Commands and Prohibitions and Naskh
USUL AL-FIQH 1
“COMMANDS AND PROHIBITIONS”
“NASKH (ABROGATION)”
PRESENTED FOR
DR. YUSUFF JELILI AMUDA
PRESENTED BY
NUR SAFURA BINTI MD SALLEH 1114750
SYAFINAZ BINTI SAPARUDDIN 1119226
SITI HAJAR BINTI ISMAIL 1117638
INTRODUCTION
As students of Usul Fiqh Semester 2 2012/2013 we are required to make a report on Commands and Prohibition and Naskh. The language of the Qur'an (and the Sunnah) differs from that of modern statutes in that Qur'anic legislation is not confined to commands and prohibitions and their consequences, but is often coupled with an appeal to the conscience of the individual. This moral appeal may consist of a persuasion or a warning, an allusion to the possible benefit or harm that may accrue from observing or violating an injunction, or a promise of reward/punishment in the hereafter. Modern laws are often devoid of such appeals, as they are usually confined to an exposition of imperative rules and their tangible results.
Commands and prohibitions in the Qur'an occur in a variety of forms. An injunction is normally expected to be in the imperative mood and may occur in the form of a moral condemnation of a certain form of conduct. Also, a Qur'anic command and prohibition may be conveyed in the form of an allusion to the consequences of a form of conduct, such as a promise of reward or punishment in the hereafter.
Naskh is an Arabic language word usually translated as abrogation, it shares the same root as the words appearing in the phrase al-naskh wal-mansukh “the abrogating and abrogating and abrogated. The emergence of naskh dates back to the first centuries of Islamic civilization. Naskh employs the logic of chronology and progressive revelation. Here in this report will explain more about the types of Naskh based on explicit and implicit, the distinction between the words and the rulings of the Quran and the Qur’an and the Sunnah may be abrogated by themselves or by one another. Not to forget the distinctions between naskh and specification and naskh and addition.
1.1 COMMANDS
A command proper (amr) is defined as a verbal demand to do something issued from a position of superiority over who is inferior. Command in this sense differs from both supplication (du’a) and request (iltimas) in that the supplication is a demand from an inferior to one who is superior, whereas a request is a demand among people of equal or near-equal status. Since a verbal command can mean different things, namely an ordinary order, a mere recommendation and even permissibility, the ulema have differed as to which of these is the primary and which the secondary meaning of a command. Some have held the view that amr is in the nature of a homonym (mushtarak) which imparts all of these concepts, which are obligation, recommendation, but not permissibility. Still others have held that amr implies a permission to do something and that this is the widest meaning of amr, which is common to all three foregoing concepts. 1. According to the majority opinion, a command by itself that is when it is not attended by clues or circumstances that might give it a particular meaning implies obligation or an emphatic demand only. 2. But this may change in the event of other indications being present, which might reduce a command to permissibility, recommendation or indeed to a variety of other meaning. For example, when we read in the Quran command such as ‘kulu wa’shrabu’ (al-A’raf 7:31), the indications that the amount to no more than permissibility. For eating and drinking are the necessities of human life and a command in respect of them must logically amount to permissibility only. Similarly, Qur’anic permission in respect of hunting after the completion of the hajj ceremonies given in sura al-Ma’idah 5:2 (wa idha halaltum fastadu) and its address to the believers to ‘scatter the land’ (fa’ntashiru fi’l-ard) after performing the Friday prayers (al-Jumu’ah 62:10) are both in the imperative form. But in the cases the purpose is to render these activities permissible only. 3. A command may likewise convey a recommendation should there be indications to warrant this conclusion. This is, for example, the case with regard to the Qur’anic command which requires the documentation of loans: ‘When you give or take a loan for a fixed period, reduce it into writing’ (al-Baqarah 2:282). However, form an indication which occurs in the next ayah in the same sura, it is concluded that the command here implies a recommendation only. This ayah read ‘and if one of you deposits a thing on trust let the trustee [faithfully] discharges his trust’. Here the use of the word ‘trust’ signifies that the creditor may trust the debtor even without any writing. The majority of ulema have held the same view regarding the requirement of witnesses in commercial contracts, which is the subject of another Qur’anic command occurring in the same passage, known as the ayah al-mudayanah (2:282): ‘Whenever you enter a contract of sale, let it be witnessed and let neither the scribe nor the witness suffer harm.’ The Zahiri ulema have upheld the obvious meaning of these provisions and have made documentation a requirement of every loan, or any form of deferred payment, and have made witnesses a requirement of every contract of sale. This, in their view is more conducive to the fulfillment of contracts and the prevention of disputes among people.
A command may according to the indications provided by the context and circumstances, imply a threat, such as the Qur’anic address to the unbelievers: ‘Do what you wish’ (I’malu ma shi’tum) and to the devil: ‘Lead to destruction those that you can’(wastafziz man istata’ta) (Bani Isra’il 17:64). A command may similarly imply contempt (ihanah) such as the Qur’anic address to the unbelievers on the Day of Judgment: ‘Taste [the torture], you mighty and honourable!’ A command may sometimes imply supplication when someone says: ‘O Lord grants me forgiveness’, and indeed a host of other meanings which may be understood in the light of the context and surrounding circumstances. As already noted, the majority of ulema have held that a command normally conveys an obligation unless there are indications to suggest otherwise.
The lawgiver may at times order something which has hitherto been prohibited. The question then arises from this situation. Which are: 1. As the nature of a command which follows a prohibition (al-amr ba’d al-hazar); does it convey an obligation or a mere permissibility? The majority of ulema have held the view that a command following a prohibition means permissibility, not obligation. Two examples of such a command in the Quran have already been given above in the context of the permission to hunt following its prohibition during the hajj ceremonies and the permission to conduct trade following its prohibition at the time of the Friday prayers. (al-Ma’idah 5:2 and al-Jumu’ah 62:10 respectively). An example of such a command in the Sunnah is the Hadith in which the prophet is reported to have said: ‘I had forbidden you from visiting the graves. Nay, visit them, for it reminds you of the hereafter’. 2. Next question the question arises whether a command requires a single compliance or repetition. According to the majority view, this question can only be determined in the light of indications which might specify that repeated performance is required. However in the absent of such indications, a single instance of performance is the minimum requirement of a command. Among the indications which determine repetition is when a command is issued in conditional terms. For example, the Qur’anic provision ‘if you are impure then cleans yourselves’ (al-Ma’idah 5:7). Or the text which provides: ‘The adulterer and adulteress flog them each one hundred lashes’, that is, if they commit adultery (al-Nur 24:2). Since the command to take a bath in the first ayah is conditional on janabah, then a bath must be taken following every instance of janabah. Similarly, when a command is dependent on a cause or an attribute, then it must be fulfilled whenever the cause or the attribute is present. The Qur’anic command, for example which reads: ‘Perform the salah at the decline of the sun’ (Bani Isra’il 17:18), requires repeated performance at every instance when the cause for it is present, that is, when the specified time of salah arrives. 3. The question whether a command requires immediate or delayed performance. It is once again observed that the command itself merely consists of a demand, and the manner of its performance must be determined in the light of indications and surrounding circumstances. For example, when A tells B to ‘do such and such now’ or alternatively orders him to ‘do such and such tomorrow’, both orders are valid and there is no contradiction. However, if a command were to require immediate execution then the word ‘now’ in the first order would be superfluous just as the word ‘tomorrow’, in the second order would be contradictory. When a person command another to ‘bring me some water’ while he is thirsty, then by virtue of this indication, the command requires immediate performance just as the order to ‘collect the rent’ when it is given, say, in the middle of the month while the rent is collected at the end of each month, must be delayed performance. It is thus obvious that the commandant may specify a particular time in which the command must be executed. The time limit maybe strict or it may be flexible. If it is flexible, at the command to perform the obligatory salah, then performance may be delayed until the last segment of prescribed time. But if the command itself specify no time limit, such as the order to perform and expiation ‘kafarah’, then execution maybe delayed indefinitely within the expected limit of one’s lifetime. However, given the uncertainty of the time of one’s death, an early performance is recommended in regard to kafarat. 4. Lastly, the question arises as to whether a command to do something implies the prohibition of its opposite. According to the majority view, a command to do something does imply the prohibition of its opposite regardless as to whether the opposite in question consists of a single act or of a plurality of act. Thus when a person is ordered to move, he is in the meantime forbidden to remain still; or when a person is ordered to stand, he is forbidden from doing any of a number of opposing acts such as sitting, crouching, lying down, etc. However, some ulema, including al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali, Ibn al-Hajib and the Mu’tazillah, have held that a command does not imply the prohibition of its opposite. A group of the Hanafi and Shafi’I ulema have held that only one of the opposite act, whether known or unknown, is prohibited, but not all. The result of such differences would obviously have a bearing on whether the person who commits the opposite of the command must be penalized, and if so, to what extent. Specific answer to such question can obviously only be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the state of mind of the individual concern, as well as the general objective of the Lawgiver/commander that can be ascertain in a given command. 