Can Folk Psychology Be Defense From Paul Churchland's Criticisms Of It?
Can Folk Psychology be defended from Paul Churchland’s criticisms of it?
The nature and status of Folk Psychology (FP) in philosophy circles is controversial. In this essay I shall begin by briefly defining what folk psychology is. Followed by an outline on eliminativism where some of the controversy lies. My main focus will be on Paul Churchland’s views and his arguments against FP, as this will enable me to facilitate an assessment of his criticisms. Subsequent to that I will search for my own view in the defence of FP in the light of its proponents such as Horgan and Woodward or Dennet. By doing this I will then be able to gauge the plausibility of Churchland’s criticisms of FP.
Folk psychology (FP) is the name given by eliminativists …show more content…
Churchlands criticism dovetails with the eliminativists claim that FP is a false theory “Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes” (‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’ Paul M Churchland Reading 6, Wilkinson, Mind and Bodies p 194). He claims that FP is not only a radically false theory but also an empirical theory by pointing out its similarities with other theories. He does this by stating how our “familiar mentalistic vocabulary” is to be understood like other semantic terms. In that the terms used need or in fact do operate by a network of formulable laws like any other theory. An example of how Churchland employs FP as a theory is found in his hypothesis argument on understanding the minds of others. He says that we can use FP as a hypothetical framework which ‘works in the main and is reasonable’ to employ (Wilkinson, Mind and Bodies …show more content…
FP for me is a skill nurtured by the past and in my opinion elegantly defended by Horgan and Woodward arguments not only for its continual relevance but its reliance upon contemporary culture implying a growth in its lexicon. Finally Dennett’s utter dismissal of the eliminativists views that FP left a great deal unexplained. And it is by Dennett’s assertion that we need FP to give us a language of reason for both our personal and social behaviours, a real boon to Folk
The nature and status of Folk Psychology (FP) in philosophy circles is controversial. In this essay I shall begin by briefly defining what folk psychology is. Followed by an outline on eliminativism where some of the controversy lies. My main focus will be on Paul Churchland’s views and his arguments against FP, as this will enable me to facilitate an assessment of his criticisms. Subsequent to that I will search for my own view in the defence of FP in the light of its proponents such as Horgan and Woodward or Dennet. By doing this I will then be able to gauge the plausibility of Churchland’s criticisms of FP.
Folk psychology (FP) is the name given by eliminativists …show more content…
Churchlands criticism dovetails with the eliminativists claim that FP is a false theory “Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes” (‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’ Paul M Churchland Reading 6, Wilkinson, Mind and Bodies p 194). He claims that FP is not only a radically false theory but also an empirical theory by pointing out its similarities with other theories. He does this by stating how our “familiar mentalistic vocabulary” is to be understood like other semantic terms. In that the terms used need or in fact do operate by a network of formulable laws like any other theory. An example of how Churchland employs FP as a theory is found in his hypothesis argument on understanding the minds of others. He says that we can use FP as a hypothetical framework which ‘works in the main and is reasonable’ to employ (Wilkinson, Mind and Bodies …show more content…
FP for me is a skill nurtured by the past and in my opinion elegantly defended by Horgan and Woodward arguments not only for its continual relevance but its reliance upon contemporary culture implying a growth in its lexicon. Finally Dennett’s utter dismissal of the eliminativists views that FP left a great deal unexplained. And it is by Dennett’s assertion that we need FP to give us a language of reason for both our personal and social behaviours, a real boon to Folk