Prepared By: Noura B. Younes
Supervised By: Dr. Khalid Al Ali
Course
: BIOM550: Medical Lab. Laws & Ethics L01
Abstract
Allocation of scarce medical resources and access to medical care are major bioethical concerns in today’s society. Allocation refers to the distribution of available health –care resources. Access refers to whether people who should have health care are able to receive that care. Winners in the arena of access to health care are most likely healthy and well- insured individuals with good corporate coverage. Losers in this dilemma are often children, persons of color, and those who are poor and powerless. Allocation decision deal with how much shall be expended for medical …show more content…
To circumvent this result, some misleadingly claim that sick people with a small but clear chance of benefit do not have a medical need.13 Sick recipients’ prognoses are wrongly assumed to be normal, even though many interventions—such as liver transplants—are less effective for the sickest
people.34 If the failure to take account of prognosis were its only problem, sickest-first allocation would merely be insufficient. However, it myopically bases allocation on how sick someone is at the current time—a morally arbitrary factor in genuine scarcity.16 Preferential allocation of a scarce liver to an acutely ill person unjustly ignores a currently healthier person with progressive liver disease, who might be worse off when he or she later suffers liver failure.8,22 Favoring those who are currently sickest seems to assume that resource scarcity is temporary: that we can save the person who is now sickest and then save the progressively ill …show more content…
Prognosis or life-years
Rather than saving the most lives, prognosis allocation aims to save the most life-years. This strategy has been used in disaster triage and penicillin allocation, and motivates the exclusion of people with poor prognoses from organ transplantation waiting lists.7,21,46 Maximizing life-years has intuitive appeal. Living more years is valuable, so saving more years also seems valuable.8 However, even supporters of prognosisbased allocation acknowledge its inability to consider distribution as well as quantity.46 Making a well-off person slightly better off rather than slightly improving a worse-off person’s life would be unjust; likewise, why give an extra year to a person who has lived for many when it could be given to someone who would otherwise die having had few?8,47 Similarly, giving a few life-years to many differs from giving many lifeyears to a few.8 As with the principle of saving the most lives, prognosis is undeniably relevant but insufficient alone.
D. Promoting and rewarding social