1.2 PROHIBITONS Prohibition (nahy), being the opposite of a command, is defined as a word or words which demand the avoidance of doing something addressed from a position of superiority to one who is inferior. The typical form of a prohibitory order in Arabic is that of a negative command beginning with la such as la taf’al (do not), or the Qur’anic prohibition which reads ‘slay not [la taqtulu] the life which God has made sacred’ (al-An’am 6:151). A prohibition may be expounded in a statement (jumlah khabariyyah) such as occurs, for example, in the Qur’an (al-Baqarah 2:221): ‘prohibited to you are the flesh of dead corpses and blood’. It may sometimes occur in the form of a command which requires the avoidance of something, such as the Qur’anic phrase wa dharu al-bay (‘abandon sale’, that is during the time of Friday salah – al-Jumu’ah 62:100), or wa’jtanibu qawl al-zur (‘avoid lying’) in sura al-Hajj (22:30), or may occur in a variety of other forms that are found in the Quran. A prohibition, like a command, may convey a variety of meanings. Although the primary meaning of nahy is illegality, or tahrim, nahy is also used to imply a mere reprehension (karahiyyah), or guidance (irshad), or reprimand (ta’dib), or supplication (du’a). An example of nahy which implies reprehension is the Qur’anic ayah addressing the believers to ‘prohibit not [la tuharrimu] the clean foods that God has made lawful to you’ (al-Ma’idah 5:87). Nahy which conveys moral guidance may be illustrated by the Qur’anic ayah addressing the believers to ‘ask not questions about things which, if made plain to you, may cause you trouble’ (al-Ma’idah 5:101). An example of nahy which implies a threat is when a master tells his recalcitrant servant: ‘Don’t follow what I say and you will see’. An example of nahy which conveys supplication in the Quran occurs in sura al-Baraqah (2:286) which reads: ‘Our Lord, condemn us not if we forget’. Since nahy can convey several meanings, the ulema have differed as to which of these is the primary (haqiqi) as opposed to the secondary or metaphorical meanings of nahy. Some have held that illegality (tahrim) is the primary meaning of nahy while others consider reprehension (karahiyyah) to be the original meaning of nahy. According to yet another view, nahy is a homonym in respect of both. The majority (jumhur) of ulema have held the view that nahy is primarily implies tahrim, a meaning which will be presumed to prevail unless there are indications to suggest otherwise. An example of nahy in the Quran which has retained its primary meaning is the phrase ‘la taqtulu’ in the ayah which provides ‘slay not life which God has made sacred’. There is no indication in this text to warrant a departure from the primary meaning of la taqtulu, which must therefore prevail. The primary meaning of nahy may be abandoned for a figurative meaning if there is an indication to justify this. Hence the phrase la tu’akhidhna (‘condemn us not’) implies supplication, as the demand here is addressed to Almighty God. 1.3 VALUE OF LEGAL INJUNCTIONS The object of a prohibition may be to prevent an act such as adultery (zina), or it may be to prevent the utterance of words such as those purporting to effect the sale of dead corpses, or of a freeman, by means of offer and acceptance. In either case, the prohibition does not produce any rights or legal effects whatsoever. Hence no right of paternity is established through zina; on the contrary the perpetrator is liable to punishment. Similarly, no contract is concluded and no right of ownership is proven as a result of the sale of a corpse. If the object of prohibition is an act, and it is prohibited owing to an extraneous attribute rather than the essence of the act itself, such as fasting on the day of ‘id, then the act is null and void (batil) according to the Shafi’is but is irregular (fasid) according to the Hanafis. The act, in other words, can produce no legal result according to the Shafi’is, but does create legal consequences according to the Hanafis although it is basically sinful. The Hanafis consider such acts to be defective and must be dissolved by means of annulment (faskh), or must be rectified if possible. If the prohibition consists of words such as concluding a contract of sale which partakes in usury, it is still batil according to the Shafi’is but fasid according to the Hanafis, which means that it should be either revoked or amended to the extent that it is purified of its usurious content. The position is, however, different with regard to devotional matters (ibadat) whose purpose is seeking the pleasure of God. The fasid in this area is equivalent to batil. Hence there is no merit to be gained by fasting on the day of ‘id, nor will it be taken into account in compensation to the fasting owed by the mukalaf. But if the prohibition is due to the external factor such as a sale concluded at the time of the Friday prayer, or when salah is performed in usurped land (al-ard al-maghsubah), the ulema are generally in agreement that all the legal consequences will follow from the prohibited act, although the perpetrator would have incurred a sin. Thus the sale so concluded will prove the right of ownership and the salah is valid and no compensatory performance of the same salah will be acquired. As for the question of whether a prohibition requires both immediate as well as repeated compliance, the ulema are generally in agreement that it does and that this is only way a prohibition can be observed. Unless the object of the prohibition is avoided all the times, the prohibition is basically not observed. It is therefore necessary to avoid the prohibited act as from the moment it is issued and whenever it ia applicable. This is the case with regard to prohibitions that are not qualified in any way, such as the Qur’anic text concerning the property of the orphans which provides: ‘Do not approach [la taqrabu] the property of the orphan except in the way that is best’ (al-An’am 6:152). However if a prohibition is qualified by a condition that overrules immediate compliance, then it is has to be observed within the meaning of that condition. An example of this occurs in the Quran (al-Mumtahinah 60:10) which reads, in an address to the believers: ‘When there come to you believing women refugees, examine [and test] them. God knows best as to their faith. If you find that they are believers, then send them not back to the unbeliever.’ In this ayah, the prohibition (not to send them back) is conditional upon finding that they are believers, and until then the prohibition must remain in abeyance. There is a difference between a command and a prohibition in that the purpose of the command is to create something or to establish the existence of something, and this is realized by a single instance of execution, and there is basically no need for repetition. A prohibition on the other hand aims at the absence of something, and this cannot be realized unless it is absent all the time. A single instance of absence is thus not enough to fulfill the purpose of a prohibition. As already stated, a command which succeeds a prohibition conveys permissibility only. The position is once again different with regard to a prohibition: whenever a prohibition succeeds a command, it conveys illegality or tahrim, not a mere permissibility. Injunction, whether occurring in the Quran or the Sunnah, are of two types: explicit (sarih and implicit (ghayr sarih). 1. Explicit commands and prohibitions require total obedience without any allowance for individual circumstances and regardless as to whether they are found to be rational or not. For it is in the essence of devotion (ibadah) that obedience does not depend on the rationality or otherwise of an injunction. The question arises as to whether one should adopt a literal approach to the enforcement of commands and prohibitions, or should allow considerations of a rationality and maslahah to play a part in the manner of their implementation. For example, the Hadith which provides that the owners of livestock must give ‘one in forty sheep’ in zakah: should this provision be followed literally, or could we say that the equivalent price of one or many sheep could also be given in zakah? Similarly, when the Quran enjoins the Muslims concerning attendance at the Friday congregational prayers to ‘rush to the remembrance of God and abandon sale’ (al-Jumu’ah 62:9), should the word rush (fa’s’aw) be taken literally or in the sense of an emphasis on diligence at attending the Friday prayers? A similar question can be raised with regard to the second part of the same ayah which commands the Muslims to ‘abandon sale’ (wa dharu’l-bay). Should this be taken to imply that a sale which has occurred at the specified time is actually unlawful and void, or should it once again be taken as an order that requires perseverance and consistent observance? Should one follow the main objective of the Lawgiver or the literal requirements of the text which convey a command or a prohibition? These are but some of the questions which are asked concerning the correct understanding of Qur’anic injunctions. 2. The implicit injunctions are also divided into two types. i. The first of these is when a ruling of the Quran is conveyed in implicit terms but has been substantiated by the explicit terms of the Hadith, in which case it becomes equivalent to an explicit ruling. ii. The second type of implicit injunction is when a ruling of the Quran occurs, not in the form of a command or a prohibition, but as praise or condemnation of a certain conduct. The precise import of such provisions cannot always be ascertained as to whether they convey an injunction or a mere warning or recommendation as the case may be. Note for example the example the text which reads that ‘God does not love the prodigals (al-musrifin)’ (al-A’raf 7:31). The text of this ayah does not indicate the precise legal or religious enormity of extravagance, and it cannot be ascertained whether extravagance is prohibited or merely disapproved. Another question which merits attention in the study of commands and prohibitions is related to the means that lead to the performance of a command, or the avoidance of a prohibition. The question is whether the means should also be covered by the rules which regulate their ends. Briefly, the answer to this question is in the affirmative. The means which lead to the observance of commands and prohibitions are conveyed by the same ruling which applies to the command/prohibition in the first place. A mujtahid who deduces the law from a given text must be adequately familiar with the language of the Quran, and must know that the ahkam are not only expressed in the imperative but that a praise or a promise of reward may in effect be equivalent to a command. Similarly, a mere denunciation, a threat of punishment in the hereafter, or a reference to the adverse consequences of a form of conduct, may be equivalent to a prohibition. The distinction as to whether a command in the Quran conveys an obligation (wujub), a recommendation (nadb) or mere permissibility (ibahah) must be determined in the light of the objectives of the Shari’ah as well as by looking at the meaning of the words of the Quran. To determine the value (hukm) of a command, attention is paid not only to the grammatical form of the words in which it is conveyed, but also to the general objectives of the law. This is equally true of a prohibitory text. To determine whether a prohibition conveys actual tahrim, or mere reprehension (karahah) is not always easily understood from the words of the nusus. Only a portion of the nusus convey a precise meaning by virtue of clarity of their language. In shatibi’s estimation, a much larger portion of the nusus of the Quran cannot be determined by reference only to the linguistic forms in which they are expressed. The mujtahid must therefore be fully informed of the general principles and objectives of the Shari’ah so as to be able to determine the precise values of the nusus and the commands or prohibitions that they contain.
