Billie
Why did the United States under-estimate the difficulties in bringing order and development to Afghanistan and Iraq?
At the start of the twenty-first century, the United States engaged in two military interventions, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. What were supposed to be short, sharp wars dragged the US into the long and failed missions of reconstructing the Afghan and Iraqi states. Today, 97% of Afghanistan’s licit GDP is derived from foreign aid and efforts to guarantee stability are still being undermined by the Taliban-led insurgency. In fragile, conflict-driven Iraq, the population constantly struggles with ongoing water shortages, electricity scarcity and a broken economy. Given the immense costs of the two invasions, it is paramount to ask how it all could go so wrong. Focusing on the period of the Bush administration, this essay seeks to answer why the US under-estimated the difficulties in bringing order and development to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Dr Toby Dodge has identified several faulty assumptions that underpin military intervention, which explain why the US failed to bring order and development to Afghanistan and Iraq. One of these assumptions is that military force can achieve political ends, something which it did not do in Afghanistan. Henry A. Crumpton, a former CIA officer who was largely involved in ousting the Taliban, confessed that winning the war in Afghanistan required the US to “get in at a local level and respond to people’s needs so that enemy forces cannot come in and take advantage.” In ignoring this fundamental aspect of counterinsurgency, efforts succeeded only in keeping urgent problems at bay while hoping that the situation in Afghanistan would improve on its own. This brings us to a second faulty assumption underpinning military intervention: the overestimation of the stability, competence and popularity of the intervener’s local allies.
What a fragile state on the verge of collapse
At the start of the twenty-first century, the United States engaged in two military interventions, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. What were supposed to be short, sharp wars dragged the US into the long and failed missions of reconstructing the Afghan and Iraqi states. Today, 97% of Afghanistan’s licit GDP is derived from foreign aid and efforts to guarantee stability are still being undermined by the Taliban-led insurgency. In fragile, conflict-driven Iraq, the population constantly struggles with ongoing water shortages, electricity scarcity and a broken economy. Given the immense costs of the two invasions, it is paramount to ask how it all could go so wrong. Focusing on the period of the Bush administration, this essay seeks to answer why the US under-estimated the difficulties in bringing order and development to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Dr Toby Dodge has identified several faulty assumptions that underpin military intervention, which explain why the US failed to bring order and development to Afghanistan and Iraq. One of these assumptions is that military force can achieve political ends, something which it did not do in Afghanistan. Henry A. Crumpton, a former CIA officer who was largely involved in ousting the Taliban, confessed that winning the war in Afghanistan required the US to “get in at a local level and respond to people’s needs so that enemy forces cannot come in and take advantage.” In ignoring this fundamental aspect of counterinsurgency, efforts succeeded only in keeping urgent problems at bay while hoping that the situation in Afghanistan would improve on its own. This brings us to a second faulty assumption underpinning military intervention: the overestimation of the stability, competence and popularity of the intervener’s local allies.
What a fragile state on the verge of collapse
Bibliography: Barfield, Thomas (2010), Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States Carlstrom, Gregg, (June 2011) “’Economic depression’ looms in Afghanistan” Al Jazeera, retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2011/06/20116812933228775.html Dodge, Toby, (March, 2013) “Military intervention: Afghanistan and Iraq” Dodge, Toby, (2010), “The Ideological Roots of Failure: The Application of Kinetic Neo-Liberalism to Iraq.” International Affairs 86(6), pp Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, United Kingdom Holmes, Stephen, (2007), “The Matador’s Cape: America’s Reckless Response to Terror” Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom Oweiss, Ibrahim M., (2007) “Why did the United States fail in its War on Iraq?” Rid, Thomas, (2010), “Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrines, operations and challenges” Taylor and Francis, United Kingdom Rohde, D. and Sanger, D. E. (2007). “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad.” New York Times, 12 August 2007, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12afghan.html [ 1 ]. Carlstrom, Gregg, (June 2011) “’Economic depression’ looms in Afghanistan”, Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2011/06/20116812933228775.html [ 2 ] [ 4 ]. Dodge, Toby, (March, 2013) “Military intervention: Afghanistan and Iraq” Lecture conducted from the London School of Economics and Political Science [ 6 ]. Rohde, D. and Sanger, D. E. (2007). “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad.” New York Times, 12 August 2007, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12afghan.html, p [ 9 ]. Barfield, Thomas, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 2010, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, p. 304 [ 10 ] [ 23 ]. Rid, Thomas, (2010), “Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrines, operations and challenges”, Taylor and Francis, United Kingdom, p. 199 [ 24 ] [ 25 ]. Dodge, p. 1276 [ 26 ] [ 27 ]. Ibid, p. 1280 [ 28 ] [ 29 ]. Ibid, p. 1282 [ 30 ] [ 31 ]. Ibid, p. 1283 [ 32 ] [ 33 ]. Dodge, p. 1284 [ 34 ]