Challenger Report
TABLE OF CONTENT
Executive Summary…………………………………….. 3
Introduction……………………………………………… 4
Mechanical Problems……………………………………. 4
Administrative or Management Problems………………. 5
Weather conditions and delays…………………………... 5
Communication Problem ……………………………….. 6
Organizational Pressure…………………………………. 6
Using of reusable part…………………………………… 7
Recommendations………………………………………. 8
Conclusion………………………………………………. 9
Bibliography…………………………………………….. 10
Executive Summary
This Report attempts to unfold the management flaws and terrible decision making that marked the morning of the 28th of January 1986 as a terribly tragic disaster. What it sadder is that this disaster was mainly due to inhumane practices conducted by the NASA and the management bodies of companies associated with this project than natural reasons. The whistleblowing led to the loss of billions of dollars and more importantly loss of 7 innocent lives.
The space shuttle was propelled by the two attached Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) and an external fuel tank. The SRBs were joined to the External Tank. aOnce the SRBs ignited, hot gases heated the rubber O rings and they eroded to seal the joints. SRB joint design had a serious flaw in it and the engineers knew it meant a catastrophe and yet they passed the design for flight. The O rings worked only down to a temperature limit of 12 ̊ C, but the morning of the launch saw temperatures as low as -1 ̊ C which was much lower than the prescribed limit. Many engineers voiced to postpone the launch and wait for the weather to be stable but the management turned down these arguments and the challenger was cleared to launch at 11:38 A.M.
As the shuttle took off, the right SRB emitted puffs of smoke which meant that a gap was punched into the SRB and hot gases were escaping it. The O ring was supposed to seal the gap off but it was frozen so it failed and the secondary O ring was displaced because the casing of the SRB bent away. At about 60 seconds from take off, the
Executive Summary…………………………………….. 3
Introduction……………………………………………… 4
Mechanical Problems……………………………………. 4
Administrative or Management Problems………………. 5
Weather conditions and delays…………………………... 5
Communication Problem ……………………………….. 6
Organizational Pressure…………………………………. 6
Using of reusable part…………………………………… 7
Recommendations………………………………………. 8
Conclusion………………………………………………. 9
Bibliography…………………………………………….. 10
Executive Summary
This Report attempts to unfold the management flaws and terrible decision making that marked the morning of the 28th of January 1986 as a terribly tragic disaster. What it sadder is that this disaster was mainly due to inhumane practices conducted by the NASA and the management bodies of companies associated with this project than natural reasons. The whistleblowing led to the loss of billions of dollars and more importantly loss of 7 innocent lives.
The space shuttle was propelled by the two attached Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) and an external fuel tank. The SRBs were joined to the External Tank. aOnce the SRBs ignited, hot gases heated the rubber O rings and they eroded to seal the joints. SRB joint design had a serious flaw in it and the engineers knew it meant a catastrophe and yet they passed the design for flight. The O rings worked only down to a temperature limit of 12 ̊ C, but the morning of the launch saw temperatures as low as -1 ̊ C which was much lower than the prescribed limit. Many engineers voiced to postpone the launch and wait for the weather to be stable but the management turned down these arguments and the challenger was cleared to launch at 11:38 A.M.
As the shuttle took off, the right SRB emitted puffs of smoke which meant that a gap was punched into the SRB and hot gases were escaping it. The O ring was supposed to seal the gap off but it was frozen so it failed and the secondary O ring was displaced because the casing of the SRB bent away. At about 60 seconds from take off, the
Bibliography: NASA Spacelink Challenger Press Release, http://history.nasa.gov/sts51lpresskit.pdf Launius, Roger D., "Toward an Understanding of the Space Shuttle: A Historiographical Essay". Air Power History, Winter 1992, vil. 39, no. 4. Jarman A. and Kouzmin, A., "Decision pathways from crisis. A contingency-theory simulation heuristic for the Challenger Shuttle disaster", Contemporary Crises, December 01, 1990, vol. 14, no. 4. Kramer, Ronald C. and Jaska, James A., "The Space Shuttle Disaster: Ethical Issues in Organizational Decision Making", Western Michigan University, April 1987, 39 pgs Groupthink videorecording written by and produced by Kirby Timmons; produced by Melanie Mihal, Carlsbad, Calif., CRM Films, c 1991 25min http://studenthome.nku.edu/~riderj/challenger%20report.pdf