2. NASKH Naskh literally means ‘obliteration’, such as in nasakhat al-rih athar al-mashy, meaning ‘the wind obliterated the footprint’. Naskh also means transcription or transfer (al-naql wa al-tahwil) of something from one state to another while its essence remains unchanged. Naskh may be defined as the suspension or replacement of one Shariah ruling by another, provided that the latter is of a subsequent origin, and that the two rulings are enacted separately from one another. Abrogation applies almost exclusively to the Quran and the Sunnah, its application to ijma’ and qiyas has been generally overruled. However, the application of naskh to the Quran and Sunnah is confined to one period only, which is the lifetime of the Prophet saw. During Prophet lifetime, there were instances when some of the rulings of the Quran and Sunnah were either totally or partially repealed by subsequent rulings. This was due mainly to the change of circumstances in the life of the community and the fact that the revelation of the Quran spanned a period of twenty- three years. Abrogation is by and large a Madinese phenomenon which occurred as a result of the changes that the Muslim community encountered following the Prophet’s migration to Madinah. Certain rules were introduced, at the early stage of the advent of Islam, which were designed to win over the hearts of the people. An example of this is the number of daily prayers which was initially fixed at two but was later increased to five. Another example is mut’ah or temporary marriage, was initially permitted but was subsequently prohibited when the Prophet migrated to Madinah. According to the general rule a Quranic nass or a Mutawatir Hadith cannot be abrogated by a weaker Hadith, by ijma’ or by qiyas because they are not of equal authority to the nass. The main argument in support of the rule is that no abrogation of the nusus is possible after the demise of the Prophet. Since nothing weaker than the Quran and Sunnah can abrogate anything in either of these sources, abrogation, to all intents and purposes, came to an end with the death of the Prophet. Ijma’, qiyas and ijtihad, being weaker in comparison to the nusus, cannot abrogate the rules of divine revelation. However, a subsequent ijma’ may abrogate an existing ijma’ which might be founded in considerations of public interest, or maslahah mursalah. Besides that, naskh is not applicable to the ‘perspicuous’ texts of the Quran and Hadith, known as muhkamat. A text of this nature is often worded in such a way as to preclude the possibility of repeal. There are also certain subjects to which abrogation does not apply. Included among these are provisions pertaining to the attributes of God, belief in the principles of the faith and, the doctrine of tawhid and the hereafter. Another subject is the Shariah of Islam itself, which is the last of the revealed laws and can never be abrogated in its entirety. Rational matters and moral truths such as the virtue of doing justice or being good to one’s parents, and vices such as the enormity of telling lies, are not changeable and are therefore not open to abrogation.
2.1 Conditions of Naskh There are some conditions that need to be satisfied to apply abrogation. First, that the text itself has not precluded the possibility of abrogation. An example of this is the Quranic provision concerning persons who are convicted of slanderous accusation (qadhf) that they may never be admitted as witnesses (al-Nur, 24: 4). Similarly the Hadith which proclaims that jihad shall remain valid until the day of resurrection obviously precludes the possibility of abrogating the permanent validity of jihad. Second, the subject is open to the possibility of repeal. Thus the attributes of Allah and the principle of belief, moral virtues and rational truth are not open to abrogation. Third, the abrogating text is of a later origin than the abrogated. Fourth, the two texts are of equal strength in regard to authenticity (thubut) and meaning (dalalah). Thus a textual ruling of the Quran may be abrogated either by another Quranic text of similar strength or by a Mutawatir Hadith, and, according to Hanafis, even by a Mashhur Hadith, as the latter is almost as strong as the Mutawatir. By the same token, one Mutawatir Hadith may abrogate another.
Fifth, the two texts are genuinely in conflict and can in no way be reconciled with one another. Lastly, the two texts are separate and are not related to one another in the sense of one being the condition, qualification or exception to the other. It is because when this is the case, the issue is likely to be one of specification (takhsis) or qualification (taqyid) rather than abrogation.
2.2 Types of Naskh Abrogation may either be explicit (sarih) or implicit (dimni). Explicit abrogation is the abrogating text clearly repeals one ruling and substitutes another in its place. An example for explicit abrogation is the Hadith which provides: ‘I had forbidden you from visiting the graves. Nay, visit them, for they remind you of the hereafter.’ In another Hadith, Prophet is reported to have said, ‘I forbidden you from storing away the sacrificial meat because of the large crowds. You may now store it as you wish.’ The initial order not to store the sacrificial meat during the eid al-adha was given in view of the large number of visitors who attended the festival in Madinah, where the Prophet desired that they should be provided with necessary foodstuffs. The restriction was later removed as the circumstances had changed. In both these examples, the text leaves no doubt as to the nature of the two rulings and all the other relevant facts of abrogation. An example of explicit abrogation in the Quran is the passage in surah al-Baqarah (2: 142-144) with regard to the change in the direction of the qiblah from Jerusalem to the Ka’bah. The relevant text of the Quran as to the direction of the qiblah before and after the new ruling is clear, and leaves no doubt with regard to the facts of abrogation and the nature of the change which was effected thereby. Implicit abrogation is the abrogating text does not clarify all the relevant facts. An example of implicit abrogation is the ruling in surah al-Baqarah (2: 180) which permitted bequests to one’s parents and relatives. This was subsequently abrogated by another text (al-Nisa’, 4: 11) which entitled the legal heirs to specific shares in inheritance. The two rulings are not diametrically opposed to one another and could both be implemented in certain cases. Implicit abrogation has been sub-divided into two types which are total abrogation (naskh kulli) and partial abrogation (naskh juz’i).
Total abrogation is the whole of a particular nass is abrogated by another and a new ruling is enacted to replace it. The example for total abrogation can be found in two Quranic texts concerning the waiting period (‘iddah) of widows, which was initially prescribed to be one year but was subsequently changed too four months and ten days. The first ayah is “Those of you who are about to die and leave widows should bequeath for their widows a year’s maintenance and residence, but if they leave the residence, you are not responsible for what they do of themselves.” (al-Baqarah, 2: 240). The second ayah is “Those of you who die and leave widows, the latter must observe a waiting period of four months and ten days, when they have fulfilled their term, you are not responsible for what they do of themselves.” (al-Baqarah, 2: 234). As can be seen, the provision concerning the waiting period of widows in the first ayah has been totally replaced by the new ruling in the second.
While, partial abrogation is a form of naskh in which one text is only partially abrogated by another and the remaining part continues to be operative. An example of this is the Quranic ayah of qadhf (slanderous accusation) which has been partially repealed by the ayah of imprecation (li’an). The first ayah is “Those who accuse chaste women (of adultery) and then fail to bring four witnesses to prove it shall be flogged with eighty lashes.” (al-Nur, 24: 4). The second ayah is “Those who accuse their spouses and have no witnesses, other than their own words, to support their claim, must take four solemn oaths in the name of Allah and testify that they are telling the truths.” (al-Nur, 24: 6). The first ayah lays down the general rule that anyone, be it a spouse or otherwise, who accuses chaste women of zina must produce four witnesses for proof. The second ayah provides that if the accuser happens to be a spouse who cannot provide four witnesses and yet insists on pursuing the charge of zina, he may take four solemn oaths to take the place of four witnesses. This is to be followed, as the text continues, by a statement in which the husband invokes the curse of God upon himself if he tells a lie. The ruling of the first text has thus been repealed by the second text insofar as it concerns a married couple.
2.2-1 Types of Naskh on the Basis of the Distinction between the Words and the Rulings of the Quran The text of the Quran has two distinctive features, namely, the words of the text and the ruling that it conveys. Reading and reciting the words of the Quran, even its ruling is abrogated, still commands spiritual merit. The words are still regard as part of the Quran. Naskh has been classified into three types on the basis of this distinction. First and the most typical variety of abrogation are referred to as naskh al-hukm means naskh in which the ruling alone is abrogated while the words of the text are retained. The words of the Quranic text concerning bequests to relatives (al-Baqarah, 2: 180) and the one concerning the ‘iddah of widows (al-Baqarah, 2: 240) are the example for this naskh. Both ayahs are still a part of the Quran despite the fact that they have been abrogated. Second, naskh al-tilawah or naskh al-qiraah means abrogation of the words of the text while the ruling is retained. Example for this is a text that was a part of the Quran: اللهمن نكالاً البتة فارجموهما زينا إذا والشيخة الشيخ
“When a married man or a married woman commits zina, their punishment shall be stoning as retribution ordained by God.” This text has been repealed but the hukm is still there. Third is naskh al-hukm wa al-tilawah which means abrogation of both the words and the ruling. In the event where the words of the text, and the law that they convey, are both repealed, then the text in question is of little significance. According to a report which is attributed to the Prophet's widow, `A'ishah, it had been revealed in the Qur'an that ten clear suckings by a child, make marriage unlawful between that child and others who drank the same, woman's milk. Then it was abrogated and substituted by five suckings and it was then that the Messenger of God died. The initial ruling which required ten suckings was read into the text of the Qur'an. The ruling was then repealed and the words in which it was conveyed were also omitted from the text.
