratic countries which provide their citizens with the necessary means for living on the belief that providing these services are for the betterment of society and its people’s well-being. One legal theory that exemplify how our government are structured is explained by deontology which is an ethic by which focuses on actions which are guided by moral obligations, while consequentialist ethic have based itself on the principle of, if the goal is morally correct then any means to achieving it are acceptable. In an essence both
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Goldstick explains, a consequentialist sees things as they ought to be and not how they really are . A consequentialist duty to assist is guided by the principles that in any situation be it emergency or non-emergency that even if the rescue causes a type of harm such as injury or even financial loss that the individual should still proceed to assist; in comparison deontology is more forgiving to the plight of the individual being thrust into helping. Weinrib through the views of consequentialism would say, that by removing the limits to the duty to assist this would serve the greatest number thus the greatest happiness, but Weinrib then points out the folly to this view, that it would only create a perpetual reliance on assistance. Another problem of a consequentialist views on the duty to assist that it draws its roots from civil law system, but in a common law system an unrestricted duty to assist simply would put people in dangerous situation . Also a consequentialist duty to assist acts to compensate for lack of a welfare system, for example in countries such as India they lack a system to provide food and shelter for the poor, so a consequentialist responsibility for omissions would be accepted because India has no means to assist it poor because the lack of a coherent system to tackle the needs of poor. As is the case for many laws, enforcement and administrative considerations pose a problem for enshrining the responsibility for omissions in law.
In this view, the administrative and enforcement considerations on which the utilitarian account of rescue rests are irrelevant to the individual’s obligations as a moral agent. The individual should ask what he ought to do, not how others compel him to fulfill his duty. The merit of this view is its observation that any utilitarian version of a duty to rescue has nuances that do not ring true to the moral contours of the
Goldstick explains, a consequentialist sees things as they ought to be and not how they really are . A consequentialist duty to assist is guided by the principles that in any situation be it emergency or non-emergency that even if the rescue causes a type of harm such as injury or even financial loss that the individual should still proceed to assist; in comparison deontology is more forgiving to the plight of the individual being thrust into helping. Weinrib through the views of consequentialism would say, that by removing the limits to the duty to assist this would serve the greatest number thus the greatest happiness, but Weinrib then points out the folly to this view, that it would only create a perpetual reliance on assistance. Another problem of a consequentialist views on the duty to assist that it draws its roots from civil law system, but in a common law system an unrestricted duty to assist simply would put people in dangerous situation . Also a consequentialist duty to assist acts to compensate for lack of a welfare system, for example in countries such as India they lack a system to provide food and shelter for the poor, so a consequentialist responsibility for omissions would be accepted because India has no means to assist it poor because the lack of a coherent system to tackle the needs of poor. As is the case for many laws, enforcement and administrative considerations pose a problem for enshrining the responsibility for omissions in law.
In this view, the administrative and enforcement considerations on which the utilitarian account of rescue rests are irrelevant to the individual’s obligations as a moral agent. The individual should ask what he ought to do, not how others compel him to fulfill his duty. The merit of this view is its observation that any utilitarian version of a duty to rescue has nuances that do not ring true to the moral contours of the