2.2-2 Types of Naskh on the Basis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah may be abrogated by themselves or by one another.
In this sense, abrogation can be again divided into the following types: 1) Abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an 2) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Sunnah 3) Abrogation of the Qur’an by Sunnah 4) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an
2.2-2.1(i) Abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an
This type of abrogation has been explained in the previous examples in the explicit and implicit type of abrogation. One of the examples is the ruling in surah al-Baqarah (2: 180) which permitted bequests to one’s parents and relatives. This was subsequently abrogated by another text (al-Nisa’, 4: 11) which entitled the legal heirs to specific shares in inheritance.
2.2-2.1(ii) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Sunnah
This type of abrogation too has been illustrated by the two Hadith which has been explained under the rubric of explicit abrogation. Which is a Hadith, Prophet is reported to have said, ‘I forbidden you from storing away the sacrificial meat because of the large crowds. You may now store it as you wish.’ The initial order not to store the sacrificial meat during the eid al-adha was given in view of the large number of visitors who attended the festival in Madinah, where the Prophet desired that they should be provided with necessary foodstuffs. The restriction was later removed as the circumstances had changed.
2.2-2.1(iii) Abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunnah
Imams Shafi’I and ibn Taymiyyah are of the opinion that Sunnah does not abrogate Qur’an. On the other hand, there are few scholars who believe that the Sunnah abrogated the qur’an. Muhammad bin Nasr al-Marwazi is one of them. They use the following two exmples; i. The Ayah of bequest in Surah al-Baqarah (2:180) “Prescribed for you when death approaches (any) of you if he leaves wealth (is he should make) a bequest for the parent and near relatives according to what is acceptable – a duty upon the righteous.
But the Prophet pbuh said: “There shall be no bequest to an heir”. This verse was already abrogated by the verses of inheritance in Surah al-Nisaa. So this is not a good example of Sunnah solely abrogating the Qur’an. ii. The ayah in Surah al-Nisaa (4:15) “Those who commit unlawful sexual intercourse of your women – bring against them four (witnesses) from among you. And if they testify, confine the guilty women to houses until death takes them or Allah ordains for them (another) way.
But the Prophet pbuh said: “Allah has ordained for them a way, stoning for adulterers, and lashing for fornicators.”
2.2-2.1(iv) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an The abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an occurs in the initial ruling of the Prophet which determined the qiblah in the direction of Jerusalem. When the prophet migrated to Madinah, he ordered the believers to pray in the direction of the Jerusalem. This was later repealed by the Qur’an in Surah al-Baqarah (2:144) “We have certainly seen the turning of your face, (O Muhammad), toward the heaven, and We will surely turn you a qiblah with which you will be pleased. So turn your face forward al-Masjid al-Haram. And wherever you (believers) are, turn your faces toward it (in prayer)…..” The Qur’an in other words, abrogated a practice that was initially authorized by the Sunnah.
2.2-2.2 View from Shafi’i on abrogation of the Qur’an by Sunnah or vice versa
Imam Shafi’i, the majority of the Mu’tazilah, and Ahmad b. Hanbali have overruled the validity of the remaining types of abrogation (Qur’an by Sunnah and Sunnah by Qur’an). According to al-Shafi’i a number of Qur’anic Ayah indicate that the Qur’an can only be abrogated by the Qur’an itself. Surah al-Nahl (16:101) “And when We substitute one ayah in pace of another ayah (ayatan makana ayatin), and God knows best what He reveals.” The evidence of the Qur’an cannot be abrogated by Sunnah is by the occurring of the word ayah twice in the verse.
Naskh in Qur’an is wholly an internal phenomenon, and there is no evidence in the Qur’an to suggest that it can be abrogated by the Sunnah. Surah Yunus (10:15) “And when Our verses are recited to them as clear evidences, those who do not expect the meeting with Us say, ‘Bring us a Qur’an other than this or change it.’ Say, (o Muhammad), ‘It is no for me to change it on my own accord. I only follow what is revealed to me. Indeed I fear, if I should disobey my Lord, the punishment of a tremendous Day.’” It is stated in the Qur’an, that the Qur’an asks the Prophet to declare he himself cannot change any art of the Qur’an.
The Sunnah even the Mutawatir Sunnah cannot abrogate the Qur’an. Only Sunnah can abrogate Sunnah: Mutawatir with Mutawatir, Ahad with Ahad. Mutawatir can abrogate Ahad but there is some disagreement on whether Ahad can abrogate Mutawatir. According to the preferred view, ahich is also held by al-Shafi’ie, the Ahad can abrogate the Mutawatir. To illustrate this is through the changing of qiblah from Jerusalem to al-Masjid al-Haram. The fact that the ruling of qiblah at Jerusalem is a Mutawatir Sunnah but the congregation of Companions accepted the solitary report as the abrogator of Mutawatir.
Al-Shafi’ie elaborates further. If there existed any occasion for the Sunnah to abrogate the Qur’an or vice versa, the Prophet pbuh would be the first to say so. If any Sunnah is mean to be abrogated, the Prophet himself would do it by virtue of another Sunnah, hence there is no case for the abrogation of Sunnah by the Qur’an.
2.3 Abrogation and Specification (Takhsis) Naskh and Takhsis resemble one another in that both tend to qualify or specify an original ruling in some way.
There are several basic differences between naskh and takhsis. Basic characteristics of naskh are; 1) It is necessary that the two rulings are genuinely in conflict and that they could not coexist, 2) naskh can occur in respect of either a general or a specific ruling, 3) naskh is basically confined the Qur’an and Sunnah and could only be effected by the explicit rulings of divine revelation, 4) naskh can only occur by shar’, 5) naskh does not operative with regard to speculative ruling, 6) it is essential that the abrogator be later in time than the ruling which it seeks to abrogate, 7) naskh does not apply to factual reports of events (akhbar).
Basic characteristic for takhsis are; 1) there are no real conflicts in takhsis, the two texts, namely he general text and the specifying text, in effect complement one another, 2) takhsis occurs in respect of a general ruling only, 3) takhsis cold occur by means of rationality and circumstantial evidence, 4) takhsis can occur by rationality (‘aql), custom (‘urf) and other rational proofs, 5) takhsis is possible by means of speculative evidence such as qiyas and solitary hadith, 6) Hanafis maintain that the Amm and he Khass must in fact be either simultaneous or parallel in time but according to the majority, the Amm and the Khass can precede or succeed one another, 7) takhsis could occur in regard to factual report.
2.4 Abrogation and Addition (Tazid)
Naskh is whether a subsequent addition (tazid) to an exising text, which may be at variance with it, amounts to it abrogation. When new materials are added to an existing law, the added materials may fall into one of the following two categories: i. Independent addition of the original text but relate to the same subject.
For example is adding a sixth solah the existing five does this amount to the abrogation of the original ruling? The majority of ulema said it does not amount to abrogation but merely adds a new element. ii. Not independent addition of the original text in that it may be dealing with something that constitutes an integral part of the original ruling.
For example is adding an additional sajdah to one or more of the existing obligatory prayers. The majority have held the view that it does not amount to abrogation of the existing law.
CONCLUSION
In a nutshell, knowing how to differentiate between the commands and prohibitions in the Qur’an helps us to identify the rulings of the Qur’an. As we explained in the section of commands, commands can mean different things and not simply just obligatory order. It could be a mere permissibility, recommendation, threat, supplication, and contempt regarding to the indications provided by the context and circumstances. Prohibition also convey a variety of meanings such as illegality, mere reprehension, guidance, reprimand and supplication. Some have held that illegality is the primary meaning of nahy while others consider reprehension to be the original meaning of nahy. According to yet another view, nahy is a homonym in respect of both.
By deep learning and reading regarding on the subject of Naskh also helps us a lot in pursuing our life as slaves of Allah and as Khalifah of Allah in this Dunya. We also learn about the types of abrogation and khilaf or disagreement among the scholars on that. Now we know that abrogation can be classified into four types of abrogation; 1) abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an, 2) abrogation of th Sunnah by the Sunnah, 3) abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunnah and 4) abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an. There are few arguments on the types of abrogation on the basis of abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunnah and vice versa. Imams al-Shafi’ie do not accept that types of abrogation because they believe only the Qur’an can abrogate the Qur’an and the Sunnah can abrogate the Sunnah.
Lastly, by having all these knowledge we hope that we can increase our understanding on our revelations which are Qur’an and Sunnah. So that, at least while we are reading the Qur’an or Sunnah and we come across the verses regarding the commands, prohibitions and naskh we can easily understand and ponder upon it. InsyaAllah.
“COMMANDS AND PROHIBITIONS”
“NASKH (ABROGATION)”
PRESENTED FOR
DR. YUSUFF JELILI AMUDA
PRESENTED BY
NUR SAFURA BINTI MD SALLEH 1114750
SYAFINAZ BINTI SAPARUDDIN 1119226
SITI HAJAR BINTI ISMAIL 1117638
INTRODUCTION
As students of Usul Fiqh Semester 2 2012/2013 we are required to make a report on Commands and Prohibition and Naskh. The language of the Qur'an (and the Sunnah) differs from that of modern statutes in that Qur'anic legislation is not confined to commands and prohibitions and their consequences, but is often coupled with an appeal to the conscience of the individual. This moral appeal may consist of a persuasion or a warning, an allusion to the possible benefit or harm that may accrue from observing or violating an injunction, or a promise of reward/punishment in the hereafter. Modern laws are often devoid of such appeals, as they are usually confined to an exposition of imperative rules and their tangible results.
Commands and prohibitions in the Qur'an occur in a variety of forms. An injunction is normally expected to be in the imperative mood and may occur in the form of a moral condemnation of a certain form of conduct. Also, a Qur'anic command and prohibition may be conveyed in the form of an allusion to the consequences of a form of conduct, such as a promise of reward or punishment in the hereafter.
Naskh is an Arabic language word usually translated as abrogation, it shares the same root as the words appearing in the phrase al-naskh wal-mansukh “the abrogating and abrogating and abrogated. The emergence of naskh dates back to the first centuries of Islamic civilization. Naskh employs the logic of chronology and progressive revelation. Here in this report will explain more about the types of Naskh based on explicit and implicit, the distinction between the words and the rulings of the Quran and the Qur’an and the Sunnah may be abrogated by themselves or by one another. Not to forget the distinctions between naskh and specification and naskh and addition.
1.1 COMMANDS
A command proper (amr) is defined as a verbal demand to do something issued from a position of superiority over who is inferior. Command in this sense differs from both supplication (du’a) and request (iltimas) in that the supplication is a demand from an inferior to one who is superior, whereas a request is a demand among people of equal or near-equal status. Since a verbal command can mean different things, namely an ordinary order, a mere recommendation and even permissibility, the ulema have differed as to which of these is the primary and which the secondary meaning of a command. Some have held the view that amr is in the nature of a homonym (mushtarak) which imparts all of these concepts, which are obligation, recommendation, but not permissibility. Still others have held that amr implies a permission to do something and that this is the widest meaning of amr, which is common to all three foregoing concepts. 1. According to the majority opinion, a command by itself that is when it is not attended by clues or circumstances that might give it a particular meaning implies obligation or an emphatic demand only. 2. But this may change in the event of other indications being present, which might reduce a command to permissibility, recommendation or indeed to a variety of other meaning. For example, when we read in the Quran command such as ‘kulu wa’shrabu’ (al-A’raf 7:31), the indications that the amount to no more than permissibility. For eating and drinking are the necessities of human life and a command in respect of them must logically amount to permissibility only. Similarly, Qur’anic permission in respect of hunting after the completion of the hajj ceremonies given in sura al-Ma’idah 5:2 (wa idha halaltum fastadu) and its address to the believers to ‘scatter the land’ (fa’ntashiru fi’l-ard) after performing the Friday prayers (al-Jumu’ah 62:10) are both in the imperative form. But in the cases the purpose is to render these activities permissible only. 3. A command may likewise convey a recommendation should there be indications to warrant this conclusion. This is, for example, the case with regard to the Qur’anic command which requires the documentation of loans: ‘When you give or take a loan for a fixed period, reduce it into writing’ (al-Baqarah 2:282). However, form an indication which occurs in the next ayah in the same sura, it is concluded that the command here implies a recommendation only. This ayah read ‘and if one of you deposits a thing on trust let the trustee [faithfully] discharges his trust’. Here the use of the word ‘trust’ signifies that the creditor may trust the debtor even without any writing. The majority of ulema have held the same view regarding the requirement of witnesses in commercial contracts, which is the subject of another Qur’anic command occurring in the same passage, known as the ayah al-mudayanah (2:282): ‘Whenever you enter a contract of sale, let it be witnessed and let neither the scribe nor the witness suffer harm.’ The Zahiri ulema have upheld the obvious meaning of these provisions and have made documentation a requirement of every loan, or any form of deferred payment, and have made witnesses a requirement of every contract of sale. This, in their view is more conducive to the fulfillment of contracts and the prevention of disputes among people.
A command may according to the indications provided by the context and circumstances, imply a threat, such as the Qur’anic address to the unbelievers: ‘Do what you wish’ (I’malu ma shi’tum) and to the devil: ‘Lead to destruction those that you can’(wastafziz man istata’ta) (Bani Isra’il 17:64). A command may similarly imply contempt (ihanah) such as the Qur’anic address to the unbelievers on the Day of Judgment: ‘Taste [the torture], you mighty and honourable!’ A command may sometimes imply supplication when someone says: ‘O Lord grants me forgiveness’, and indeed a host of other meanings which may be understood in the light of the context and surrounding circumstances. As already noted, the majority of ulema have held that a command normally conveys an obligation unless there are indications to suggest otherwise.
The lawgiver may at times order something which has hitherto been prohibited. The question then arises from this situation. Which are: 1. As the nature of a command which follows a prohibition (al-amr ba’d al-hazar); does it convey an obligation or a mere permissibility? The majority of ulema have held the view that a command following a prohibition means permissibility, not obligation. Two examples of such a command in the Quran have already been given above in the context of the permission to hunt following its prohibition during the hajj ceremonies and the permission to conduct trade following its prohibition at the time of the Friday prayers. (al-Ma’idah 5:2 and al-Jumu’ah 62:10 respectively). An example of such a command in the Sunnah is the Hadith in which the prophet is reported to have said: ‘I had forbidden you from visiting the graves. Nay, visit them, for it reminds you of the hereafter’. 2. Next question the question arises whether a command requires a single compliance or repetition. According to the majority view, this question can only be determined in the light of indications which might specify that repeated performance is required. However in the absent of such indications, a single instance of performance is the minimum requirement of a command. Among the indications which determine repetition is when a command is issued in conditional terms. For example, the Qur’anic provision ‘if you are impure then cleans yourselves’ (al-Ma’idah 5:7). Or the text which provides: ‘The adulterer and adulteress flog them each one hundred lashes’, that is, if they commit adultery (al-Nur 24:2). Since the command to take a bath in the first ayah is conditional on janabah, then a bath must be taken following every instance of janabah. Similarly, when a command is dependent on a cause or an attribute, then it must be fulfilled whenever the cause or the attribute is present. The Qur’anic command, for example which reads: ‘Perform the salah at the decline of the sun’ (Bani Isra’il 17:18), requires repeated performance at every instance when the cause for it is present, that is, when the specified time of salah arrives. 3. The question whether a command requires immediate or delayed performance. It is once again observed that the command itself merely consists of a demand, and the manner of its performance must be determined in the light of indications and surrounding circumstances. For example, when A tells B to ‘do such and such now’ or alternatively orders him to ‘do such and such tomorrow’, both orders are valid and there is no contradiction. However, if a command were to require immediate execution then the word ‘now’ in the first order would be superfluous just as the word ‘tomorrow’, in the second order would be contradictory. When a person command another to ‘bring me some water’ while he is thirsty, then by virtue of this indication, the command requires immediate performance just as the order to ‘collect the rent’ when it is given, say, in the middle of the month while the rent is collected at the end of each month, must be delayed performance. It is thus obvious that the commandant may specify a particular time in which the command must be executed. The time limit maybe strict or it may be flexible. If it is flexible, at the command to perform the obligatory salah, then performance may be delayed until the last segment of prescribed time. But if the command itself specify no time limit, such as the order to perform and expiation ‘kafarah’, then execution maybe delayed indefinitely within the expected limit of one’s lifetime. However, given the uncertainty of the time of one’s death, an early performance is recommended in regard to kafarat. 4. Lastly, the question arises as to whether a command to do something implies the prohibition of its opposite. According to the majority view, a command to do something does imply the prohibition of its opposite regardless as to whether the opposite in question consists of a single act or of a plurality of act. Thus when a person is ordered to move, he is in the meantime forbidden to remain still; or when a person is ordered to stand, he is forbidden from doing any of a number of opposing acts such as sitting, crouching, lying down, etc. However, some ulema, including al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali, Ibn al-Hajib and the Mu’tazillah, have held that a command does not imply the prohibition of its opposite. A group of the Hanafi and Shafi’I ulema have held that only one of the opposite act, whether known or unknown, is prohibited, but not all. The result of such differences would obviously have a bearing on whether the person who commits the opposite of the command must be penalized, and if so, to what extent. Specific answer to such question can obviously only be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the state of mind of the individual concern, as well as the general objective of the Lawgiver/commander that can be ascertain in a given command. 1.2 PROHIBITONS Prohibition (nahy), being the opposite of a command, is defined as a word or words which demand the avoidance of doing something addressed from a position of superiority to one who is inferior. The typical form of a prohibitory order in Arabic is that of a negative command beginning with la such as la taf’al (do not), or the Qur’anic prohibition which reads ‘slay not [la taqtulu] the life which God has made sacred’ (al-An’am 6:151). A prohibition may be expounded in a statement (jumlah khabariyyah) such as occurs, for example, in the Qur’an (al-Baqarah 2:221): ‘prohibited to you are the flesh of dead corpses and blood’. It may sometimes occur in the form of a command which requires the avoidance of something, such as the Qur’anic phrase wa dharu al-bay (‘abandon sale’, that is during the time of Friday salah – al-Jumu’ah 62:100), or wa’jtanibu qawl al-zur (‘avoid lying’) in sura al-Hajj (22:30), or may occur in a variety of other forms that are found in the Quran. A prohibition, like a command, may convey a variety of meanings. Although the primary meaning of nahy is illegality, or tahrim, nahy is also used to imply a mere reprehension (karahiyyah), or guidance (irshad), or reprimand (ta’dib), or supplication (du’a). An example of nahy which implies reprehension is the Qur’anic ayah addressing the believers to ‘prohibit not [la tuharrimu] the clean foods that God has made lawful to you’ (al-Ma’idah 5:87). Nahy which conveys moral guidance may be illustrated by the Qur’anic ayah addressing the believers to ‘ask not questions about things which, if made plain to you, may cause you trouble’ (al-Ma’idah 5:101). An example of nahy which implies a threat is when a master tells his recalcitrant servant: ‘Don’t follow what I say and you will see’. An example of nahy which conveys supplication in the Quran occurs in sura al-Baraqah (2:286) which reads: ‘Our Lord, condemn us not if we forget’. Since nahy can convey several meanings, the ulema have differed as to which of these is the primary (haqiqi) as opposed to the secondary or metaphorical meanings of nahy. Some have held that illegality (tahrim) is the primary meaning of nahy while others consider reprehension (karahiyyah) to be the original meaning of nahy. According to yet another view, nahy is a homonym in respect of both. The majority (jumhur) of ulema have held the view that nahy is primarily implies tahrim, a meaning which will be presumed to prevail unless there are indications to suggest otherwise. An example of nahy in the Quran which has retained its primary meaning is the phrase ‘la taqtulu’ in the ayah which provides ‘slay not life which God has made sacred’. There is no indication in this text to warrant a departure from the primary meaning of la taqtulu, which must therefore prevail. The primary meaning of nahy may be abandoned for a figurative meaning if there is an indication to justify this. Hence the phrase la tu’akhidhna (‘condemn us not’) implies supplication, as the demand here is addressed to Almighty God. 1.3 VALUE OF LEGAL INJUNCTIONS The object of a prohibition may be to prevent an act such as adultery (zina), or it may be to prevent the utterance of words such as those purporting to effect the sale of dead corpses, or of a freeman, by means of offer and acceptance. In either case, the prohibition does not produce any rights or legal effects whatsoever. Hence no right of paternity is established through zina; on the contrary the perpetrator is liable to punishment. Similarly, no contract is concluded and no right of ownership is proven as a result of the sale of a corpse. If the object of prohibition is an act, and it is prohibited owing to an extraneous attribute rather than the essence of the act itself, such as fasting on the day of ‘id, then the act is null and void (batil) according to the Shafi’is but is irregular (fasid) according to the Hanafis. The act, in other words, can produce no legal result according to the Shafi’is, but does create legal consequences according to the Hanafis although it is basically sinful. The Hanafis consider such acts to be defective and must be dissolved by means of annulment (faskh), or must be rectified if possible. If the prohibition consists of words such as concluding a contract of sale which partakes in usury, it is still batil according to the Shafi’is but fasid according to the Hanafis, which means that it should be either revoked or amended to the extent that it is purified of its usurious content. The position is, however, different with regard to devotional matters (ibadat) whose purpose is seeking the pleasure of God. The fasid in this area is equivalent to batil. Hence there is no merit to be gained by fasting on the day of ‘id, nor will it be taken into account in compensation to the fasting owed by the mukalaf. But if the prohibition is due to the external factor such as a sale concluded at the time of the Friday prayer, or when salah is performed in usurped land (al-ard al-maghsubah), the ulema are generally in agreement that all the legal consequences will follow from the prohibited act, although the perpetrator would have incurred a sin. Thus the sale so concluded will prove the right of ownership and the salah is valid and no compensatory performance of the same salah will be acquired. As for the question of whether a prohibition requires both immediate as well as repeated compliance, the ulema are generally in agreement that it does and that this is only way a prohibition can be observed. Unless the object of the prohibition is avoided all the times, the prohibition is basically not observed. It is therefore necessary to avoid the prohibited act as from the moment it is issued and whenever it ia applicable. This is the case with regard to prohibitions that are not qualified in any way, such as the Qur’anic text concerning the property of the orphans which provides: ‘Do not approach [la taqrabu] the property of the orphan except in the way that is best’ (al-An’am 6:152). However if a prohibition is qualified by a condition that overrules immediate compliance, then it is has to be observed within the meaning of that condition. An example of this occurs in the Quran (al-Mumtahinah 60:10) which reads, in an address to the believers: ‘When there come to you believing women refugees, examine [and test] them. God knows best as to their faith. If you find that they are believers, then send them not back to the unbeliever.’ In this ayah, the prohibition (not to send them back) is conditional upon finding that they are believers, and until then the prohibition must remain in abeyance. There is a difference between a command and a prohibition in that the purpose of the command is to create something or to establish the existence of something, and this is realized by a single instance of execution, and there is basically no need for repetition. A prohibition on the other hand aims at the absence of something, and this cannot be realized unless it is absent all the time. A single instance of absence is thus not enough to fulfill the purpose of a prohibition. As already stated, a command which succeeds a prohibition conveys permissibility only. The position is once again different with regard to a prohibition: whenever a prohibition succeeds a command, it conveys illegality or tahrim, not a mere permissibility. Injunction, whether occurring in the Quran or the Sunnah, are of two types: explicit (sarih and implicit (ghayr sarih). 1. Explicit commands and prohibitions require total obedience without any allowance for individual circumstances and regardless as to whether they are found to be rational or not. For it is in the essence of devotion (ibadah) that obedience does not depend on the rationality or otherwise of an injunction. The question arises as to whether one should adopt a literal approach to the enforcement of commands and prohibitions, or should allow considerations of a rationality and maslahah to play a part in the manner of their implementation. For example, the Hadith which provides that the owners of livestock must give ‘one in forty sheep’ in zakah: should this provision be followed literally, or could we say that the equivalent price of one or many sheep could also be given in zakah? Similarly, when the Quran enjoins the Muslims concerning attendance at the Friday congregational prayers to ‘rush to the remembrance of God and abandon sale’ (al-Jumu’ah 62:9), should the word rush (fa’s’aw) be taken literally or in the sense of an emphasis on diligence at attending the Friday prayers? A similar question can be raised with regard to the second part of the same ayah which commands the Muslims to ‘abandon sale’ (wa dharu’l-bay). Should this be taken to imply that a sale which has occurred at the specified time is actually unlawful and void, or should it once again be taken as an order that requires perseverance and consistent observance? Should one follow the main objective of the Lawgiver or the literal requirements of the text which convey a command or a prohibition? These are but some of the questions which are asked concerning the correct understanding of Qur’anic injunctions. 2. The implicit injunctions are also divided into two types. i. The first of these is when a ruling of the Quran is conveyed in implicit terms but has been substantiated by the explicit terms of the Hadith, in which case it becomes equivalent to an explicit ruling. ii. The second type of implicit injunction is when a ruling of the Quran occurs, not in the form of a command or a prohibition, but as praise or condemnation of a certain conduct. The precise import of such provisions cannot always be ascertained as to whether they convey an injunction or a mere warning or recommendation as the case may be. Note for example the example the text which reads that ‘God does not love the prodigals (al-musrifin)’ (al-A’raf 7:31). The text of this ayah does not indicate the precise legal or religious enormity of extravagance, and it cannot be ascertained whether extravagance is prohibited or merely disapproved. Another question which merits attention in the study of commands and prohibitions is related to the means that lead to the performance of a command, or the avoidance of a prohibition. The question is whether the means should also be covered by the rules which regulate their ends. Briefly, the answer to this question is in the affirmative. The means which lead to the observance of commands and prohibitions are conveyed by the same ruling which applies to the command/prohibition in the first place. A mujtahid who deduces the law from a given text must be adequately familiar with the language of the Quran, and must know that the ahkam are not only expressed in the imperative but that a praise or a promise of reward may in effect be equivalent to a command. Similarly, a mere denunciation, a threat of punishment in the hereafter, or a reference to the adverse consequences of a form of conduct, may be equivalent to a prohibition. The distinction as to whether a command in the Quran conveys an obligation (wujub), a recommendation (nadb) or mere permissibility (ibahah) must be determined in the light of the objectives of the Shari’ah as well as by looking at the meaning of the words of the Quran. To determine the value (hukm) of a command, attention is paid not only to the grammatical form of the words in which it is conveyed, but also to the general objectives of the law. This is equally true of a prohibitory text. To determine whether a prohibition conveys actual tahrim, or mere reprehension (karahah) is not always easily understood from the words of the nusus. Only a portion of the nusus convey a precise meaning by virtue of clarity of their language. In shatibi’s estimation, a much larger portion of the nusus of the Quran cannot be determined by reference only to the linguistic forms in which they are expressed. The mujtahid must therefore be fully informed of the general principles and objectives of the Shari’ah so as to be able to determine the precise values of the nusus and the commands or prohibitions that they contain.
2. NASKH Naskh literally means ‘obliteration’, such as in nasakhat al-rih athar al-mashy, meaning ‘the wind obliterated the footprint’. Naskh also means transcription or transfer (al-naql wa al-tahwil) of something from one state to another while its essence remains unchanged. Naskh may be defined as the suspension or replacement of one Shariah ruling by another, provided that the latter is of a subsequent origin, and that the two rulings are enacted separately from one another. Abrogation applies almost exclusively to the Quran and the Sunnah, its application to ijma’ and qiyas has been generally overruled. However, the application of naskh to the Quran and Sunnah is confined to one period only, which is the lifetime of the Prophet saw. During Prophet lifetime, there were instances when some of the rulings of the Quran and Sunnah were either totally or partially repealed by subsequent rulings. This was due mainly to the change of circumstances in the life of the community and the fact that the revelation of the Quran spanned a period of twenty- three years. Abrogation is by and large a Madinese phenomenon which occurred as a result of the changes that the Muslim community encountered following the Prophet’s migration to Madinah. Certain rules were introduced, at the early stage of the advent of Islam, which were designed to win over the hearts of the people. An example of this is the number of daily prayers which was initially fixed at two but was later increased to five. Another example is mut’ah or temporary marriage, was initially permitted but was subsequently prohibited when the Prophet migrated to Madinah. According to the general rule a Quranic nass or a Mutawatir Hadith cannot be abrogated by a weaker Hadith, by ijma’ or by qiyas because they are not of equal authority to the nass. The main argument in support of the rule is that no abrogation of the nusus is possible after the demise of the Prophet. Since nothing weaker than the Quran and Sunnah can abrogate anything in either of these sources, abrogation, to all intents and purposes, came to an end with the death of the Prophet. Ijma’, qiyas and ijtihad, being weaker in comparison to the nusus, cannot abrogate the rules of divine revelation. However, a subsequent ijma’ may abrogate an existing ijma’ which might be founded in considerations of public interest, or maslahah mursalah. Besides that, naskh is not applicable to the ‘perspicuous’ texts of the Quran and Hadith, known as muhkamat. A text of this nature is often worded in such a way as to preclude the possibility of repeal. There are also certain subjects to which abrogation does not apply. Included among these are provisions pertaining to the attributes of God, belief in the principles of the faith and, the doctrine of tawhid and the hereafter. Another subject is the Shariah of Islam itself, which is the last of the revealed laws and can never be abrogated in its entirety. Rational matters and moral truths such as the virtue of doing justice or being good to one’s parents, and vices such as the enormity of telling lies, are not changeable and are therefore not open to abrogation.
2.1 Conditions of Naskh There are some conditions that need to be satisfied to apply abrogation. First, that the text itself has not precluded the possibility of abrogation. An example of this is the Quranic provision concerning persons who are convicted of slanderous accusation (qadhf) that they may never be admitted as witnesses (al-Nur, 24: 4). Similarly the Hadith which proclaims that jihad shall remain valid until the day of resurrection obviously precludes the possibility of abrogating the permanent validity of jihad. Second, the subject is open to the possibility of repeal. Thus the attributes of Allah and the principle of belief, moral virtues and rational truth are not open to abrogation. Third, the abrogating text is of a later origin than the abrogated. Fourth, the two texts are of equal strength in regard to authenticity (thubut) and meaning (dalalah). Thus a textual ruling of the Quran may be abrogated either by another Quranic text of similar strength or by a Mutawatir Hadith, and, according to Hanafis, even by a Mashhur Hadith, as the latter is almost as strong as the Mutawatir. By the same token, one Mutawatir Hadith may abrogate another.
Fifth, the two texts are genuinely in conflict and can in no way be reconciled with one another. Lastly, the two texts are separate and are not related to one another in the sense of one being the condition, qualification or exception to the other. It is because when this is the case, the issue is likely to be one of specification (takhsis) or qualification (taqyid) rather than abrogation.
2.2 Types of Naskh Abrogation may either be explicit (sarih) or implicit (dimni). Explicit abrogation is the abrogating text clearly repeals one ruling and substitutes another in its place. An example for explicit abrogation is the Hadith which provides: ‘I had forbidden you from visiting the graves. Nay, visit them, for they remind you of the hereafter.’ In another Hadith, Prophet is reported to have said, ‘I forbidden you from storing away the sacrificial meat because of the large crowds. You may now store it as you wish.’ The initial order not to store the sacrificial meat during the eid al-adha was given in view of the large number of visitors who attended the festival in Madinah, where the Prophet desired that they should be provided with necessary foodstuffs. The restriction was later removed as the circumstances had changed. In both these examples, the text leaves no doubt as to the nature of the two rulings and all the other relevant facts of abrogation. An example of explicit abrogation in the Quran is the passage in surah al-Baqarah (2: 142-144) with regard to the change in the direction of the qiblah from Jerusalem to the Ka’bah. The relevant text of the Quran as to the direction of the qiblah before and after the new ruling is clear, and leaves no doubt with regard to the facts of abrogation and the nature of the change which was effected thereby. Implicit abrogation is the abrogating text does not clarify all the relevant facts. An example of implicit abrogation is the ruling in surah al-Baqarah (2: 180) which permitted bequests to one’s parents and relatives. This was subsequently abrogated by another text (al-Nisa’, 4: 11) which entitled the legal heirs to specific shares in inheritance. The two rulings are not diametrically opposed to one another and could both be implemented in certain cases. Implicit abrogation has been sub-divided into two types which are total abrogation (naskh kulli) and partial abrogation (naskh juz’i).
Total abrogation is the whole of a particular nass is abrogated by another and a new ruling is enacted to replace it. The example for total abrogation can be found in two Quranic texts concerning the waiting period (‘iddah) of widows, which was initially prescribed to be one year but was subsequently changed too four months and ten days. The first ayah is “Those of you who are about to die and leave widows should bequeath for their widows a year’s maintenance and residence, but if they leave the residence, you are not responsible for what they do of themselves.” (al-Baqarah, 2: 240). The second ayah is “Those of you who die and leave widows, the latter must observe a waiting period of four months and ten days, when they have fulfilled their term, you are not responsible for what they do of themselves.” (al-Baqarah, 2: 234). As can be seen, the provision concerning the waiting period of widows in the first ayah has been totally replaced by the new ruling in the second.
While, partial abrogation is a form of naskh in which one text is only partially abrogated by another and the remaining part continues to be operative. An example of this is the Quranic ayah of qadhf (slanderous accusation) which has been partially repealed by the ayah of imprecation (li’an). The first ayah is “Those who accuse chaste women (of adultery) and then fail to bring four witnesses to prove it shall be flogged with eighty lashes.” (al-Nur, 24: 4). The second ayah is “Those who accuse their spouses and have no witnesses, other than their own words, to support their claim, must take four solemn oaths in the name of Allah and testify that they are telling the truths.” (al-Nur, 24: 6). The first ayah lays down the general rule that anyone, be it a spouse or otherwise, who accuses chaste women of zina must produce four witnesses for proof. The second ayah provides that if the accuser happens to be a spouse who cannot provide four witnesses and yet insists on pursuing the charge of zina, he may take four solemn oaths to take the place of four witnesses. This is to be followed, as the text continues, by a statement in which the husband invokes the curse of God upon himself if he tells a lie. The ruling of the first text has thus been repealed by the second text insofar as it concerns a married couple.
2.2-1 Types of Naskh on the Basis of the Distinction between the Words and the Rulings of the Quran The text of the Quran has two distinctive features, namely, the words of the text and the ruling that it conveys. Reading and reciting the words of the Quran, even its ruling is abrogated, still commands spiritual merit. The words are still regard as part of the Quran. Naskh has been classified into three types on the basis of this distinction. First and the most typical variety of abrogation are referred to as naskh al-hukm means naskh in which the ruling alone is abrogated while the words of the text are retained. The words of the Quranic text concerning bequests to relatives (al-Baqarah, 2: 180) and the one concerning the ‘iddah of widows (al-Baqarah, 2: 240) are the example for this naskh. Both ayahs are still a part of the Quran despite the fact that they have been abrogated. Second, naskh al-tilawah or naskh al-qiraah means abrogation of the words of the text while the ruling is retained. Example for this is a text that was a part of the Quran: اللهمن نكالاً البتة فارجموهما زينا إذا والشيخة الشيخ
“When a married man or a married woman commits zina, their punishment shall be stoning as retribution ordained by God.” This text has been repealed but the hukm is still there. Third is naskh al-hukm wa al-tilawah which means abrogation of both the words and the ruling. In the event where the words of the text, and the law that they convey, are both repealed, then the text in question is of little significance. According to a report which is attributed to the Prophet's widow, `A'ishah, it had been revealed in the Qur'an that ten clear suckings by a child, make marriage unlawful between that child and others who drank the same, woman's milk. Then it was abrogated and substituted by five suckings and it was then that the Messenger of God died. The initial ruling which required ten suckings was read into the text of the Qur'an. The ruling was then repealed and the words in which it was conveyed were also omitted from the text.
2.2-2 Types of Naskh on the Basis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah may be abrogated by themselves or by one another.
In this sense, abrogation can be again divided into the following types: 1) Abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an 2) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Sunnah 3) Abrogation of the Qur’an by Sunnah 4) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an
2.2-2.1(i) Abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an
This type of abrogation has been explained in the previous examples in the explicit and implicit type of abrogation. One of the examples is the ruling in surah al-Baqarah (2: 180) which permitted bequests to one’s parents and relatives. This was subsequently abrogated by another text (al-Nisa’, 4: 11) which entitled the legal heirs to specific shares in inheritance.
2.2-2.1(ii) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Sunnah
This type of abrogation too has been illustrated by the two Hadith which has been explained under the rubric of explicit abrogation. Which is a Hadith, Prophet is reported to have said, ‘I forbidden you from storing away the sacrificial meat because of the large crowds. You may now store it as you wish.’ The initial order not to store the sacrificial meat during the eid al-adha was given in view of the large number of visitors who attended the festival in Madinah, where the Prophet desired that they should be provided with necessary foodstuffs. The restriction was later removed as the circumstances had changed.
2.2-2.1(iii) Abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunnah
Imams Shafi’I and ibn Taymiyyah are of the opinion that Sunnah does not abrogate Qur’an. On the other hand, there are few scholars who believe that the Sunnah abrogated the qur’an. Muhammad bin Nasr al-Marwazi is one of them. They use the following two exmples; i. The Ayah of bequest in Surah al-Baqarah (2:180) “Prescribed for you when death approaches (any) of you if he leaves wealth (is he should make) a bequest for the parent and near relatives according to what is acceptable – a duty upon the righteous.
But the Prophet pbuh said: “There shall be no bequest to an heir”. This verse was already abrogated by the verses of inheritance in Surah al-Nisaa. So this is not a good example of Sunnah solely abrogating the Qur’an. ii. The ayah in Surah al-Nisaa (4:15) “Those who commit unlawful sexual intercourse of your women – bring against them four (witnesses) from among you. And if they testify, confine the guilty women to houses until death takes them or Allah ordains for them (another) way.
But the Prophet pbuh said: “Allah has ordained for them a way, stoning for adulterers, and lashing for fornicators.”
2.2-2.1(iv) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an The abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an occurs in the initial ruling of the Prophet which determined the qiblah in the direction of Jerusalem. When the prophet migrated to Madinah, he ordered the believers to pray in the direction of the Jerusalem. This was later repealed by the Qur’an in Surah al-Baqarah (2:144) “We have certainly seen the turning of your face, (O Muhammad), toward the heaven, and We will surely turn you a qiblah with which you will be pleased. So turn your face forward al-Masjid al-Haram. And wherever you (believers) are, turn your faces toward it (in prayer)…..” The Qur’an in other words, abrogated a practice that was initially authorized by the Sunnah.
2.2-2.2 View from Shafi’i on abrogation of the Qur’an by Sunnah or vice versa
Imam Shafi’i, the majority of the Mu’tazilah, and Ahmad b. Hanbali have overruled the validity of the remaining types of abrogation (Qur’an by Sunnah and Sunnah by Qur’an). According to al-Shafi’i a number of Qur’anic Ayah indicate that the Qur’an can only be abrogated by the Qur’an itself. Surah al-Nahl (16:101) “And when We substitute one ayah in pace of another ayah (ayatan makana ayatin), and God knows best what He reveals.” The evidence of the Qur’an cannot be abrogated by Sunnah is by the occurring of the word ayah twice in the verse.
Naskh in Qur’an is wholly an internal phenomenon, and there is no evidence in the Qur’an to suggest that it can be abrogated by the Sunnah. Surah Yunus (10:15) “And when Our verses are recited to them as clear evidences, those who do not expect the meeting with Us say, ‘Bring us a Qur’an other than this or change it.’ Say, (o Muhammad), ‘It is no for me to change it on my own accord. I only follow what is revealed to me. Indeed I fear, if I should disobey my Lord, the punishment of a tremendous Day.’” It is stated in the Qur’an, that the Qur’an asks the Prophet to declare he himself cannot change any art of the Qur’an.
The Sunnah even the Mutawatir Sunnah cannot abrogate the Qur’an. Only Sunnah can abrogate Sunnah: Mutawatir with Mutawatir, Ahad with Ahad. Mutawatir can abrogate Ahad but there is some disagreement on whether Ahad can abrogate Mutawatir. According to the preferred view, ahich is also held by al-Shafi’ie, the Ahad can abrogate the Mutawatir. To illustrate this is through the changing of qiblah from Jerusalem to al-Masjid al-Haram. The fact that the ruling of qiblah at Jerusalem is a Mutawatir Sunnah but the congregation of Companions accepted the solitary report as the abrogator of Mutawatir.
Al-Shafi’ie elaborates further. If there existed any occasion for the Sunnah to abrogate the Qur’an or vice versa, the Prophet pbuh would be the first to say so. If any Sunnah is mean to be abrogated, the Prophet himself would do it by virtue of another Sunnah, hence there is no case for the abrogation of Sunnah by the Qur’an.
2.3 Abrogation and Specification (Takhsis) Naskh and Takhsis resemble one another in that both tend to qualify or specify an original ruling in some way.
There are several basic differences between naskh and takhsis. Basic characteristics of naskh are; 1) It is necessary that the two rulings are genuinely in conflict and that they could not coexist, 2) naskh can occur in respect of either a general or a specific ruling, 3) naskh is basically confined the Qur’an and Sunnah and could only be effected by the explicit rulings of divine revelation, 4) naskh can only occur by shar’, 5) naskh does not operative with regard to speculative ruling, 6) it is essential that the abrogator be later in time than the ruling which it seeks to abrogate, 7) naskh does not apply to factual reports of events (akhbar).
Basic characteristic for takhsis are; 1) there are no real conflicts in takhsis, the two texts, namely he general text and the specifying text, in effect complement one another, 2) takhsis occurs in respect of a general ruling only, 3) takhsis cold occur by means of rationality and circumstantial evidence, 4) takhsis can occur by rationality (‘aql), custom (‘urf) and other rational proofs, 5) takhsis is possible by means of speculative evidence such as qiyas and solitary hadith, 6) Hanafis maintain that the Amm and he Khass must in fact be either simultaneous or parallel in time but according to the majority, the Amm and the Khass can precede or succeed one another, 7) takhsis could occur in regard to factual report.
2.4 Abrogation and Addition (Tazid)
Naskh is whether a subsequent addition (tazid) to an exising text, which may be at variance with it, amounts to it abrogation. When new materials are added to an existing law, the added materials may fall into one of the following two categories: i. Independent addition of the original text but relate to the same subject.
For example is adding a sixth solah the existing five does this amount to the abrogation of the original ruling? The majority of ulema said it does not amount to abrogation but merely adds a new element. ii. Not independent addition of the original text in that it may be dealing with something that constitutes an integral part of the original ruling.
For example is adding an additional sajdah to one or more of the existing obligatory prayers. The majority have held the view that it does not amount to abrogation of the existing law.
CONCLUSION
In a nutshell, knowing how to differentiate between the commands and prohibitions in the Qur’an helps us to identify the rulings of the Qur’an. As we explained in the section of commands, commands can mean different things and not simply just obligatory order. It could be a mere permissibility, recommendation, threat, supplication, and contempt regarding to the indications provided by the context and circumstances. Prohibition also convey a variety of meanings such as illegality, mere reprehension, guidance, reprimand and supplication. Some have held that illegality is the primary meaning of nahy while others consider reprehension to be the original meaning of nahy. According to yet another view, nahy is a homonym in respect of both.
By deep learning and reading regarding on the subject of Naskh also helps us a lot in pursuing our life as slaves of Allah and as Khalifah of Allah in this Dunya. We also learn about the types of abrogation and khilaf or disagreement among the scholars on that. Now we know that abrogation can be classified into four types of abrogation; 1) abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an, 2) abrogation of th Sunnah by the Sunnah, 3) abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunnah and 4) abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an. There are few arguments on the types of abrogation on the basis of abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunnah and vice versa. Imams al-Shafi’ie do not accept that types of abrogation because they believe only the Qur’an can abrogate the Qur’an and the Sunnah can abrogate the Sunnah.
Lastly, by having all these knowledge we hope that we can increase our understanding on our revelations which are Qur’an and Sunnah. So that, at least while we are reading the Qur’an or Sunnah and we come across the verses regarding the commands, prohibitions and naskh we can easily understand and ponder upon it. InsyaAllah.
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